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JUSTICES WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR. AND
THURGOOD MARSHALL ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY,
MORALITY, DETERRENT EFFECT, AND
INTERPRETATION BY THE COURT
ALAN I. BIGEL*

Of the 106 individuals who have served on the United States
Supreme Court up to the end of the October, 1992 Term, only
two - Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall
were categorically opposed to capital punishment for the
duration of their tenure. Brennan, who announced his retirement on July 20, 1990, served on the Court thirty-four years, a
tenure equaled by just four other members,' and exceeded only
by Justice William 0. Douglas (1939-1975). Marshall, who
retired immediately after the end of the October, 1990 Term,
and died on January 24, 1993, at the age of eighty-four, served for
twenty-four years. Both men were widely praised
for their contri2
butions to American legal jurisprudence.
*
B.A. 1976, Brooklyn College; M.A. 1978, and Ph.D. 1984, The New
School for Social Research. Professor of Political Science, University of
Wisconsin-La Crosse. I wish to thank Tammy Hass for her patience and
diligence in typing this material. I also wish to express profound gratitude to
Justice Brennan for his willingness to read this article.
1. Chief Justice John Marshall (1801-1835) and Justices Stephen J. Field
(1863-1897), John Marshall Harlan (1877-1911), and Hugo L. Black (19371971) each were on the Court thirty-four years.
2. Brennan's stature had been acknowledged throughout his tenure. In
1966, ChiefJustice Earl Warren stated that, "[i ] n the entire history of the Court,
it would be difficult to name another Justice who wrote more important
opinions in his first ten years than [Brennan]." Earl Warren, Mr. Justice
Brennan, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1966). In 1974, Leonard W. Levy wrote that
Brennan "[w]ith each passing year [ ] has grown in stature and attainments."
LEONARD W. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAw: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

39 (1974). Immediately following his retirement, Brennan was characterized
as one of the most influential members ever to have served on the Court. On
July 23, 1990, three days after Brennan announced his decision to step down,
several guests on the PBS broadcast of MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour assessed his
impact. Though he strongly disagreed with Brennan's judicial philosophy,
Robert Bork, unsuccessfully nominated to the Court by President Ronald
Reagan in 1987, stated that Brennan was "the most powerful justice in this
century on the Supreme Court." Nina Totenberg, law correspondent for
National Public Radio, declared that there is not "an area of the law in which
there is not a landmark opinion written by William Brennan." Also appearing
on the aforementioned telecast, former Representative Barbara Jordan labeled
Brennan "an institution within an institution." MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour (PBS

14

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

While it remains for history to definitively record their most
significant contributions,' the jurisprudence of Brennan and
Marshall .on capital punishment has conspicuously carved a
unique niche. Their opposition to the death penalty was fundamentally rooted in their conception of judicial power and the
role of the Court in American society. This article will examine
their opinions on the death penalty and will seek to understand
whether a range of issues connected with its infliction can be reconciled with constitutional protections. Beyond the wording of
applicable provisions of the Constitution, Brennan and Marshall's positions also touched on a number of social and political
questions invariably raised in consideration of capital punishtelevision broadcast, July 23, 1990), quoted in W. WAT

HOPKINS, MR. JUSTICE
New York University School of
Law Professor Norman Dorsen, reflecting on Brennan's decision to retire,
noted that "a titanic figure had passed from the public scene." Norman
Dorsen, A Tribute to Justice WilliamJ Brennan,Jr. (pt. 4), 104 HAv. L. REv. 15
(1990).
Unlike Brennan, whose opinions were admired as cogent and carefully
crafted pieces of intellectual scholarship, Marshall was paid tribute for his
symbolic role in dramatizing lingering abridgment of civil rights and individual
liberty. Praise for Marshall as a formidable figure on the Court was widespread.
Retired Justice Brennan declared that Marshall "is one of our century's legal
giants." WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall (pt. 1), 105
HARv. L. REv. 23 (1991). William Coleman, Jr., Chairman of the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, stated that Marshall "is among the very few
Americans who have made a significant difference in the quality of life of our
nation." William T. Coleman, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall (pt. 3),
105 HARv. L. REv. 42 (1991). Also reflecting on Marshall's significance at the
time of his retirement, Federal DistrictJudge Robert L. Carter for the Southern
District of New York wrote:
Marshall's steadfast belief in the Constitution as the pillar of
democratic and egalitarian principles and in law generally as the
protector of the poor and the powerless - and his efforts toward the
realization of these ideals - reminds the American people as a whole
of their vast potential for social progress.
Robert L. Carter, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall (pt. 2), 105 HARv. L. REv.
33, 42 (1991).
3. Both Brennan and Marshall had many years of service on the Court;
however, while longevity is helpful in enabling a justice to build a reputation,
this alone does not - as demonstrated in the case ofJustice Benjamin Cardozo,
who served but six years (1932-1938) and is generally regarded as among the
"great" members in the history of the Court - ensure high stature. Depth of
intellectual reasoning, philosophical consistency, number of occasions in which
a dissenting position is ultimately adopted by the majority, total number of
opinions written, and perception by colleagues as an obstructionist or
consensus builder when seeking to forge a majority coalition, among other
considerations, affect historical assessments of a justice. The passage of time
will enable scholars to more fully perceive the contributions of Brennan and
Marshall in these and other areas.

BRENNAN AND FREEDOM OF ExPREssION 3 (1991).
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ment. Is the death penalty a statistically demonstrable deterrent
to the commission of murder? Is capital punishment more cost
effective than life imprisonment without parole? Is it morally justifiable for government to execute individuals? Has the death
penalty been arbitrarily imposed? To what extent should public
opinion affect a state's willingness to legalize capital punishment,
and should the Court challenge this preference? The morality,
legality, and practicality of capital punishment permeated Brennan and Marshall's opinions, and their impact on public discourse will also be addressed.
I.

WILLIAM

J.

BRENNAN,JR.,

AND THURGOOD MARSHALL JOIN

THE COURT

A.

Brennan's Appointment and ConstitutionalJurisprudence

1. Brennan's Nomination and Confirmation Hearings
William J. Brennan, Jr., was born on April 25, 1906, in Newark, New Jersey.4 The second of eight children, Brennan characterized his childhood as "comfortable." 5 His father, who came to
the United States from Ireland in 1893, shoveled coal and
became active in local labor unions; he later became City Commissioner and Newark's Director of Public Safety.6 Brennan
enormously admired his father's work ethic and integrity, and
declared that no individual has had a greater influence on him.7
Brennan attended public school in Newark, and enrolled in
the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, where he
earned a bachelor's degree, cum laude, in economics in 1928.8
Three years later, he graduated from Harvard Law School
"among the top 10 students in the class." 9 Brennan joined the
Newark firm of Pitney, Hardin & Skinner, where he specialized
4. Tim O'Brien, William J Brennan, Jr., in EIGHT MEN AND A LADYPROFILES OF THEJUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 52 (National Press 1990). For
additional biographical material on Brennan, see STEPHEN J. FRIEDMAN,
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.: AN AFFAIR WITH FREEDOM (1967); Stanley H.
Friedelbaum, Justice Williamj Brennan,Jr.: Policy-Makingin theJudicial Thicket, in
THE BURGER COURT: POLrrIcAL ANDJUDICIAL PROFILES 101-05 (Charles Lamb &
Stephen Halpern eds., 1991);Jeffrey T. Leeds, A Life on the Court: A Conversation
with Justice Brennan, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, October 5, 1986, at 24-27;
HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 4-6.

5.

O'Brien, supra note 4, at 53.

6.

HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 4-5; Friedelbaum, supra note 4, at 101.

7.
8.

O'Brien, supra note 4, at 53.
Linda Greenhouse, Vacancy on the Court; Brennan, Key Liberal, Quits

Supreme Court; Battle for Seat Likely, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1990, at 7A, col. 4-5.
9. Id.

16
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in labor relations.' ° In 1949, Brennan left the firm upon
accepting an appointment from Governor Alfred Driscoll to the
NewJersey Superior Court." Brennan was subsequently elevated
to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, and, in 1952, he
became an Associate Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court. 2
Frustrated with the perceived inability of state courts to
expeditiously process cases, Brennan became a prominent advocate of trial reform. His proposals were supported by his colleague, nationally renowned New Jersey Chief Justice Arthur T.
Vanderbilt, who asked Brennan to deliver a speech on his behalf
to a gathering ofjudges and court administrators in Washington,
DC, in 1956.1' United States Attorney General Herbert Brownell, impressed with Brennan's comments, recommended him to
President Eisenhower as a possible replacement for Justice Sherman Minton, who announced his intention to retire for health
reasons at the end of the October, 1955 Term.14 On September
28, 1956, Brownell telephoned Brennan to arrange a meeting at
the White House the next day, when Brennan learned that he
was going to be chosen as the next Justice. 5 Brennan, given a
recess appointment, joined the Court on October 15, 1956, and
the Senate Judiciary Committee held confirmation hearings on
February 26 and 27, 1957.16
The questions presented to Brennan focused on three areas.
On the first day, SenatorJoseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, who was
not a member of the Committee but was granted permission to
10.
11.
12.

O'Brien, supra note 4, at 53.
HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 5.
Id.

13.
14.

Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.

15. Accounts differ as to why Eisenhower chose Brennan to replace
Minton. Clearly, ChiefJustice Vanderbilt's praise of Brennan to Eisenhower as
"possess[ing] the finest judicial mind that he had known" enormously

influenced the President, as revealed in his memoirs. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS: MANDATE FOR CH-ANGE, 1953-1956, at 226-27 (1963),
quoted in HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 262 (1985). However, at the time of the
appointment it was alleged that Vanderbilt himself expressed displeasure with
Brennan's selection, and that he was Eisenhower's first choice. O'Brien, supra
note 4, at 53-55. See also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND
His SUPREME COURT A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 205 (1983).
Political
considerations likely played a major role in Brennan's selection. "The
Eisenhower campaign," said one scholar, "apparently believed that a Roman
Catholic Democrat from the Northeast would help win some extra support for

the president's reelection bid." HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 6. See also ABRAHAM,
supra at 263.
16. N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1957, at 15, col 3-6; N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1957, at
16, col 3-4.
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appear, sought to elicit Brennan's position on the allegedly subversive objectives of Communist Party activities in the United
States, and congressional efforts to investigate this subject.17
Brennan agreed that there is no "more vital function of the Congress than the investigatory function of its committees," and
stated that he "can't think of a more important or vital objective
of any committee investigation than that of rooting out subversives in Government;""8 however, he refused to speculate on the
goals of the Communist Party, claiming that this would be inappropriate given the number of cases touching on this subject
which are pending before the Court. 9
Brennan was also questioned about his belief on separation
of church and state. Responding to Senator Joseph C.
O'Mahoney of Wyoming, also a Roman Catholic, as to whether
he felt bound to follow the edicts of the Pope in questions concerning freedom of religion, Brennan emphasized that the oath
he took for every public office he has held to support the Constitution shall be "unreservedly"2" paramount over any other
obligation.
Concerning his judicial philosophy, Brennan refrained from
expressing support for a specific mode of constitutional interpre17. During the 1940s and 1950s, the House Un-American Activities
Committee and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and Permanent
Investigations Subcommittee had been conducting investigations into alleged
Communist Party activities in the United States. This subject, investigated
intermittently by Congress since the end of World War I, had aroused intense
controversy and often acrimonious debates on the proper exercise of
congressional inquisitorial power at the time of Brennan's nomination. See
generally CARL BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS: A STUDY OF THE PROSECUTIONS
INITIATED BY THE HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTMTIES COMMITrEE (2d ed. 1974);
RONALD GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER
COMMITTEE:

(1963);

WALTER GOODMAN, THE

THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-

AMERICAN ACrwVTIES

(1968).

18. Nomination of William J. Brennan,Jr., to the United States Supreme Court:
Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957
(hereinafter Hearings.). For an account of Senator McCarthy's questions, see
Hopkins, supra note 2, at 9-11.
19. For a discussion of cases concerning alleged Communist Party
activities which had been on the Court's docket at the time of Brennan's

appointment, see

WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE STUDY
IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS (1962). For a comprehensive analysis of

the entire array of cases coming to the Court on congressional investigations
into the associations and conduct of alleged Communist Party members, see
Alan I. Bigel, The First Amendment and National Security: The Court Responds to
Governmental Harassmentof Alleged Communist Sympathizers, 19 OHIO N.U. L. REv.
885 (1993).
20. Brennan Stands on Judicial Oath, supra note 16, at 16.
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tation.2 ' Asked by Senator James 0. Eastland of Mississippi
whether the meaning of the Constitution was fixed or adaptable
to evolving contemporary needs, Brennan initially responded
that this would depend on the circumstances of a case. 22 Pressed
by Eastland to be more specific, Brennan declared that "it is part
of the judicial process to consult a lot of things which may bear
upon the particular case."2 3 Brennan did not elaborate; he
added that he has always endeavored "to apply the law whether
the applicable law is constitutional, legislative, or common law or
otherwise to the facts of the given case that is before us." 24 He
seemed to eschew a mechanical interpretation of the Constitution, and agreed with statements of Senator ArthurJ. Watkins of
Utah that it would be preposterous to rigidly follow precedent
since fallible human beings may not share the same views as to
what its provisions mean. 25 The members of the Judiciary Committee did not press Brennan for his views on the Court's potential for shaping social policy and its role within the framework of
separation of powers and federalism.
On March 19, 1957, the Judiciary Committee voted 11-0
(four members were not present) to recommend confirmation,
which was immediately endorsed by a voice vote of the full Senate later that day. 26 Brennan took his oath on March 22, 1957.
2.

Brennan's Judicial Philosophy

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of literature
examining various modes of constitutional interpretation. 27 Is
21.

Hearings,supra note 18, at 34.

22.

Id. at 36, quoted in HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 1.

23. Hearings,supra note 18, at 38, quoted in HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 1.
24. Hearings,supra note 18, at 38, quoted in HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 8.
25. Hearings,supra note 18, at 39, quoted in HOPKINS, supra note 2, at 8.
26. Senate Votes 11 to 0 for Brennan, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 1957, at 23;
Senate Confirms 2 for High Court, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 1957, at 38.
27. See, e.g., JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (1984); HADLEY ARKES, BEYOND THE CONSTrruTION (1990); SOTIRIOS
BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1986); PHILIP BOBBITT,

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); SUPREME
COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds.,
1982); GARY L. McDOWELL, CURBING THE COURTS: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY MAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982); LAURENCE H. TRIBE &
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991); HARRY H.
WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (1990); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTMSM:

BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR PRECARIOUS SECURITY? (1991).
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the Constitution to be read as an enumeration of explicit commands and prohibitions, or as a body of general guidelines to be
reexamined by each generation? If the meaning of the Constitution changes over time, what role should the Court play in assessing the applicability of provisions to contemporary priorities? Is
the Court bound to interpret the Constitution as it was construed
by the founding fathers, or is it appropriate for the justices to
seek to affect the direction of social policy? Addressing these
questions, Thomas Grey asked whether justices must "confine
themselves" to "norms derived from the written Constitution" or
whether they "may ...

also enforce principles of liberty and jus-

tice when the normative content of those principles is not to be
found within the four corners of our founding document?"2"
Both positions present formidable challenges.
Ajustice who endeavors to adjudicate cases based on "norms
derived from the written Constitution"29 may seek to decipher
and apply the original intention of a provision or adopt a literal
interpretation of the text.3 ° Both of these approaches present
obstacles. The foremost difficulty with a jurisprudence relying
on original intention is definitional. Does "original intention"
refer to the Philadelphia debates in 1787, historical events ante28. Thomas Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REv.
Two other influential scholars presented comparable
703, 703 (1975).

depictions of judicial power. John Hart Ely identified two types of judicial
review: "Interpretivism," where justices "deciding constitutional issues . . .
confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the
written Constitution," and "noninterpretivism," the "contrary view that courts
should go beyond that set of references and enforce norms that cannot be
discovered within the four corners of the document." ELY, supra note 27, at 1.
Similarly, MichaelJ. Perry discussed two perspectives: "[I]nterpretive," where a
justice" ascertains the constitutionality of a given policy choice by reference to
one of the value judgments of which the Constitution consists - that is, by
reference to a value judgment embodied, though not necessarily explicitly,
either in some particular provisions of the text of the Constitution or in the
overall structure of government ordained by the Constitution"; and
"noninterpretive," where ajustice "makes the determination of constitutionality
by reference to a value judgment other than one constitutionalized by the
framers." PERRY, supra note 27, at 10-11.
29. Grey, supra note 28, at 703.

30. On occasion, a justice may base adjudication on both the wording
and perceived original intention of a provision. See, e.g., Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (Burger, C.J., for the
majority); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring). Two modern scholars have argued that these criteria are
methods of constitutional
compatible and the only legitimate interpretation. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987);
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:

LAw (1989).

THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
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cedent to the convening of the Constitutional Convention, the
debates in the state ratifying conventions, the sentiments of the
First Congress, Court opinions issued during the framers' generation, the letters and correspondence of the framers, or other
sources? Focusing on the discussions at the Philadelphia Convention, is emphasis to be placed only on those proposals voted
on or on any statement made by the framers? Can the sense of
the founders be determined by the silence of members on issues
raised during the debates, or is original intention to be based
only on the spoken words? The elusiveness of this task is compounded by the uneven participation of the framers. It has been
estimated that only twenty-nine of the fifty-five delegates were
present for every session and that almost one-third of the members "missed long and critical portions" of the deliberations.3 "
Moreover, Madison's notes,3 2 though helpful, are by necessity
incomplete; one scholar has estimated that Madison probably
was able to record "at best ... only one-fifth of what was said."3 3

Adopting a strict interpretation of the wording similarly may
not simplify the task of constitutional adjudication. Many provisions written into the Constitution were not the product of painstaking debate but rather were worded to accommodate
differences in opinion. Gouvemeur Morris, draftsman of the
Constitution, declared that he endeavored "to select phrases
which, expressing my own notions, would not alarm the others or
shock their self love."3 4 Even if the wording is unambiguous,
how does one reconcile language of the Constitution which
makes possible an interpretation contrary to the express intentions of the framers? Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. cautioned that, when reading the words of the Constitution, "we
must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the
most gifted of its begetters.""5 Holmes emphasized that constitu31.
CLINTON ROssrrER,
CONVENTION 178 (1966).
32.

SEVENTEEN

EIGHTY-SEVEN:

THE

GRAND

MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787

(1937).
33. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
288 (1988). Other records of the Philadelphia debates are also fragmentary.

See James H. Hutson, Riddles of the Federal Constitutional Convention, 44 WM. &
MARY Q. (3d ser.) 411 (1987);James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution:
The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1986).
34. C. HERMAN PRITCHETr, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 45 (1968)
(quoting Gouverneur Morris).
35. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (Holmes, J., for the
majority).
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tionality must be based "in the light of our whole experience and
not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago."6
Arguably, then, neither originalism nor textualism may
definitively
employed to establish constitutionality. It is also
necessary tobe
examine the role of the Court within the framework
of separation of powers and federalism. Is the Court obligated to
uphold legislation, irrespective of its perceived reasonableness or
necessity, 7 once it has determined that a particular branch - at
the federal or state level - is not precluded from exercising contemplated power, or may the justices take the initiative in
embarking the country on a political or social vision?3" The
wording of the Constitution and the Court's position within the
overall framework of government may furnish sufficient maneuverability to the justices to institute policy preferences.
Brennan's judicial philosophy recognized that provisions of
the Constitution are to be flexibly construed to accommodate
perceived contemporary needs.
He neither exclusively
embraced nor rejected original intent and textualism; indeed,
both were integral components of Brennan's justification for an
adjudicatory function which compelled the Court to assess the
substance of legislation.
Brennan's belief in the organic meaning of the Constitution
was apparent from his statements on the significance of original
intent. His position was dramatized on July 9, 1985, when Attorney General Edwin Meese III, in a speech before the American
Bar Association, extolled the virtues of a jurisprudence based on
original intent, and criticized Brennan's alleged judicial activism.39 On October 12, Brennan, speaking at Georgetown Uni36. Id. Along similar lines, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that, in
assessing school segregation, "we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
[Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted... [w] e must consider public education
in the light of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-93
(1954) (Warren, C.J., for the majority).
37. On the Court, the most vigorous present supporters of this position
are Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas. Most recently, see, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (cruel and unusual punishments); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (abortion); Payne v.
Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., for the majority) (capital
punishment).
38. For several variations of this position, see supra note 27.
39. Edwin Meese, III, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July
9, 1985), in THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION

(1986).
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versity, responded in a lengthy address on the meaning of the
Constitution and the intent of the framers.4 °
Praising the meticulous work of the founders, Brennan
41
declared that they created "a blueprint for government"
intended to be adaptable to changing needs. Each generation,
"in response to both transformations of social condition and
evolution of our concepts of human dignity, "42 must reexamine
provisions of the Constitution, and Brennan believed that the
framers purposely adopted ambiguous wording to facilitate this
undertaking. While denying that justices are "platonic guardians
appointed to wield authority according to their personal moral
predilections, 4 ' Brennan maintained that the framers intended
the federal judiciary to play a role in applying constitutional provisions to new circumstances. The founders, he emphasized,
bequeathed to posterity not a rigid code of conduct but rather a
body of principles, and adjudication aimed toward the "ceaseless
pursuit of the constitutional ideal of human dignity"44 fulfilled
original intention by validating the aspirations of the document.
Clearly, Brennan did not repudiate reliance on original
intention. He maintained that faithfulness to originalism
depended not on mechanically adopting the policies in effect at
the time of the Philadelphia Convention; rather, to the extent
that each generation reduces arbitrariness in the application of
its laws, enhances procedural protections in the courtroom for
the accused, and eliminates discriminatory exercise of governmental power, the ideals of the founders are fulfilled.
Brennan believed that the Constitution, as envisioned by the
framers, was an aspirational projection on the evolving relationship between government and the citizenry, and that each generation, building upon the work of its predecessors, must strive for
a more enlightened sense of justice. The Court, as a coequal
branch of government, must play a role in this ongoing
endeavor, and Brennan's belief that the Constitution "places certain values beyond the power of any legislature"4" affected his
conception of federalism.
On August 7, 1964, after only eight years on the Court, Brennan, in a speech to a Conference of Chief Justices in New York,
40. Justice William Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:

Contemporary Ratification,Address at Georgetown University (October 12, 1985),
in 27 S. TEX. LJ. 433 (1986).
41. Id. at 438.
42. Id. at 439.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 434-35.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 437.
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expounded on his understanding of federalism. 46 Brennan did
not read the Constitution as a document which merely conferred
spheres of sovereignty on two separate and exclusive jurisdictions; 47 rather, he believed that states, empowered to exercise
"the widest latitude to deal with the dynamics of social and economic change in seeking to satisfy their needs and further their
progress," 48 and the central authority, share a common goal to
protect individual rights. However, the geometric growth of governmental power beginning in the New Deal period has created
numerous opportunities for intrusion into citizens' lives, thereby
enhancing the judiciary's obligation to protect individual freedom. Brennan did not attach great importance to the kind of
jurisdiction federal or state judges might exercise in discharging
this duty; the judicial function compelled judges, regardless of
what governmental level encroachments on individual liberty
transpired, to prevent potentially repressive governmental
action. The federal judiciary, Brennan believed, will inevitably
play a more extensive role as the proliferation of governmental
regulation diminishes49divergence among states and makes us "a
more united nation."
Brennan's commitment to preserving individual rights from
possible governmental abridgment with vigorous exercise ofjudicial power envisaged an active role for the Court. Brennan did
not believe that the Court must defer to state practices alleged to
abridge liberty until the political process successfully implemented remedial action; rather, he envisioned "individuals and
governments confront[ing] each other, with courts mediating
between the two."5" As he made clear in a highly influential 5 '
article published in 1977,52 state judges, within their respective
jurisdiction, are to be no less vigilant in protecting their citizens
from violations of state constitutional provisions than federal
46. WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., Some Aspects of Federalism,39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 945
(1964).
47. For a discussion claiming that this dual relationship is mandated by
both the text of the Constitution and the intent of the framers, see BERGER,

supra note 30, at 48-76.
48. Brennan, supra note 46, at 954.
49. Id. at 960.
50. Robert C. Post, Justice Brennan and Federalism, 7 CONS. COMM. 227, 233
(1990).
51. It has been determined that Brennan's article is "the nineteenth most
frequently cited law review article of those published within the past forty
years." Fred Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1540,

1550 (1985).
52. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
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judges in safeguarding the guarantees of the Constitution.
Where "state courts can be trusted to safeguard individual
rights," the Court has confined "the protective role of the federal
judiciary;" 3 however, Brennan emphasized, "our federal system
...provides a double source of protection for the rights of our
citizens"5 4 when state judges do not shield their citizens against
abridgment of liberty. Thus, Brennan recognized a degree of
state autonomy not to enable local legislatures to independently
establish modes of interaction among its citizens, but rather to
devise policies which do not fall outside the parameters of federal protection of liberty. Brennan elaborated on this dichotomy
in a 1986 address on the Bill of Rights and the states.55
Brennan believed that the Bill of Rights placed certain powers beyond the reach of government to abridge. Initially, their
provisions were considered binding only on federal power;5 6
however, with the ratification in 1868 of the Fourteenth Amendment,"7 the federal government, by Section 5,58 acquired jurisdiction over state protection of individual liberty. The degree of
potential federal supervision was clarified in the 1960s, when
many of the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights were
held to be binding on the states.5 9 Expressing his belief that this
53.

Id. at 502-03.

54.

Id. at 503.

55. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Reuival of
State Constitutionsas Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
56. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters 243 (1833).

57.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
58.

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "The Congress shall

have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
59. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial by jury); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14 (1967) (compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363

(1966) (impartial jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of
witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (protection against selfincrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishments);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule).
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was one of the Warren Court's greatest accomplishments,6" Brennan declared that the Fourteenth Amendment acknowledged a
minimum level of human liberty and dignity which was beyond
the power of government to abridge. Incorporation of the Bill of
Rights, Brennan maintained, underscored that states "could [not]
be trusted to nurture individual rights,"6 1 and, since the Fourteenth Amendment contained ambiguous wording,6 2 it would
ultimately befall to the federal judiciary to establish evolving conceptions of justice to guide them.
In short, Brennan did not view the Constitution as containing a set of fixed principles; rather, it embodied an ongoing aspiration of the citizenry to achieve an enlightened state of justice.
While the Constitution conferred power to two different levels of
government, its vision transcended jurisdictional boundaries and
obligated public officials and the citizenry to engage in an ongoing effort to enhance individual liberty. Because state legislatures have historically been unsuccessful in fulfilling this
objective, the judicial branch will be compelled to play a pivotal
role in protecting individuals against governmental encroachments on freedom. And the ambiguous wording of constitutional provisions will require federal judges to formulate evolving
standards ofjustice and human dignity by which to measure state
enactments, the legality of which will be based not on degree of
popular support within a state or how widespread a practice may
be.
The literature on this ongoing controversy is increasingly vast. See generally
JUDITH BAER, EQuALITy UNDER LAW: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1983); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES (1981); MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986);
HORACE FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908);
HowARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYONE'S CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE
FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT,
THE
"CONSPIRACY
THEORY,"
AND
AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1968); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); JACOBUS TENBROEK,
THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); Akhil R.
Amar, The Bill of Rights and the FourteenthAmendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992);

Charles Fairman, Does The FourteenthAmendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); Stanley Morrison, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 140 (1949);
Michael P. Zuckert, CongressionalPower Under the Fourteenth Amendment - The
Original Understandingof Section Five, 3 CONS. COMM. 123 (1986).
60. Brennan, supra note 55, at 536.
61. Id. at 537.
62. See supra note 57.
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During Brennan's tenure, no individual was more in accord
with this judicial philosophy than Justice Thurgood Marshall.6 3
B.
1.

Marshall's Confirmation and Understandingof the Constitution
Marshall's Selection as the First African-American Justice

Thurgood Marshall was born on July 2, 1908, in Baltimore,
Maryland, "with scarcely better prospects than thousands of
other Negroes who ended up as high-school dropouts."6 4 Segregation permeated every phase of his life;6 5 however, as a youngster, Marshall, perhaps due to his relatively comfortable
upbringing" and father's attitude, was not sensitive to racial
63. In the October, 1989 Term, the last in which Brennan and Marshall
sat together, both voted identically 94.2% of the time. Note, The Supreme Court,
1989 Term: Leading Cases: IV. The Statistics, 104 HARv. L. REv. 360 (1990). For a
tabulation of the voting alignments of the justices, see the annual November
issue of HarvardLaw Review which focuses on the Court's most recent Term.
64. High Court Appointee Thurgood Marshal4 N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1967, at
32.
65. The neighborhood in which Marshall grew up was described as
follows:
Baltimore was a town where blacks attended 'colored school' run by a
white superintendent who said he wouldn't build a swimming pool for
students because 'Negroes don't deserve swimming pools.' It was a
town where the parochial schools let students out ten minutes earlier
than the black public schools to minimize fights between the two
groups. Not a single department store in Baltimore was open to
blacks, not a single restroom that blacks could use was to be found
downtown.
Juan Williams, Marshall's Law, in ROGER GOLDMAN wIrH DAVID GALLEN,
THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL 143 (1992). For an elaboration of
racial and social conditions in Marshall's childhood, see MICHAEL D. DAVIS &
HUNTER

R.

CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL, WARRIOR AT THE

BAR,

REBEL ON THE

BENCH 30-46 (1992); CARL T. ROwAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE
WORLD OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

33-49 (1993).

66. RowAN, supra note 65, at 33-34.
67. With no formal education, William Marshall held a number of jobs,
and, given the social climate of his time, was subjected to ongoing racial taunts.
ROWAN, supra note 65, at 37-39. Likely overwhelmed by frustration and pride,
William "encouraged. . . [his son] to adjust to segregation, not to fight it."
Williams, supra note 65, at 143. At the same time, Marshall's father had a keen
mind and took an interest in court cases by both attending local trials and
reading about them in the newspaper. When Thurgood was thirteen his father,
after briefly explaining treatment of blacks in the former Confederate states
following the end of the Civil War, told him that "the Constitution was the
Founding Fathers' blueprint for the way things should be, not a description of
the way things were." DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 65, at 38. See also, LEWIS H.
FENDERSON, THURGOOD MARSHALL:

FIGHTER FOR JUSTICE

29 (1969). Marshall

himself declared that his father's teaching encouraged him to become a lawyer,
suggesting that William imparted to his son not to accept injustice passively and
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stratification.6 8 His teen years furnished opportunities to
become acquainted with the law. The high school Marshall
attended was located next to the police station, where he often
overheard officers coercing suspects, 69 and his father occasionally took him to the courthouse. 7 ° Often disciplined in school,
Marshall's high school principal punished him by sending him to
the basement to memorize sections of the Constitution. Years
later, Marshall declared that, "[b] efore I left that school I knew
the entire Constitution by heart."7 1 In 1925, he entered Lincoln
University in Pennsylvania, known as "the oldest American educational institution for blacks." 72 Graduating cum laude in 1930,
he decided to attend law school, and, after being rejected by the
University of Maryland
because of race, Marshall enrolled at
73
Howard University.
Marshall had the good fortune to be at Howard when its
President, Mordecai Johnson, had been enhancing the rigorousness of the curriculum and recruiting first rate faculty. During
Marshall's years as a law student, Howard had become "a laboratory where civil rights law was invented, where students and
faculty developed the legal arguments that would propel the
courts and the nation towards change." 74 After graduating in
1933 at the top of his class, 75 Marshall briefly entered private
practice in Baltimore, where he worked on civil rights cases and
became affiliated with the local branch of the NAACP. 7 6 In 1936,
Marshall became special assistant legal counsel in charge of litigation.7 7 Personally enduring racial insults, 78 Marshall passionately practiced civil rights litigation, acquiring a reputation as a
vigorous and extremely able attorney.79 In 1950, he was named
to be willing to work patiently but persistently to improve the human condition.
DAvis & CLARK, supra note 65, at 38.
68.

Williams, supra note 65, at 143.

69.

Id. at 144.

70.

Id.

71.

DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 65, at 37.

72. William Daniels, Justice Thurgood Marshall: The Racefor EqualJustice,in
THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES, supra note 4, at 213.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 214. For a discussion of Howard University's tradition and
curriculum at the time of Marshall's enrollment, see DAvIs & CLARK, supra note
65, at 47-58.
75.

Williams, supra note 65, at 145.

76.

Daniels, supra note 72, at 214.

77.

Id.

78.

DAviS & CLARK, supra note 65, at 105-19.

79.

ROWAN, supra note 65, at 50-97, 124-29. See generally RICHARD KLUGER,

SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALrY (1975).
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director and chief counsel of the Legal Defense and Educational
Fund. 80
While Marshall's crowning achievement was his successful
argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, in the landmark 1954
case of Brown v. Board of Education,8" to declare segregation in
public schools unconstitutional, he had amassed an extremely
impressive record; while with the NAACP Marshall "won twentynine out of thirty-two cases before the Supreme Court and
numerous victories in the lower courts."8 2 Indeed, one scholar
noted, Marshall "masterminded the litigation of the civil-rights
movement for almost a quarter of a century."8 3 In 1961, President John F. Kennedy successfully nominated Marshall to the
United States Court of Appeals, where he acquired a reputation
as a skillful and meticulous legal writer. Four years later, President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed him Solicitor General, and,
in 1967, Marshall was nominated to fill the vacancy created by
the retirement of Justice Tom C. Clark.
Aside from reservations expressed by some Southern senators, Marshall's nomination was generally greeted with enthusiastic support. Stating that Marshall "has already earned his place
in history," the President, noting that he would be the first black
to sit on the Court, declared: "I believe it is the right thing to do,
the right time to do it, the right man and the right place."8 4 On
July 13, 1967, one month to the day after Johnson spoke with
Marshall about filling the upcoming Court vacancy, the Senate
Judiciary Committee commenced hearings, which continued to
the 14th, 18th, 19th, and 24th.8 5
Unsurprisingly, Marshall was asked to discuss his judicial
philosophy, but refused to respond to specific issues which he
believed might come to the Court. Senator John L. McClellan,
Democrat of Arkansas, opened the hearings by attacking various
Warren Court rulings which allegedly undermined the ability of
police to perform law enforcement, and asked Marshall for his
views on wiretapping,8 6 right to counsel, 87 obtaining confes80. Daniels, supra note 72, at 214.
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an examination of Marshall's role in
bringing and arguing this case before the Court, see generally KLUGER, supra
note 79; RowAN, supra note 65, at 143-219; DAviS & CLARK, supra note 65, at 13678.
82. LEVY, supra note 2, at 42.
83. Id.
84.

Roy Reed, Marshall Named For High Court, Its First Negro, N.Y.

June 14, 1967, at 1.
85. DAvis & CLARK, supra note 65, at 273.
86. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).

TIMES,
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sions," and the exclusionary rule,8 9 among other areas. Marshall
refrained from specifically addressing these issues, and
responded with a broad generalization: "I'm worried as anybody
about the mounting rate of crime. But I am equally determined
that whatever is to be done must be done within the United
States Constitution." 90
During the other four days of hearings, no major attempt
was made to learn Marshall's judicial philosophy. To be sure, he
was asked his opinion on original intention, which elicited a brief
statement that the Constitution must be construed as a "living
document"9 applicable to circumstances unforeseen by the
framers, and on the importance of legislative history, to which
92
Marshall responded that it was "relevant but not controlling;"
however, much of the questioning dealt with "the kind of esoterica found in a law school exam." 93 For example, Senator Strom
Thurmond, Republican of South Carolina, asked, seeking to
embarass Marshall, to state who drafted the Thirteenth Amendment,9 4 to discuss the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment's
privileges or immunities clause,9 5and to name the number of
"provisions of the Bill of Rights... held by the Supreme Court to
be binding on the states."9 6 Marshall alternately responded with
the answer, when he knew it, and with "folksy directness"9 7 when
irritated with the pointlessness of the questioning. Marshall was
also asked whether his years of civil rights litigation "had
87. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
88. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
89. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
90.

Fred P. Graham, Senate Confirmation of Marshall Delaying by McClellan

Questions, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1967, at 12.
91.
TIMES,

Fred P. Graham, Marshall is Questioned on Fine Points of the Law, N.Y.

July 20, 1967, at 17.

92.
93.

Id.
DAvis & CLARK, supra note 65, at 273.

94.

N.Y. TIMES, supra note 91, at 17. The Thirteenth Amendment states

in Section 1: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within

the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CoNST.
amend. XIII, § 1.
95.

N.Y. TIMES, supra note 91, at 17. For the text of the Fourteenth

Amendment's privileges or immunities clause, see supra note 57.
96. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 91, at 17.
97. Id. For example, when asked, "What provisions of the slave codes in
existence in the eighteen-hundreds was Congress desirous of eliminating in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866?," Marshall responded: "There were many of the socalled black codes and I don't know about all of them, but one was a statute in

my own state of Maryland that prevented Negroes from flying kites."
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prejudiced him against the white people of the South,"9 8 to
which he respon ded that he would interpret the law "without any
personal predilection."9 9
On August 30, 1967, the Senate, by a vote of 69-11, confirmed Marshall's nomination.' 0 0 He took his seat on October 1.
2.

Marshall's Understanding of the Constitution

Unlike Brennan, who articulated the subtle points of his
constitutional philosophy in a number of law review articles, 01
Marshall did not employ this forum to explain his position on
such subjects as original intention, federalism, judicial activism
and self-restraint, and the implications of ambiguous phrases in
the Constitution. 10 2 While Marshall's jurisprudence can be deciphered from his opinions,' his understanding of the Constitution most fully emerges within the context of events which
shaped his life, as well as his legal activities prior to taking his seat
on the Court.'0 4 Whether Marshall's greatest accomplishments
to the life of the law came during his years of litigation on behalf
of the NAACP or during his period of service on the Court will,
over time, be examined; nevertheless, Marshall's judicial philosophy, perhaps uniquely in the twentieth century, is, noted one
scholar, "linked to the larger social context that permeated his
personal and professional life," and what he "witnessed in this
context... [ - ] racism, oppression, segregation, discrimination,
and the denial of equal protection of the laws [ - ]10' is an
integral component of his constitutional approach.
Marshall's most revealing insight into his view of the Constitution may have come in an address delivered in 1987 to com98.

Id.

99. Id.
100. Fred P. Graham, Senate Confirms MarshallAs the FirstNegroJustice, N.Y.
TIMES, August 31, 1967, at 1.

101. See, e.g., supra notes 40, 46, 52, and 55. See also William J. Brennan,
Jr., Constitutional Adjudication, 40 NOTRE DAME LAw. 559 (1965); William J.
Brennan, Jr., Fundamentals of Judicial Review, Address to the Student Legal
Forum at the University of Virginia Law School (February 17, 1959), in ALAN F.
WESTIN, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT 258-66 (1963).
102.

The only two law journal articles published by Marshall prior to 1986

touched on his general conception of the Constitution as a vehicle to effect
social change. See Thurgood Marshall, Group Action in the Pursuit of Justice, 44
N.Y.U. L. REv. 661 (1969); Thurgood Marshall, The Continuing Challenge of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 3 GA. L. REv. 1 (1968).
103. See Daniels, supra note 72, at 213.
104. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute toJustice Thurgood Marshallpt. 1, 105
HARV. L. REV. 23 (1991).

105.

Daniels, supra note 72, at 234.
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memorate its bicentennial. 10 6 Concerning the enduring
permanence of the intentions of the framers, Marshall declared:
I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was
forever 'fixed' at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I
find the wisdom, foresight, and the sense of justice exhibited by the framers particularly profound. To the contrary,
the government they devised was defective from the start,
requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous
social transformation to attain the system of constitutional
government, and its respect for the individual freedoms
07
and human rights, that we hold as fundamental today.
Marshall suggested not that the writing of the Constitution
has been insignificant, but that the work of the framers should
not be viewed in isolation. The pathways of history, transformation of the human condition, and the evolution of political,
social, and economic patterns, have all - as the abolition of slavery and the movement for civil rights have dramatically illustrated - redefined the meaning of the Constitution far beyond
the vision of the founders. The work of the Philadelphia Convention must be viewed with its "inherent defects"' and subsequent "suffering, struggle, and sacrifice that has triumphed over
much of what was wrong with the original document,"'0 9 to fully
comprehend the promise of the Constitution. Each generation,
to achieve evolving aspirations, will need to devise "new constitutional principles . . . to meet the challenges of a changing

society.""o
Marshall's understanding of the Constitution was virtually
identical to Brennan's. While neither was willing to repudiate
original intention - indeed, in racial discrimination and civil
liberties cases Marshall frequently discussed the framers and
practices of their time - both Justices emphasized that constitutional provisions evolve in meaning as conditions and priorities
change. Marshall, no less than Brennan, believed that the judiciary must play an active role in shaping an evolving vision of justice, and must vigorously serve to protect the rights of minorities,
and those who are outside the political and socioeconomic mainstream, from possible governmental oppression. Both acutely
realized that the federal courts may be the last opportunity for
106. Thurgood Marshall, Commentay: Reflections on the Bicentennial of the
Constitution, 101 HIARv. L. REv. 1 (1987).
107. Id. at 2.

108.
109.
110.

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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aggrieved individuals to obtain redress, and their efforts to establish minimum judicial standards, and hopefully prevent excessive
or arbitrary exercise of power by federal and state officials, fulfilled Brennan and Marshall's conception of the role of the
Court in American society.
These considerations permeated the opinions of Brennan
and Marshall on capital punishment. They consulted but
refused to rigidly adhere to views of the death penalty prevalent
in the founding generation; this issue, both emphasized, must be
perceived in light of modem conceptions of human dignity.
Believing in the pivotal -

though not omnipotent -

role of the

federal judiciary in shaping modes of interaction between government and the citizenry, Brennan and Marshall did not hesitate to formulate minimum standards to guide states in their
treatment of those accused of murder. Their position on capital
punishment envisioned an enlightened plane of justice which
they believed society aspired toward, and this, Brennan and Marshall were convinced, was the most fundamental component of
constitutional adjudication, and a fulfillment of the vision and
promise of the founders and the document itself.
II.

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION AGAINST
INFLICTION OF "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS"

A.

The Original Understandingof CapitalPunishment

The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments inflicted."11 1 The phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 1689,
though the concept was expressed in the Magna Carta. Chapter

14 of that document provided in pertinent part that "[a] free man
shall not be amerced for a trivial offence, except in accordance
with the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence he shall
be amerced according to its gravity .. ."112 Parliament, by this
clause, did not seek to ban specific types of punishment, but
rather to prohibit judges from imposing penalties not legally
sanctioned, and from exceeding statutory guidelines in sentenc111. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
112. Quoted in Anthony F. Granucci, 'Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Inflicted'. The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 846 (1969). Concern for
fixing penalties proportionate to the offense committed predates the writing of
the Magna Carta; according to Granucci, statutory provisions assigning
monetary compensation for various types of bodily injury appeared prior to the
Norman Conquest of 1066. Id. at 844-45.

19941
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ing.' 1 3 The death penalty, which in England dated back to the
reign of King Alfred (871-901 A.D.), 1 was not prohibited in
Magna Carta; Chapter 39, which provided that no person shall be
deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but "by the judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land,""' indicated that capital punishment may be imposed provided that statutory guidelines are
followed. There is also no evidence suggesting that England
sought to abolish the death penalty prior to the writing of the Bill
of Rights in 1689; indeed, for the period beginning with the
reign of King Henry VIII in 1509 and proceeding into the 1600s
the annual number of executions remained high. 16
The death penalty was imposed in the American colonies for
a wide range of offenses. 1 7 The first known infliction of the
death penalty took place in Jamestown Colony in 1608, and, during the seventeenth century, there were 162 documented executions in the colonies."1 There was little debate on the death
penalty by statesmen of the Revolutionary period; however, evidence indicates that its infliction was widely accepted. Of the
eleven states which wrote new constitutions after 1776 (Rhode
Island and Connecticut retained their colonial charters), nine, to
be sure, prohibited infliction of cruel and unusual punishments;
113. For an analysis of events prior to the writing of the Magna Carta
concerning assessment of penalties, see Granucci, supranote 112, at 844-45. See
RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 30-31 (1982).
114. 3 JAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 24 (1883),
quoted in Note, Furman v. Georgia: Deathknell For Capital Punishment?, 47 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 107, 108 (1972).
115. MAGNA CARTA ch. 39, quoted in Murray v. The Hoboken Land and
Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 276 (1856).

116.

According to one scholar, a 1948 study revealed that the annual rate

of executions averaged 140 during the reign of King Henry VIII (1509-47); 560

during the tenure of King Edward VI (1547-53); following a decline in
frequency, 90 per year during the occupation of Charles I (1625-49); and "990
more during the ten years of the Commonwealth under Oliver Cromwell (164958)." 1 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAw, 140-42
(1948), quoted in RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 5

(1991).
117. The range of offenses punishable by death in colonial America
included, in addition to murder, rape, burglary, sodomy, arson, treason,
adultery, witchcraft, blasphemy, sexual immorality, horse stealing,
counterfeiting and forgery, and, in some Southern states, stealing, concealing
with intent to emancipate, and inciting to insurrection, slaves. See WILLIAM J.
BowERs, LEGAL HOMICIDE 133-34 (1984); HUGO BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN

AMERICA 7-8 (3rd ed. 1982), quoted in PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 5.
118. Victoria Schinader & John 0. Smykla, A Summary Analysis of
Executions in the United States 1608-1987: The Espy File, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA: CURRENT RESEARCH 6 (Robert M. Bohm, ed., 1991), quoted in
PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 4.
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however, during the 1700s, the total number of executions was
1391,119 almost nine times as many as those carried out in the
1600s.' 2 0
No reference to the death penalty was made at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 or at the state ratifying conventions,
and little discussion took place in the First Congress on
Madison's proposed amendment.1 2 1 Only a few minutes' time
was devoted to the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments."
The only discussion on this subject came from Congressman William Smith of South Carolina, who declared that the wording of
the Eighth Amendment was "too indefinite," and Congressman
Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire, who stated: "It is sometimes necessary to hang a man, .

.

. villains often deserve whip-

ping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in the
future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments
because they are cruel?"1 22 Livermore's concern that this clause
might limit Congress' discretion to punish offenses as capital did
not indicate that the First Congress wished to restrict capital punishment or curb legislative discretion in its mode of infliction.
Indeed, the death penalty was legal in all thirteen states in 1789,
and, one year later, the First Congress itself enacted legislation
which punished by death the crimes
of murder, robbery, rape,
23
and forgery of public securities.
Capital punishment, extensively employed for centuries in
England, was also widely adopted both during the colonial
period and the generation of the founding fathers. However,
during the early 1800s there had been abolitionist agitation, and,
in the years leading up to the Civil War, "most of the Northern
and Eastern states"' 24 had significantly reduced the number of
crimes punishable by death, and revised capital proceedings to

119.

See id.

120.
121.

See supra text accompanying note 118.
See generally HELEN E. VEIT ET AL., CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, THE

DOCUMENTARY

RECORD FROM

THE

FIrST FEDERAL

CONGRESS

(1991).

The

prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" was the tenth of twelve
Amendments submitted by the First Congress to the states, but the first two
were not ratified, numerically changing the original Tenth Amendment to the
Eighth.
122. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782-83 (1789).
123. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 115, quoted in Berger, supra note 113, at
47.
124. JAN GORECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL
EVOLUTION 86 (1983).
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confine the discretion ofjurors and sentencing authorities.1 2 5 In
1846, Michigan became the first state to abolish capital punishment, to be followed, in the period prior to the Civil War, by
Rhode Island in 1852, and Wisconsin in 1853.1'6 Thus, while
capital punishment was widespread in our formative years,
12 7it had
generated debate concerning its morality and necessity.
The original understanding of the prohibition against "cruel
and unusual punishments" cannot be definitively determined, 12in
part because seeking to define initial conceptions is elusive. 1
To be sure, both the death penalty and barbaric forms of punishment, prevalent in British history, 129 continued in early AmeriConceivably, the phrase "cruel and unusual"
can experience.
referred not to the type of punishment imposed but rather to the
EXECUTION, CAPITAL
1776-1865 50-92
(1989); PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 6-9; GORECI, supra note 124, at 83-87.
126. GORECO, supra note 124, at 86.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 175-88.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36.
129. See generally Granucci, supra note 112. Sir William Blackstone noted
that one hundred sixty nonclergyable capital crimes were statutorily enacted in
the 1760s. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 18 (1768), cited in GORECKI,
supra note 124, at 60 n.118. Concerning noncapital offenses, Blackstone
emphasized that punishment should be consistent with statutory guidelines
rather than arbitrarily imposed by the biases of the judge. Among the types of
punishment discussed by Blackstone are the pillory, the stocks, the
duckingstool, whipping, splitting the nostrils, branding, and cutting off the
hand or ear. Id. at 369-72, quoted in Granucci, supra note 112, at 862-63.
130. For example, the North Carolina legislature passed a law in 1786
requiring horse thieves, for a first offense, to "stand in the pillory one hour, and
[be] publicly whipped on his, or her or their bare backs with thirty-nine lashes
well laid on, and at the same time [to] have his, her, or their ears nailed to the
pillory and cut off, and [to] be branded on the right cheek with the letter H of
the length of three-quarters of an inch, and on the left cheek with the letter T
of the same dimensions as the letter H, in a plain and visible manner." The
death penalty was to be imposed for a second offense. State Records of NC
(Holdsboro, 1905) xxiv, 795. In 1785, Pennsylvania enacted a law providing
that an individual filing for bankruptcy who committed perjury at the time
assets were examined, which "tend[ed] to the damage of the creditors twenty
pounds," shall be required to "stand in the pillory in some public place two
hours and have one of his ears nailed to the pillory and cut off." 12 Pa. Stat. at
L., 76-77. In Virginia, a statute in effect in the 1780s, and reenacted in 1792,
punished, for a first offense, the stealing of hogs, by inflicting, "twenty-five
lashes, well laid on, at the public whipping post of the county;" for a second
offense, one was required to "stand two hours in the pillory, on a court day, at
the court house of the county .... and have both ears nailed thereto, and, at the
end of two hours, have the ears cut loose from the nails." A third offense was
punishable by death. 6 Hening, Va. Stat. at L., 121-23, quoted in 1 WILLIAM W.
125.

See generally Louis

P.

MASUR,

RITES OF

PUNISHMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE,

CROSSKEY,
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STATES 474-75 (1953).
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duration and degree of suffering inflicted.1 3 1 In short, it is
unclear whether the framers wished to uphold or proscribe capital punishment by the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause,
and uncertain as to what types of offenses or modes of punishment might have been acceptable to them. The original understanding of this phrase may be more fully understood by
examining provisions of the Constitution applicable to the death
penalty.
B.

The Constitutionality and Morality of the Death Penalty

1. Is Capital Punishment Constitutional?
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual
punishments" does not, by itself, sanction or proscribe the death
penalty. The language of the Bill of Rights, however, suggests
that its infliction in certain circumstances was constitutionally
recognized. The Fifth Amendment states that no one shall be
"deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law," and that no person shall "be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb" for the same offense or be compelled "to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime."1" 2 This suggests that persons
may, consistent with "due process of law," be deprived of life. In
1868, seventy-nine years after the Bill of Rights was written, the
Fourteenth Amendment, providing in pertinent part that "no
State shall . .. deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law,"' 3 3 indicates that legislatures, provided that "due process" is furnished, may impose the death
penalty.
The wording of these phrases would appear to make the
death penalty legal; indeed, one scholar contended that the First
Congress "was not outlawing by the eighth amendment the right
to impose death penalties it simultaneously recognized in the
131. See, e.g., Hugo Bedau, who wrote: "An unbroken line of interpreters
has held that it was the original understanding and the intent of the framers of
the Eighth Amendment to proscribe as 'cruel and unusual' only such modes of
execution as compound the simple infliction of death with added cruelties,"
such as "burning at the stake, [and] crucifixion." HUGo A. BEDAU, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 14, 35 (rev. ed. 1967), quoted in BERGER, supra note 113, at
49. Raoul Berger argued that the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause was
originally "concerned solely with the nature of the punishment - barbarous,
torturous - not with the process whereby the sentence was handed down."
BERGER, id. at 131 (emphasis in original).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 57.
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However, unaccompanied by careful debate, it is uncertain whether capital punishment is sanctioned by the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments. Leonard Levy pointed out that the drafting of the Bill of Rights was "imitative, deficient, and irrationally
selective" and that, rather than addressing specific issues, the
authors wrote a random catalogue of rights that seemed to satisfy
their urge for a statement of first principles - or for some of
them."13 5 During debates in the 39th Congress (1866-68) on the
Fourteenth Amendment, not a single statement was made concerning whether inclusion of the word "life" as being prohibited
from deprivation without "due process of law" might, contrary to
the intentions of the authors,3 6 authorize the states to retain or
institute capital punishment.
A literal reading of pertinent provisions in the Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that the death penalty is
not precluded if states choose to adopt it. However, the phrases
"cruel and unusual punishments" and "due process of law" do
not specify the types of offenses which may be categorized as capital or the modes of proceeding to be followed if it is litigated.
Perhaps states are free to sanction the death penalty for any
offenses desired, and, provided that defendants are accorded all
due process of law protections statutorily enacted, no constitutional challenge is presented. 137 In other words, are statutes
which do not violate any express provision of the Constitution
presumed valid? Could a state, for example, punish jaywalking as
a capital offense, and claim that there is nothing in the Constitution which specifically prohibited such a measure? Would this
punishment become acceptable if elaborate due process safeguards were instituted to ensure that a defendant facing this penalty had every opportunity to challenge prosecutorial allegations?
Laurence Tribe emphasized that it would be improper to "lift
134. BERGER, supra note 113, at 46. For a critical analysis of Berger's
position, see David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Interpretation, History, and the
Death Penalty: A Book Review, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1372 (1983) and Hugo A. Bedau,
Thinking of the Death Penalty as a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 873 (1985).
135. LEONARD W. LEw, ORIGINS OF THE FirtH AMENDMENT 411 (1968).
136. For an examination of the topics discussed while drafting the
Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 59.
137. This has been the position of Chief Justice William Rehnquist. See
Alan I. Bigel, William H. Rehnquist on CapitalPunishment, 17 OHIo N.U. L. REv.
729 (1991). On the death penalty, Justice Scalia has unwaveringly voted with

Rehnquist. Id. at 762. While it is premature to assess Justice Thomas'
philosophy, it is likely that he will follow this position on the Eighth
Amendment.

dissenting).

See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992)

(Thomas, J.,

38

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

one [constitutional] provision out, hold it up to the light, and
give it its broadest possible interpretation, while ignoring the fact
that it is immersed in a larger whole.""3 8
If the wording of the Constitution is "only a framework" and
"not a blueprint,"139 it may not be possible to conclude that the
death penalty is constitutional based on recognition of this punishment in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. What types
of punishments are "cruel and unusual," and how might this prohibition in the Eighth Amendment be reconciled with provisions
in the Bill of Rights? The Court has applied most of the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights as binding on the states, 14 °
which would make a capital offense in violation of the Constitution if it does not conform with its provisions; hence, a punishment may be "cruel and unusual" in a due process context. Yet,
given its ambiguous wording, it is not clear as to what procedures
do not meet stipulations in the Bill of Rights. How can it be
ascertained, for example, whether evidence against a capital
defendant was obtained by an "unreasonable search[ ] and
seizure[

];141

whether an accused is being "twice put in jeopardy

of life and limb;" '4 2 whether one has been tried "by an impartial
jury" with a satisfactory opportunity to "be confronted with the
witnesses against him" and to "have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor " 14 3 and whether effective "assistance of counsel" '4 4 was available? Arguably, it is not possible to
state whether capital punishment is constitutionally sanctioned
since this will be based on uneven trial proceedings.
It is uncertain whether the words "cruel and unusual" apply
to the content of legislation as well as the process by which a
defendant is tried. The Eighth Amendment prohibits infliction
of punishments which are "cruel and unusual;" by refraining
from employing the word "or" it would appear that, to be unconstitutional, a penalty must be measured by its severity and frequency with which it is carried out. There are no objective
standards to assess degree of cruelty, which may be both physical
and psychological, and a punishment thought to be cruel in the
sense that, among other factors, it is disproportionate to the
offense allegedly committed, may or may not be unusual,
138.

LAURENCE

TRIBE

&

MICHAEL

C.

DoR,

ON

READING

CONSTITUTION 22 (1991).
139. Id. at 6.
140. See supra note 59 and text accompanying notes 56-62.
141. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
143. Id.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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depending on how often a state is able to carry out a sentence.
In short, capital punishment may only be constitutional if the
Court believes that this penalty is both appropriate, given the heinous nature of a crime, and consistent with the pattern in which
a state has charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced similarly situated defendants.
How is the Court to make this assessment? Is perception of
"cruel and unusual" to be based on attitudes toward punishment
prevalent at the time the Eighth Amendment was written, or is it
necessary for the Court to apply this standard in light of evolving
notions of justice? Should trends in public opinion affect the
Court's position, and does the overwhelming adoption of capital
punishment by state legislatures affect its constitutionality? Is it
appropriate for the Court to establish procedural standards to be
followed by states which choose to sanction the death penalty, or
may the justices, based on their conceptions of morality, seek to
affect philosophical attitudes on capital punishment? Clearly,
the prohibition against infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments" must be examined from a number of perspectives which
may affect perceptions as to whether the death penalty is
constitutional.
2.

Abolitionist and Retentionist Positions on the Death
Penalty

Though capital punishment was widely practiced at the time
the Eighth Amendment was adopted,1 1 5 vigorous debate on the
morality of the death penalty, already widespread during the Revolutionary period,14 6 persisted after the Constitution was written.
The most prominent and elaborate discussion opposing the
death penalty in the 1790s was put forward by Benjamin Rush,
"the most influential physician in America, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and a prolific essayist. " 147 in a series of
essays written in the late 1780s and early 1 7 90s, 14 8 Rush maintained that capital punishment is antithetical to the "mild and
145.

See supra text accompanying note 123.
MASUR, supra note 125, at 50-70.
Id. at 62.

146. See
147.
148.
OF

See, BENJAMIN RUSH, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE INJUSTICE AND IMPOLICY
MURDER BY DEATH (1792)
[hereinafter CONSIDERATIONS ON

PUNISHING

INJUSTICE];

BENJAMIN

RUSH,

AN

ENQUIRY

INTO

THE

EFFECTS

OF

PUBLIC

(1787); Benjamin Rush,
Rejoinder to a Reply to the Enquiry into the Justice and Policy of PunishingMurder by
Death, 5 AM. MUSEUM 63, 121 (1789); Benjamin Rush, An Enquiry Into the Justice
and Policy of PunishingMurder by Death, 4 AM. MUSEUM 78 (1788).
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benevolent principles"1 4 9 of republican government, a repudiation of the Lord's vision that humankind display forgiveness and
compassion,' 50 and insensitive to society's need to (seek to) rehabilitate offenders. 5 ' While the death penalty was not abolished
in Rush's lifetime, a few state legislatures, in the 1780s and 1790s,
revised statutes reducing the number of capital crimes 1 52 and
more strictly codifying procedures for its infliction, 15 3 giving rise
to further debate, 5 4 which has continued unabated, on the
appropriateness of capital punishment.
Essentially, supporters and opponents of capital punishment
have raised the following questions in seeking to justify their
position: Is the death penalty a deterrent to the commission of
murder? Is it offensive to human dignity, and to evolving notions
ofjustice, for government to sanction capital punishment? Is life
imprisonment without parole a more cost effective alternative to
the death penalty? Is retribution an appropriate objective of
punishment? Is the death penalty arbitrarily imposed? Is the discretion exercised by juries and judges resulting in more frequent
death sentences for defendants who are minorities and
socioeconomically disadvantaged? Does public opinion support
or reject capital punishment? Can convicted murderers be rehabilitated, and is society obligated to make this effort? A number
of studies on capital punishment may illuminate the arguments
put forward by abolitionists and retentionists.
3.

The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment

Perhaps the most extensively examined aspect of capital
punishment has been its alleged deterrent effect. Does enact149. CONSIDERATIONS ON
MASUR, supra note 125, at 65.
150.

THE

INJUSTICE, supra note 148, at 19, quoted in

Rush, An Enquiry into theJustice and Policy of PunishingMurder by Death,

supra note 148, at 16.
151. RusH, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE INJUSTICE, supra note 148, at 13.
152. See MASUR, supra note 125, at 71-81.
153. Id. See also PATEPNOSTER, supra note 116, at 6-7.
154. Though no prominent statesman in Rush's time favored abolition of
capital punishment, a few addressed mitigating the severity of criminal
sanctions. In the 1770s, Thomas Jefferson, in a bill proposal to the Virginia
legislature, wrote that "if the punishment were only proportional to the injury,
men would feel it their inclination, as well as their duty, to see the laws
observed," and supported the death penalty only for murder and treason.
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for ProportioningCrimes and Punishments,in MERRILL D.
PETERSON, JEFFERSON: WRrrINGS 349-52 (Library of America ed. 1984).
Benjamin Franklin, also reflecting on the proportionality between an offense
and its punishment, asked: "Is it not murder ...to put a man to death for an
offence which does not deserve death?," 2 JARED SPARKS, THE WORS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 479 (1840), quoted in MASUR, supra note 125, at 62.

1994]

JUSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

41

ment of capital punishment statutes discourage potential murderers from committing homicide? This may be examined by
comparing homicide figures in contiguous states which retain
and do not statutorily impose the death penalty; by analyzing
murder statistics in a state which has abolished capital punishment compared with the period during which the death penalty
was legal; by noting the frequency with which those convicted of
murder are executed; and by observing whether there has been a
decrease in the homicide rate for a specific period following a
highly publicized execution. An early study, published in 1925,
declared that evidence on the deterrent effect of capital punishment is inconclusive, a55 and, in 1952, an examination of homicide rates in the abolitionist states of Michigan, Wisconsin,
Rhode Island, and Minnesota during the period 1931-1946 indicated that they were statistically comparable to figures in neighboring states which retained the death penalty.1 5 6 The most
extensive examination of the possible deterrent effect of capital
punishment has been undertaken by Thorsten Sellin, beginning
with his landmark 1959 work titled The Death Penalty,15 7 and fol15
lowed by revised studies in the 1960s and 1980s. 1
Sellin examined the annual homicide rates for contiguous
retentionist and abolitionist states, as well as changes in murder
statistics when a state had abolished or reinstated the death penalty. Covering the period from 1920 to 1955, Sellin examined
homicide rates for five sets of contiguous states,1 5 9 and concluded that there was no statistically significant difference in the
number of murders committed between neighboring states

155. Edwin H. Sutherland, Murder and the Death Penalty, 15 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 522 (1925).
156. Karl F. Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of the Death Penalty, 284
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 54 (1952).

157.
158.

THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959).
THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1982); THORSTEN SELLIN,

THE PENALTY OF DEATH (1980); CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT (Thorsten Sellin ed.,

1967).
159. In the Midwest, Sellin considered three groups (those which have
the death penalty are indicated with the word "capital," and states which
mandate a maximum punishment of life imprisonment are designated

"noncapital"): Michigan (noncapital), Indiana (capital), Ohio (capital) Minnesota (noncapital), Wisconsin (noncapital), Iowa (capital) - North
Dakota (noncapital), South Dakota (capital), Nebraska (capital) - and, in the

New England area, two groups were studied: Maine

(noncapital), New

Hampshire (capital), Vermont (capital) Rhode Island (noncapital),
Massachusetts (capital), Connecticut (capital). PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at

222.
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which punish by death and life imprisonment,1 6 0 or within states
during the period before and after a capital punishment statute
is repealed or 'adopted. 6 ' Sellin's findings, which suggest that
capital punishment cannot statistically be shown to deter
criminals from committing murder, gave rise to other major
studies which claimed to examine a wider range of socioeconomic factors in assessing the significance of numerical variations. Three major studies
of this issue were published in the
62
1970s by Isaac Ehrlich.'
Covering the period 1933-1969, Ehrlich argued that geographical proximity, by itself, presented an incomplete comparison of homicide statistics; since no two states have an identical
population density and urban and rural configuration, similar
rates of unemployment in particular racial and age groups, and
comparable methods of law enforcement, a multidimensional
perspective on the possible deterrent effect of capital punishment can best be ascertained by examining nationwide annual
murder figures. Comparing the number of convictions for murder with executions, Ehrlich, arguing that deterrence is evident
when death penalty statutes are vigorously enforced, concluded
that, "[a] n additional execution per year over the period in question [1933-1969]
may have resulted, on average, in 7 or 8 fewer
163
murders."
Ehrlich's contention that capital punishment is a deterrent
to the commission of murder brought forth additional studies, in
part challenging the variables which he employed in reaching his
conclusion," and, simultaneously, inquiring into whether a
160. Examining the rate of homicide for every 100,000 inhabitants, Sellin
concluded that, for each of his five groups, see supra note 159, the numerical
difference between states with the highest and lowest homicide rates was
between 1.3 and 0.4. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 222.

161.

In 1967, Sellin published data from eleven states -

Arizona,

Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Washington - and concluded that the rates of homicide, per

100,000 inhabitants, remained constant. SELLIN, supra note 158, at 122-24.
162. Isaac Ehrlich, CapitalPunishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts
and Additional Evidence, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741 (1977); Isaac Ehrlich & Joel C.
Gibbons, On the Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment and the
Theory of Deterrence,6J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1977); Isaac Ehrlich, The DeterrentEffect
of CapitalPunishment:A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975).
163. Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life

and Death, supra note 162, at 414. For a criticism of the position that the death
penalty is a deterrent to the commission of murder, see James A. Fox & Michael
L. Radelet, Persistent Flaws in Econometric Studies of the DeterrentEffect of the Death
Penalty, 23 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 29 (1989).

164.

For an extensive critique of Ehrlich's findings, see JACK P. GIBBS,
(1975); FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON
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deterrent effect was present after the early 1970s, when many
states revised their capital statutes. A study published in 1988,165
comparing murder rates in abolitionist and retentionist states
from 1973 to 1984, concluded that states which had the death
penalty had higher rates of homicide than both states which
imposed a maximum punishment of life imprisonment and the
national average.1 66 Comparing contiguous states which had,
and refused to impose, the death penalty, it was also found that
the homicide rate for the period 1973-1984 was either comparable in capital and noncapital states, or, in some instances, slightly
higher in states which retained the death penalty.' 6 7 Other studies concluded that there is no lower incidence of murder of law
enforcement officers in capital as opposed to noncapital
states;' 68 that publicity accompanying an execution has not
resulted in a short term lower homicide rate in the state;16 9 and
that the rate of homicide had not appreciably changed in the
HAWKINS, DETERRENCE (1973); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA (1986); David C. Baldus &

James Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on the
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Arnold Barnett,
Crime and CapitalPunishment: Some Recent Studies, 6 J. CRIM. JUST. 291 (1978);
Theodore Black & Thomas Orsagh, New Evidence on the Efficacy of Sanctions as a
Deterrent to Homicide, 58 Soc. Sc. Q. 616 (1978); Brian Forst, The DeterrentEffect of
Capital Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis of the 1960s, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743
(1977); Stephen J. Knorr, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Temporal CrossSectional Approach, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 235 (1979); Richard 0.
Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the Case for
CapitalPunishment,79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1206-21 (1981); Peter Passell &John
Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of CapitalPunishment: Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REV.
445 (1977); Jon K. Peck, The DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment: Ehrlich and His
Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359 (1976); Hans Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death
Penalty: Factsv. Faiths, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 317. For Ehrlich's replies, see Ehrlich
& Gibbons, supranote 162; Isaac Ehrlich & Randall Mark, Fear of Deterrence,6J.
LEGAL STUD. 293 (1977); Isaac Ehrlich, The DeterrentEffect of Capital Punishment:
Reply, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 452 (1977); Isaac Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and
Inference, 85 YALE L.J. 209 (1975).
165. Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Murder and CapitalPunishment
in the Evolving Context of the Post-Furman Era, 66 Soc. FORCES 774 (1988).
166. The average annual homicide rate was "8.46 per 100,000 population
in death penalty states, 5.35 in abolitionist states, and 7.61 for the United States
as a whole." Peterson & Bailey, supra note 165, at 785.
167. Id. at 786-88. See also PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 223.
168. William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Police Killings and Capital
Punishment: The Post-FurmanPeriod," 25 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1987).
169. See William J. Bowers, The Effect of Executions is Brutalization, Not
Deterrence, in KENNETH R. HAAS & JAMES A. INCIARDI, CHALLENGING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 72 (1988); William C.
Bailey, Disaggregationin Deterrence and Death Penalty Research: The Case of Murder
in Chicago, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827 (1983); WilliamJ. Bowers & Glenn
Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What Is The Effect Of Executions, 26 CRIME &
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years during which a state did not have the death penalty
compared with
the period when capital punishment was
170
reintroduced.

These studies suggest that the death penalty is not a statistically significant deterrent to the commission of homicide. If a
purpose of punishment is to induce potential offenders to
refrain from a course of conduct by making clear that its commission will result in a severe penalty, and evidence seems to indicate that this objective is not being achieved, perhaps some other
type of sanction should be adopted. Abolitionists have in part
sought to discredit the death penalty on this ground; however,
notwithstanding empirical studies, deterrence, as one opponent
of the death penalty conceded, can never be precisely ascertained because "no adequately controlled experiment or observation is possible or... ever will be possible" where, "inescapabl [y],
...

social conditions in any state are not constant through time,

and... not the same in any two states." '71 Instead of seeking to
measure deterrence from a national, interstate or intrastate perspective, retentionists have argued that, even if only a few randomly convicted felons concede that they refrained from
committing murder to avoid the death penalty, the deterrent
effect of capital punishment has been fulfilled.
In part because murders are often not premeditated, and,
undoubtedly, since serial killers believe that they will be sufficiently clever and methodical to evade apprehension, it is difficult to assess whether murderers, before committing homicide,
calculated whether the prospect of the death penalty was more
undesirable than life imprisonment. One supporter of capital
punishment, based on information obtained from state district
attorneys, a police department study, and testimony given in the
early 1970s by an assistant attorney general in the criminal division of the Justice Department to the House of Representatives,
furnished accounts of individuals arrested for murder in the late
1950s and early 1960s who stated that they used a fake gun, pretended to be carrying a weapon, or refrained from killing a robbery victim to avoid the death penalty. 172 Additionally, during
the ten-year moratorium on executions (voluntarily adopted by
453 (1980); David R. King, The BrutalizationEffect: Execution Publicity and
the Incidence of Homicide in South Carolina,57 Soc. FORCES 683 (1978).
170. See Richard 0. Lempert, The Effect of Executions on Homicides: A New
Look in an Old Light, 29 CRIME & DEI.INQ. 88 (1983); Peterson & Bailey, supra
DELINQ.

note 165.
171. CHARLES L.

BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:

THE INEVITABILITY OF

CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 33 (1981).
172. FRANK G. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 92-99 (1978).
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states pending resolution of the constitutionality of the death
penalty by the United States Supreme Court), from June 2, 1967,
untilJanuary 17, 1977, when the carrying out of a death sentence
174
was resumed, 173 the national homicide rate nearly doubled,
which may be attributable to a wide range of dynamic political,
social, and economic factors, or, no less than figures suggesting
that there is no appreciable difference in the homicide rates of
capital and noncapital states, an indication that removing the
prospect of death eliminates the fear potential killers might have
felt in contemplating murder.
It appears that neither the position of the abolitionists nor
the retentionists is more compelling. If deterrence could be
objectively and comprehensively measured, how significant a
numerical disparity between the commission of homicide in capital and noncapital states would there have to be to show that the
death penalty discourages individuals from attempting murder?
How long would this trend have to persist to illustrate that the
death penalty is an ongoing and demonstrable deterrent? The
arguments put forward by retentionists are no less statistically
supportable in that a handful of statements from arrested murderers indicating fear of the death penalty does not conclusively
prove that capital punishment is an effective deterrent. Ultimately, both positions appeal to the emotions: If executing just
one convicted murderer will prevent that individual from ever
killing again, is the death penalty not worthwhile? On the other
hand, is it morally justifiable to inflict a punishment qualitatively
different from any other when evidence does not indicate that
the death penalty is discouraging commission of homicide? To
gain a better understanding of the abolitionist and retentionist
positions, it is helpful to explore both perspectives on the issue of
retribution.
4.

The Relevance of Retribution in Penal Codes

Unlike deterrence, which, despite its divergent observations,
can be discussed in a quantified context, retribution elicits emotions which are not empirically directed. Essentially, it may be
argued that a murderer has committed such a heinous injustice
to both the victim and the notion of civilized communal coexistence that society is obligated to inflict a degree of pain and suffering on the accused as a way of imparting that such conduct
will not be tolerated. If this position is acceptable, it becomes
necessary to define punishment, when and how it should be
173.
174.

PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 18.
CARRINGTON, supra note 172, at 86.
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inflicted, and what purpose it seeks to accomplish. Because of
the enormity and irreversibility of the death penalty, both its supporters and opponents have argued, respectively, that it is the
only punishment commensurate with the cruelty of murder, and
that government must seek to preserve the dignity of humankind
by communicating that execution is morally repugnant.
The two concepts most frequently connected to the death
penalty are utilitarianism and retributivism - or, as one scholar
wrote, " [d] esert and [d]eterrence." 7 5 The doctrine of lex talionis
-

an eye for an eye

-

was first recognized in the Old Testament

of the Bible:17 6 "If a man injures his neighbor, what he has done
must be done to him: broken limb for broken limb, eye for eye,
tooth for tooth. As the injury inflicted, so must be the injury
suffered." '7 7 This notion, in the modem period, refers to the
need for society to be compensated for an injustice. In other
words, if individuals agree to submit to the rule of civil authority,
they have consented to partake in both its privileges - the protection of one's physical safety and possessions from the possible
greed of others

-

and its responsibilities

-

to obey a body of

laws ostensibly enacted for the well-being of all. Those who violate the laws have broken a trust with the citizenry, which, by
exacting a penalty, seeks compensation for an act considered an
affront to the purpose for which submission to civil authority was
commenced. 178 Conceptually, lex talionis maintains that the punishment imposed should be commensurate with the injury
inflicted. With regard to capital punishment, retentionists might
argue that, since murder is unique in terms of its gravity and
79
finality, only the death penalty is proportionate punishment.
Abolitionists, on the other hand, accentuate the utilitarian
component of punishment. Unlike retributivists, who view punishment as a means to impose, for the purpose of vengeance, a
degree of pain and suffering on an offender proportionate to
that inflicted on the victim, utilitarians maintain that the purpose
of sanctions is "deterrence of potential criminals, rehabilitation
of convicted criminals, and incapacitation of convicted

175.

Lempert, supra note 164.
176. Exodus 21:25.
177. Leviticus 24:19-20, quoted in Granucci, supra note 112, at 844.
178. For an elaboration of this position, see IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (1797).
179. WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1979); ERNEST VAN DEN
HAAG &JOHN P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY- A DEBATE (1983). See also Mary
E. Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 973 (1985).
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criminals." 8 ' The utilitarian conception of punishment is that,
to compensate society for the violation of law incurred, a sanction is appropriate only if it is perceived by the offender to
impose burdens greater than any benefit which might be gained
by committing the infraction. This, presumably, would both discourage unlawful conduct and confer a benefit on society by educating the offender to refrain from recidivism.1 8 1 Where
retribution is concerned with exacting an equivalent degree of
punishment on an offender as an expression of outrage toward
that individual act, utilitarianism aims not so much at proportionality but rather at the perceived benefit
to be gained by soci82
ety from a particular type of sanction.1
With regard to capital punishment, there is no greater
degree of morality in the position of the retributivist or utilitarian. The retributivist, likely to be a supporter of the death penalty, would generally argue that the uniqueness of murder
compels a penalty qualitatively more severe than any other; that a
respect for the sanctity of extinguished human life obligates society to communicate a message that it will not tolerate homicide;
that some peace of mind might be communicated to a victim's
family by taking the life of a convicted murderer; and that, irrespective of any possible deterrent effect, it is appropriate for
lawmakers to take into account vengeance as a motive for legislation. Not all retributivists, however, believe that death is the only
acceptable punishment for those convicted of murder. Two
recent scholars have advocated retributivism which emphasizes
punishment comparable in severity to the unlawful activity rather
than seeking to mechanically inflict the same type of bodily harm
on both the
victim and the offender. These positions, labeled
"equality" 8 ' and "proportional"' 8 4 retributivism, do not disre180. Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An
Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 847 (1972).
181. For an analysis of how the goals of utilitarianism may be achieved,
see CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAILS AND LEGISLATION (1789);
H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); HERBERT PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968);JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971);
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
182. For example, a retributivist would likely wish to punish one who
stole money with a commensurate fine, while a utilitarian would assess the
burden to be imposed on the offender by reducing, in the form of a fine, this
individual's net worth, as opposed to the benefit which may accrue to the
citizenry by compelling a certain number of hours of community service.
183. STEVEN NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE? THE MORALITY OF
PUNISHING BY DEATH (1987).
184. Jeffrey R. Reiman, Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering
van den Haag,14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 115 (1985).
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gard execution as a possible penalty, but rather point out that a
commensurate punishment for murder need not necessarily be
death.
Opponents of capital punishment, who tend to support utilitarianism, have maintained, no less fervently than their counterparts, that retribution is an improper justification for legislation
because it assumes that the convicted murderer is totally responsible for the unlawful activity. Abolitionists have argued that
murderers, who have often come from broken homes and may
have endured parental abuse, are "victims" who need compassion
rather than retaliation from society, which perhaps by neglect of
family breakdown is partly responsible for the offender's deviant
behavior. A utilitarian would also likely insist that the death penalty degrades the sanctity of life by sanctioning a form of punishment which produces the same result as the conduct being
condemned. As to whether the death penalty is a more cruel
form of punishment than many years of incarceration, a utilitarian would probably respond affirmatively on the ground that a
prisoner might perform useful work even while confined, and
wages earned, however meager, can be turned over as compensation to the victim's family, or for some penological endeavor.
While the life of the victim can never be restored, this, a utilitarian would probably declare, would direct punishment not
toward vengeance, which would arouse base human passions, but
rather to a far more desirable objective of somewhat making restitution to the community for the injustice it has suffered.
The issue of retribution is the most emotional component of
discussion on capital punishment. Fundamentally, it raises questions concerning the level of dignity which government seeks to
preserve with the citizenry, and the degree of civility which
humankind is morally expected to follow. It is unclear whether
contemporary society is retributivist or utilitarian. Since the early
1970s, public approval for the death penalty has steadily
increased;1 8 5 in 1988, it was estimated in a Gallup poll that nearly
80% of the adult population supported it for murder.'8 6 However, when asked whether the death penalty was preferred to life
imprisonment without parole, fewer than one-third expressed
support for execution, 18 7 suggesting perhaps that protection
from possible repeat offenders, rather than retribution, was the
primary motivation which has induced individuals to support
185.

PATERNOSTER,

186.

Id. at 25.

187.

Id. at 275.

supra note 116, at 26.
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capital punishment.""' Beyond deterrence and retribution,
other considerations must be weighed in assessing the position of
abolitionists and retentionists.
5.

Is Execution More Cost Effective Than Life Imprisonment
Without Parole?

Both abolitionists and retentionists have sought to bolster
their position on capital punishment by examining the financial
aspects of executing a convicted murderer compared to the cost
of lifetime incarceration. These arguments are not primarily
intended to induce a state to more effectively practice fiscal
integrity with budgetary priorities; rather, they fundamentally
question the extent to which a community, compelled to emotionally deal with an extreme transgression of voluntary coexistence under the direction of civil authority, must divert attention
from ongoing policy priorities and focus on an individual who,
arguably, has relinquished any claim to the facilities and institutions of society. In short, retentionists have argued that execution would not enable convicted murderers to make ongoing
demands on the psychological and financial resources of the
community in that the death penalty is less costly and burdensome than lifetime incarceration. Abolitionists, on the other
hand, have insisted that the cost of litigation in capital cases,
greatly exceeding keeping an individual in prison for life, militated against sanctioning capital punishment.
In recent years there have been inquiries into the estimated
cost of life imprisonment. A 1990 study reported that it costs
approximately $63,000 to build a maximum security cell and
about $5,000 a year on the annual principal and interest to
finance construction of a prison facility. 89 It has also been estimated to cost around $20,000 a year to maintain a maximum
security cell with an inmate.190 Thus, assuming an annual cost of
$25,000, a convicted murderer incarcerated for forty to forty-five
years could cost the taxpayers, subject to inflation and adjustments for cost of operations, between 1-1.25 million dollars.
Comparing the cost of life imprisonment with the expense
of trial proceedings prior to execution is invariably imprecise
given extreme statewide fluctuations in the financial outlays for
litigation. Aside from salaries paid to court personnel, empanel188. Id. at 276-77.
189. D.P. Cavanagh & M.A.R. Kleiman, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Prison Cell
Construction and Alternative Sanctions, BOTEC ANALYSIS CORP. 12-14 (1990),
quoted in PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 209.
190. Id.
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ing and sequestering a jury, as well as monetary outlays to operate a state adversarial system, the cost of capital proceedings is
subject to the extent of due process protection to be accorded to
one facing possible execution or life imprisonment. Abolitionists
may argue that life imprisonment is less expensive than litigation
which may statutorily result in execution, while retentionists,
depending on the fervor of their support of the death penalty,
may insist that court costs are variable and capable of being contained by limiting the types of evidence admissible, the extent of
due process to be accorded to capital defendants, and the opportunities to appeal a verdict, among other factors.
Though the Constitution does not require more elaborate
trial proceedings for those charged with capital , as opposed to
noncapital, offenses,1 9 1 a sense that the death penalty, given its
finality and irreversibility, is a more severe punishment than life
imprisonment, has induced states to statutorily prescribe more
elaborate trial and appellate procedures for those facing possible
execution. During the pretrial stage, where the prosecutor will,
among other activities, seek to obtain information from psychologists and psychiatrists, as well as family members, neighbors,
and fellow workers, about the character and background of the
accused, and to investigate possible tangible evidence connected
to the commission of the alleged offense, examine the competency of the accused to stand trial, and devise legal strategy in
view of the perceived weight of evidence bearing on the defendant, it has been estimated that the state can incur costs of over
$2,000 per day, 19 2 and that this period may last up to two
years. 193
The costs of a capital trial are affected by the elaborate procedural safeguards statutorily mandated, as well as the greater
191.

See U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V & XLV; see supra text accompanying notes

132-33.
192. Margot Garey, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollarsand Sense of the Death
Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1221, 1253-54 (1985), cited in PATERNOSTER, supra
note 116, at 194.

193. Garey, supra note 192, at 1252. In addition to the time required to
locate and interview witnesses, as well as examine evidence and testimony of
medical experts, there is a tendency by both the prosecutor and defense
attorney to file a number of pretrial motions challenging, among other things,
the constitutionality of a state's death penalty statute, admissibility of evidence,
accuracy of information on the competency and lifestyle of the accused, and
ability of the defendant, in view of media publicity, to obtain a fair trial. It has
been estimated that "the number of pretrial defense motions in capital cases is
from twice to five or six times the number in a noncapital case, and the number
filed by the prosecution is twice the number filed in noncapital cases."
PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 193 (citing Garey, supra note 192, at 1248).
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time and effort expended, in view of the possible penalty to be
inflicted, to meticulously verify evidence. Unlike noncapital trials, where guilt or innocence as well as sentence are determined
in a single proceeding, capital defendants are tried in a bifurcated process, where a verdict and sentence are separately issued.
This may require prolonged involvement by jurors, making the
need for careful empaneling compelling, and inducing both the
prosecution and defense to rigorously question, over a period of
weeks or months, a large number of potential jurors. Assembling
a jury is "[o] ne of the most expensive components of a capital
trial,"19 4 and, by one estimate, may take "five times longer to
complete than in a noncapital case,"1 9 and cost about $87,000
more in courtroom time than the expense incurred in trials
where the death penalty is prohibited.1 9 6 In addition, anticipating a possible dual stage proceeding will require extensive preparation by the prosecution and defense, both of which may in
effect have to expend time for two trials, and, considering the
magnitude of the possible punishment in the penalty phase, long
hours seeking to uncover new information and corroborate evidence are expected. While enormous variation in the cost of
capital trials from state to state makes compilation of national
figures difficult, a 1982 study estimated that the cost of conducting a bifurcated trial in New York State would be around
$1.5 million; 19 7 three years later an examination of expenses
likely to be incurred in other states pointed out that California
"budgets over $4 million annually just to reimburse county costs
for the defense side of a capital trial.""' 8
The most expensive portion of capital litigation is the appellate process. Capital defendants may pursue "a complex and
multileveled system of both state and federal appellate review," 19 9
where a number of years may elapse while a conviction and sentence are challenged in the state and federal courts.2 °° Two stud194.

PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 194.
Garey, supra note 192, at 1257.
PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 197.
197. NEW YORK STATE DEFENDER'S ASSOCIATION, CAPITAL LOSSES: THE
PRICE OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR NEW YORK STATE 19 (1982), cited in
PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 201.
198. PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 201 (citing Garey, supranote 192, at
195.
196.

1260).
199. PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 201.
200. Both the conviction and sentence may be appealed up to the state
supreme court, which may affirm both, affirm the conviction and remand the
case for resentencing, or, after vacating the conviction, remand the case for
retrial. The conviction and sentence issued following a retrial may be appealed

back to the state supreme court and, subsequently, a petition for a writ of
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ies published in the late 1980s indicated that, in Florida, 1700
hours of attorney time would be required to appeal a death sentence up to the federal courts.2 1 Additionally, if a capital case
"were to go through all avenues of appeal, it would consume
approximately 1470 hours of preparation by the defense,"202
and, as documented by some capital attorneys, as high as 2000
hours.20 3 While the hourly rate charged by attorneys, as well as
the time spent and expenses incurred, varies with each case and
within different states, one scholar concluded that "a capital punishment system probably costs more
than one that excludes the
20 4
possibility of the death penalty."

The exorbitant cost of litigating capital trial proceedings has
been raised by abolitionists to buttress their contention that the
death penalty ought to be abolished. Costs of capital litigation
and lifetime incarceration, however, may fluctuate, and different
aspects of these processes may be statistically accentuated by both
abolitionists and retentionists to suggest that their position has
greater validity. Retention or abolition of the death penalty
raises profound moral and ethical questions pertaining to the
capacity of humankind for virtue and justice which, arguably,
cannot be reduced to fiscal considerations. Instead of tabulating
the number of hours spent on litigation, and tangible expenses
incurred, it might be more helpful to assess whether capital punishment comports with notions of community by examining how
it is perceived in the hearts and minds of those who play a role in
its administration.

certiorari may be filed with the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court may affirm or
reverse both the conviction and sentence, with or without a remand, which,
consistent with the Court's guidelines, would send the case back to state court
for retrial or resentencing. A dissatisfied litigant may subsequently file a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, followed by an appeal
of this action to a federal court of appeals, and, subsequently, to the U.S.

Supreme Court.
201. THE SPANGENBERG

GROUP CASELOAD AND COST PROJECTIONS FOR

FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS DEATH PENALLY CASES IN FY 1988 AND FY 1989, at 49
(prepared for the Administrative Office of State Courts) 49 (1989), cited in
Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life
Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations,23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 45, 55 (1989).
202. PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 205.
203. Michael Mello, FacingDeath Alone: The Post-ConvictionAttorney Crisis
on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 513, 557 (1988).
204. PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 211. See a/soJulian H. Wright, Jr.,
Life-Without-Parole: An Alternative to Death or Not Much of a Life At All?, 43 VAND.
L. REv. 529 (1990).
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Is The Death Penalty Arbitrarily or Discriminatorily
Imposed?

The enormity of possibly sentencing a defendant to death
has underscored concern that weighing of evidence, application
of statutory provisions, and pronunciation of verdict and sentence, be performed objectively. Avoidance of arbitrariness,
racial bias, and discriminatory assessment in capital proceedings
may be elusive in part because these alleged practices are difficult to define. The frequency with which a death sentence is
imposed does not, by itself, indicate whether statutory provisions
are being evenhandedly applied; indeed, a relatively high or low
issuance of death sentences may, alternatively, indicate that a
large number of convicted murderers are being punished pursuant to the maximum parameters of the law, or that, objectively
applying legal guidelines, few are found to merit capital punishment. In both instances prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges,
and jurors use discretion, a range of interpretation incorporated
into statutory provisions, to assess whether the evidence, testimony, and character and background of an accused, merit a sentence of death or a term of imprisonment.
Discretion, an indispensable component of capital trial proceedings, has enabled courtroom participants to assess whether
the totality of evidence justifies a particular punishment for one
defendant, but not another. Given human frailty and conflicting
perceptions of facts and circumstances, discretion, while unavoidable, has also given rise to speculation as to whether infliction of the death penalty has been to some extent motivated by
racial or ethnic bias toward the accused or victim. Additionally,
the exercise of discretion may result in a random or arbitrary
application of statutory provisions whereby, in part due to inability to decipher complex penal codes or failure of a judge to
clearly explain points of law, ajury may appear to selectively pronounce a verdict of guilty and a recommendation of death on
some defendants but not others who present comparable circumstances and have been charged with similar offenses. These concerns have been extensively debated by abolitionists and
retentionists. Opponents of capital punishment have in part
argued that the possibility of an innocent person being executed
justified statutory prohibition of the death penalty, while retentionists have maintained that the elaborate procedural safeguards accompanying capital proceedings make erroneous
conviction remote, and, notwithstanding this possibility, do not
negate society's legitimate desire to deem the death penalty an
appropriate punishment for murder.
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Statistically, the number of individuals executed is far lower
than that for capital convictions. From 1976 to 1990, approximately 20,000 homicides have been committed nationally,2" 5
resulting in 3447 capital convictions,20 6 and 140 executions,20 7 all
but seventeen of which were conducted in the South.20 8 Moreover, nearly 70% of these executions took place in four southern
states. °9 While these numbers may simply reflect more vigorous
enforcement of the death penalty in the South, closer examination reveals a statistical pattern concerning the color of the
defendant and victim and the likelihood of being charged and
convicted of a capital crime. A series of studies seems to indicate
that racial bias, dating back in the South to the harsher statutory
penalties mandated for slaves and free blacks,21 0 persisted into
the present time in the area of capital proceedings. Evidence of
a greater frequency to convict blacks who have been charged
with murdering a white individual was first compiled in the early
1930s,2 1 and a series of studies of conviction and sentencing patterns in capital trials conducted from the 1940s up through the
1970s has corroborated this pattern. 2 In 1983, Professor David
205. WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 46 n.4 (1991).
206. Id. at 46 n.5.
207. PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 21.
208. Id.
209. From July 2, 1976 to June 3, 1990, there were 35 executions in
Texas, 22 in Florida, 19 in Louisiana, and 14 in Georgia. WHITE, supra note 205,
at 33. For a breakdown of the number of executions and individuals on death
row for the period 1977-1990, see PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 22.
210. For the history of legislation enacted during the colonial period and
continued in the antebellum South which mandated as capital offenses
committed by blacks but not by whites, see EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN
ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974); KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR
INSTITUTION (1956).
211. For-the years 1920 to 1926, white defendants charged with murder
in South Carolina were convicted 32% of the time, compared with 64% for
blacks. See HARRINGTON C. BREARLEY, HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES 110
(1932), cited in PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 120.
212. See generally CHARL.Es MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO
(1940) (indicating that, in eight Southern states, the rate of executions was
higher for blacks than whites); Guy Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS
AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 93 (1941) (examining sentencing patterns for parts
of Virginia and North Carolina in the 1930s); Elmer Johnson, Selective Factors in
CapitalPunishment, 36 Soc. FORCES 165 (1957) (furnishing evidence of more
frequent execution of blacks than whites for rape in North Carolina in the first
half of the twentieth century); Donald H. Partington, The Incidence of the Death
Penaltyfor Rape in Virginia,22 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 43, 52-53 (1965) (stating that
every rapist executed in Virginia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, District of
Columbia, and West Virginia from 1930-1962 was black); Robert C. Koeninger,
Capital Punishment in Texas, 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELINQ. 132 (1969)
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Baldus and two colleagues published "the most exhaustive study
of racial discrimination in capital sentencing that has ever been
conducted."2 1
The Baldus study analyzed death sentences for each of 594
defendants convicted of murder in Georgia from March, 1973, to
July, 1978, and 1066 prosecutions for homicide for the period
1973 to 1980.214 Employing slightly over 200 variables - such as
the race and gender and socioeconomic status of the offender
and victim, existence and extent of discussion during trial of
aggravating and mitigating factors, racial balance of the neighborhood where the homicide was committed, population density
of the crime area, commission of felony in addition to murder,
and gruesomeness of the killing, among many other factors Baldus and his colleagues discovered a dramatic pattern of racial
disparity: a black accused of killing a white person is 4.3 times
more likely to receive a death sentence than instances in which
the victim is black; black defendants were 1.1 times more likely to
be sentenced to death; a white victim was involved in 108 of the
128 cases where the death penalty was imposed; and the prosecutors recommended the death penalty in 70% of cases involving
black defendants and white victims, but in only 32% of cases
(reporting a higher rate of execution for blacks); Marvin Wolfgang, et. al,
Comparison of the Executed and the Commuted Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J.
CIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 301 (1962)
(reporting that, in
Pennsylvania during the period 1914-1958, white felony murderers were almost
three times as likely as black defendants to have their sentences commuted);
Marvin Wolfgang & Marc Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty,
407 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 119 (1973); Marvin Wolfgang & Marc
Reidel, Rape, Race, and the Death Penalty in Georgia, 45 AM. J. OF
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY

658 (1975); Rape, Racial Discrimination, and the Death Penalty,

in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Hugo Bedau & Chester Pierce
eds., 1976) (revised earlier essays; finding in eleven Southern states during the
period 1945-1965, that blacks who raped white women were eighteen to twenty
times more likely to be sentenced to death than when both the offender and
victim were white or black, or when a white raped a black woman), cited in
PATERNOSTER,

supra note 116, at 125-27. For a discussion of these and other

studies on the statistical disparities concerning treatment of blacks and whites

in capital proceedings, see

PATERNOSTER,

supra note 116, at 119-38.

213. WHITE, supra note 205, at 150, referring to David C. Baldus et al.,
Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the GeorgiaExperience,
74 J. CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983). See also their follow up studies:

EQUAL

JUSTICE

AND

THE

DEATH

PENALTY

(1990); David C. Baldus et al.,

Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A
Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REv. 133 (1986); David C. Baldus,
et al., Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Lessons
from Georgia, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1375 (1985).
214. See David C. Baldus et al., Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary
Death Sentencing Systems: Lessonsfrom Georgia, 18 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 1375 (1985).

56

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

where both individuals were white. 15 It appeared from these
findings, as well as earlier studies,2" 6 that blacks who are accused
of killing a white victim are far more likely to be convicted and
sentenced to death than among any other racial combination.
With regard to the death penalty for rape, a statistical disparity
was also evident. One scholar noted that, for the period 19301967, "50 percent of those executed for murder and 89 percent
of those executed for rape were black, even though black males
have comprised less than 20 percent of the U.S. population,"
and, since 1977, "about 40 percent of all those executed.., have
been black, and over 80 percent killed white victims. "217
Abolitionists have cited statistical trends to support their
contention that the death penalty has been discriminatorily
imposed, while retentionists have maintained that such studies
are inevitably incomplete and, irrespective of their purported
accuracy and thoroughness, do not preclude infliction of death
as a valid policy choice which a community may desire. Tabulation of statistics concerning the race of individuals convicted of
murder and the color of victims neither confirms nor negates the
position of those who support or oppose the death penalty;
retentionists cannot dismiss studies illustrating possible racial
bias in sentencing as insignificant and irrelevant, and abolitionists cannot definitively declare that bigotry is an inherent component of capital proceedings which can only be eradicated by
prohibition of the death penalty.
Infrequent conviction and execution of those tried for a capital offense has also been addressed to bolster the position of
abolitionists and retentionists, but it is unclear what constitutes
arbitrariness. Convicting, for example, only 5% of those tried for
homicide may mean either that a few individuals were capriciously chosen to be punished by death, or that juries, after careful deliberation, are preserving the integrity of the death penalty
by pronouncing it only for the most heinous offenders. One fervent opponent of capital punishment has objected that a prosecutor's decision to recommend the death penalty for some
defendants but not others may subject an accused to arbitrary
action in that a defendant, wishing to avoid death, will feel
coerced into pleading guilty to a serious offense raised by the
prosecutor; thus, a criminal conviction would be based not on
the culpability of the accused but rather on the negotiated plea
215.
216.
217.

Id.
See supra note 213.
PATERNOSTrR, supra note 116, at 156.

1994]

JUSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

57

option dictated by the district attorney. 1 8 However, an accused
facing a possible death sentence may feel that there is nothing to
lose by rejecting a prosecutor's aggressive plea bargaining tactics
and requesting a trial. Moreover, assertions by abolitionists that
varying degrees of harshness displayed by prosecutors, as well as
evidence that, within a state, likelihood of convicting of a capital
crime varied in urban and rural settings, 19 made possible an
arbitrary death sentence based on factors unrelated to the circumstances of the accused, may be countered by noting that
jurors may not necessarily succumb to prosecutorial overzealousness or perceived community sentiment.
Clearly, the positions raised by abolitionists and retentionists
may be reciprocally refuted, and, ultimately, their inconclusive
contentions are subject to the vicissitudes of political discourse.
For Justices Brennan and Marshall, however, the abolitionist's
arguments were more compelling, and their opinions on the
death penalty sought to convince the citizenry that capital punishment has no place in contemporary American society.
III.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF
THE DEATH PENALTY

A.

Initial Examination of CapitalPunishment (1878-1947)

Only two cases examining the Eighth Amendment's ban of
"cruel and unusual punishments" in connection with the death
penalty were adjudicated in the nineteenth century. In the 1878
case of Wilkerson v. Utah,22 ° the Court held that execution by firing squad did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Acknowledging the elusiveness of defining with precision the words "cruel
and unusual," the Court pointed out that "punishments of tor22 1
ture ... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty
218. BLACK, supra note 171, at 46-53. For a discussion of the challenges
facing attorneys in capital cases, see Esther F. Lardent & Douglas M. Cohen, The
Last Best Hope: RepresentingDeath Row Inmates, 23 Lo'. L.A. L. REV. 213 (1989);
Michael E. Tigar, Judges, Lawyers and the Penalty of Death, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 147

(1989).
219.

See,

e.g.,

BALDUS

ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY

(1990); SAMUEL GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989); William Bowers & Glenn Pierce,
Arbitrarinessand DiscriminationUnder Post-Furman CapitalStatutes, 26 CRIME AND
DELINQ. 563 (1980); Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime:
The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983).

220.
(1976).
221.

99 U.S. 130 (1878), overruled by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
Id. at 135.
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are forbidden." The Court's perception of degree of cruelty was
somewhat clarified twelve years later in the case of In re Kemmler,222 which, upholding electrocution as a constitutional
method of execution, stated that "[p]unishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death."2 2 These rulings suggested that punishments inflicted without prolonged pain did
not violate the Eighth Amendment.
These two rulings did not address whether the phrase "cruel
and unusual" referred to punishments practiced in the founding
generation or an evolving concept. In Kemmler, the Court
referred to "burning at the stake, crucifixion.... [and] breaking
on the wheel"2 2 4 as "inhuman and barbarous" 225 punishments,
and contrasted them with electrocution, which, though technologically novel, appeared to inflict instant death. The Court suggested that it would not confine the meaning of "cruel and
unusual" to a specific method of punishment provided that the
one adopted inflicted minimal physical suffering.
The Court next examined the phrase "cruel and unusual" in
the 1910 case of Weems v. United States,2 26 which presented not
imposition of the death penalty but rather a protracted punishment appearing excessive in relation to the offense committed.
A provision of the Philippine Penal Code punished falsifying an
official document with imprisonment "for twelve years and one
day, [and] a chain at ankle and wrist... [at] hard and painful
labor." 227 Weems, a U.S. government official, received a fifteenyear term of imprisonment, during which time he was required
to carry a chain hanging from his ankle and wrist, a substantial
fine, a loss of voting rights, and lifetime surveillance. 228 He
argued that the punishment was excessive and thus "cruel and
unusual."
In Weems, the Court for the first time declared that punishments disproportionate to the offense committed violated the
Eighth Amendment. 229 Refusing to confine interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment to its understanding in the founding genera222.

136 U.S. 436 (1890), overruled by Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153

(1976).
223.

Id. at 447.

224.

Id. at 446.

225.

Id. at 447.

226.
227.

217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Id. at 366.

228.
229.

Id. at 363-64.
This concept was first addressed in 1892 by Justice Stephen Field,

who, in dissent, wrote that "[t]he inhibition [of the Eighth Amendment] is
directed, not only against

punishments which

[barbaric]

punishments . . . but against all

by their excessive

length or severity are

greatly
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tion, the Court noted that "[t]ime works changes, brings into
existence new conditions and purposes," 230 and compelled "progressive" application of provisions which may "acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."231
Thus, the meaning of "cruel
and unusual" must evolve as concep23 2
tions of justice change.
By the early twentieth century the Court had ruled that lingering death and penalties excessive in relation to the offense
violate the Eighth Amendment. In its sole opportunity to
examine the death penalty, the Vinson Court (1946-1953), in
Louisiana ex rel. Francisv. Resweber,233 considered whether an individual facing the electric chair a second time following an electrical malfunction which prevented execution on the first attempt
was being subjected to "cruel and unusual" punishment. Conceding that an "unforeseeable accident" 234 had occurred, the
Court nevertheless held that the Eighth Amendment was not violated. Regarding the psychological stress the accused claimed to
have suffered anticipating the date of the next attempted execution, the Court declared that the "cruelty against which the Constitution protects . . . is cruelty inherent in the method of

punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method
employed to extinguish life humanely. "235
These rulings did not articulate a legal theory concerning
"cruel and unusual" punishment. To be sure, the Court permitted infliction of the death penalty, but, other than ambiguous
reference to the need for a punishment to be commensurate
with an offense, and to the performance of an execution with
minimal pain to the accused, clear standards were not furnished.
It appeared that the meaning of "cruel and unusual" was to be
disproportioned to the offenses charged." O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323,
339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
230. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.

231. Id. at 378.
232. This perception may have influenced the Court in the 1932 case of
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), which involved availability of counsel for
several youths charged with the capital offense of rape. Though not directly
addressing the Eighth Amendment, the Court, ruling that right to counsel is
required given the illiteracy of the defendants and their inability to present a
meaningful defense unaided, arguably implied that, where execution may

result, fairness of treatment to the defendant (in this instance the evolving
importance of counsel when seeking to apply increasingly complex penal
statutes) judged by contemporary expectations is an appropriate element of
constitutional adjudication.
233. 329 U.S. 459 (1947), reh'g denied,.330 U.S. 853 (1947).
234. Id. at 464.
235. Id.
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based on the justices' perceptions of the humaneness of the form
of punishment.
B.

The Warrren Court (1953-1969) Addresses "Cruel and Unusual
Punishments"

Perhaps the most fundamental components of modem adjudication on the Eighth Amendment were put forward by the
Warren Court in two cases which did not involve the death penalty. In the landmark 1958 case of Trop v. Dulles,23 6 which dealt
with loss of citizenship as punishment for wartime desertion, the
Court declared that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."2" 7 This signaled a new perspective to examinations of "cruel and unusual" punishment. Prior
to 1958, the Court had suggested that forms of execution propor23 8
tionate to a crime and inflicted humanely would be upheld;
The Trop opinion, however, indicated that sanctions would be
assessed in view of society's perceived changing attitudes, which
may call into question, by implication, psychological effects of
capital punishment, public opinion, the morality of the death
penalty, its alleged deterrent effect, and the modes of proceeding by which capital trials are conducted, whenever these issues
might arise.2 3 9 Four years later, in Robinson v. California,2 4 ° the
Court, striking down as overbroad a statute which imposed criminal penalties for a person to be addicted to narcotics, 241 held that
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" was applicable, by the due
process clause of the Four2 42
teenth Amendment, to the states.

These rulings did not signify opposition to the death penalty
but rather suggested that the Court envisioned a vigorous role in
overseeing both the method and appropriateness of criminal
sanctions. Brennan first indicated a strong desire to have the
Court examine the death penalty in a 1963 case which denied
236.
237.

356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Id. at 101.

238. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
239. Trop, 356 U.S. at 86.
240. 370 U.S. 660 (1962), reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1962).
241. § 11721 of the California Health and Safety Code provided for a
term of imprisonment of not less than ninety days or more than one year for
any person convicted of".. .use, or be[ing] under the influence of, or be[ing]
addicted to the use of narcotics," except as prescribed by a physician. Robinson,
370 U.S. at 660 n.1.
242. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
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certiorari to an individual convicted of rape and subject to execution."' Joining a brief dissent written by Justice Goldberg, Brennan, along with Justice Douglas, wished to consider: Does the
death penalty for rape violate evolving conceptions of justice
both in American society and in view of "standards of decency
more or less universally accepted?" 24 4 Is "the taking of human
life to protect a value other than human life" a disproportionate
punishment? 245 Can some of the goals of punishment - "deterrence, isolation, rehabilitation" - be achieved with a sanction
less severe than execution for rape?24 6
Brennan did not, at this point in his tenure, urge categorical
rejection of capital punishment, and, in the handful of cases
decided in the 1960s dealing with procedures followed in state
capital trials, it appeared that the Warren Court accepted the
constitutionality of the death penalty and was unwilling to consider whether it violated the Eighth Amendment per se.
The Warren Court did not articulate a comprehensive position on capital punishment; instead, it addressed admissibility of
evidence in proceedings statutorily punishable by death. In
247
the Court objected that testimony furDavis v. North Carolina,
nished to police by an individual arrested for rape and murder,
and subsequently interrogated over a sixteen-day period of incarceration, was coercively obtained. 248 The Court also invalidated
confessions to a capital crime on the ground that the nature and
implications of the guilty plea were insufficiently explained and
thus involuntary. 249 At no time did the Court discuss applicability of "cruel and unusual punishments" or give any indication
that the death penalty was unacceptable.
The Warren Court's unwillingness to declare the death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment was most apparent in
cases dealing with waiving trial by jury and empaneling of jurors
in capital proceedings. In United States v. Jackson,25 ° the Court
examined a provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act of 1932251
which punished interstate kidnaping by death or life imprison243. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, reh'g denied, 375 U.S. 917 (1963).
244. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. at 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469 (1947)).
245. Id. at 891.
246. Id.
247. 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
248. Id. at 752.
249. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969);Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964).
250. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
251. Federal Kidnapping Act of 1932, ch. 271, 47 Stat. 236 (1932)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1988)).
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ment, as "the verdict of the jury shall so recommend."2

52

This

suggested that a defendant who relinquished jury trial by pleading guilty, or who was sentenced by ajudge, may evade the death
penalty, since its infliction was possible only by a jury. This prospect, the Court believed, would compromise the Sixth Amendment's protection of trial by jury.25 3 Moreover, the Court
insisted that the statute refrained from specifying procedures for
an accused who pleaded guilty or waived jury trial, and did not
clarify the relationship between
the jury and judge concerning
254
determination of sentence.

The Court's concern with jury deliberations was also evident
256
in the cases of Whitus v. Georgia2 55 and Witherspoon v. Illinois,
both of which addressed procedures for empaneling jurors in
capital trials. The Whitus case involved a provision of Georgia law
which authorized jury commissioners to select grand and petit
jurors from lists of county tax digests which, prior to 1965, used
257
separate tax return sheets for white and black taxpayers.
Though state authorities claimed to have employed a revised jury
list on which no one had been included or excluded on the basis
of race or color, the Court held that the petitioners, convicted of
murder, confronted a "prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
by which an extreme disparity between the "percentage
of Negroes listed on the tax digest (27.1%) and that of the grand
jury venire (9.1%) and the petit jury venire (7.8%) "1259 suggested
an ongoing pattern of selective empaneling.
In Witherspoon, the Court also objected to a practice which it
believed compromised the objectivity of a jury. A provision of
Illinois law which permitted a judge to disqualify potential jurors
who expressed "conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same, "260 was construed by the
petitioner to produce a biased jury which, unopposed to the
death penalty, would "too readily .

.

. accept the prosecution's

252.

390 U.S. at 570-71.

253.

The Sixth Amendment in pertinent part states that: "In all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For identical reasons, the Court,
per curiam, vacated and remanded a sentence of death under the Federal Bank
Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (1988). See Pope v. United States, 392 U.S.
651 (1968).
254. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 580-84.
255. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
256. 391 U.S. 510 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968).
257. Whitus, 385 U.S. at 548-49.
258. Id. at 551.
259. Id. at 552.
260. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512.
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version of the facts, and return a verdict of guilt."' 26 ' Though
stating that this position was "tentative and fragmentary," 262 the
Court reversed the death sentence and suggested that only those
potential jurors who indicated that they would vote against the
death penalty regardless of the evidence brought out in trial be
excluded.2 63
The Warren Court was concerned with procedural fairness
in capital deliberations and refrained from examining whether
capital punishment violated the Eighth Amendment per se.
Interestingly, Brennan at no time during Warren's tenure wrote
a concurring or dissenting opinion expressing his views on capital punishment. In view of the strong opposition to capital punishment which Brennan articulated following Warren's
retirement, 264 it is surprising that, in Witherspoon, he did not write
a concurring opinion expressing concern over possible arbitrariness of the death penalty arising from the subjectivity accompanying jury empaneling. In other words, Brennan might have
emphasized that jury bias, which no procedural safeguards can
completely eliminate, compelled a form of punishment (other
than execution) capable of suspension if courtroom improprieties are subsequently proved. Marshall, who joined the Court in
1967, did not participate in any cases on this subject.

261. Id. at 516-17.
262. Id. at 517.
263. Id. at 522 n.21. See also Bumper v. State of North Carolina, 391 U.S.
543 (1968) (considerig a similar objection from a defendant sentenced to life
imprisonment). For an analysis ofjury empaneling in capital cases, see HARRY
KALVEN, JR., & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 437-49 (1966); Marshall Dayan
et al., SearchingForan ImpartialSentencer ThroughJuiy Selection in Capital Trials, 23
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 151 (1989); Robert E. Knowlton, Problems of Juy Discretion in
Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1099 (1953); Walter E. Oberer, Does
DisqualificationofJurorsfor Scruples Against CapitalPunishment ConstituteDenial of
Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEX. L. REv. 545 (1961). For an analysis of the
Witherspoon opinion, see WHrrE, supra note 205, at 186-207; Edward Bronson,
On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-QualifiedJury: An
Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1970); Faye
Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: CapitalScruples, Juy Bias and Use of
Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53
(1970); Craig Haney, ExaminingDeath Qualification:FurtherAnalysis of the Process
Effect, 8J.L. & HUM. BEHAV. 133 (1984); George L. Jurow, New Data on the Effect
of a 'Death Qualified'Juy on the Guilt DeterminationProcess, 84 HARv. L. REv. 567
(1971); David Rotman,Jury Selection and the Death Penalty: Witherspoon in the Lower
Courts, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 759 (1970); Welsh S. White, The Constitutional
Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death-QualifiedJuries, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1176
(1973).
264.

See infra text accompanying notes 404-85.
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The Burger Court (1969-1986) Upholds the Death Penalty and
Discusses ProceduralGuidelines to be Followed in its
Imposition

At the time Warren Burger commenced his tenure as Chief
Justice in October, 1969, a voluntary moratorium on execution
had been in effect for two years. Pending clarification of procedural guidelines in capital trials, states, as ofJune, 1967, adopted
a de facto moratorium on execution.2 6 In 1969, forty-six petitions concerning the death penalty were filed with the Court, followed by thirty-eight others the next year.2 66 In 1970, the Court
refrained from addressing the constitutionality of capital punishment, and confined itself to issues dealing with fairness of procedural standards comparable to those adjudicated in the last two
years of Warren's tenure.
In the pivotal cases of McGautha v.
California2 68 and Crampton v. Ohio,26 9 decided on the same day in
1971, the Court discussed discretion to be accorded to states in
administering the death penalty.
The McGautha and Crampton cases examined the range of
discretion available to juries which may impose the death penalty, and whether both the verdict and sentence may be pronounced in a single stage.2 7 ° California was one of six states
which provided for a bifurcated trial in capital cases whereby
guilt would be determined in the first stage, and, in a subsequent
proceeding, sentence would be pronounced based on an examination of aggravating and mitigating factors.27 1 Ohio statutes,
similar to those in twenty-six other states, provided that both guilt
and punishment are to be determined in a single trial. 272
265.
266.

BowERs, supra note 117, at 419.
MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 214 (1973).
267. The position put forward in Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512, was applied
in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970), first set aside for review in 1968, 393
U.S. at 997, argued before the Court on March 4, 1969, and, following the

resignation on May 14 of Justice Abe Fortas, reargued on May 4, 1970.
Allegations of coerced confession in a capital offense, examined in Davis v.
State of North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966), were considered in three 1970
cases: Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970); and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The
opportunity of a defendant to question the testimony of twenty witnesses called

by the prosecution was considered in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
268.
269.

402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh'g denied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972).
Id.

270.
271.

Id.
Id. at 185.

272.

Id.
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Speaking on behalf of six members, Justice Harlan declared
that state statutes which left absolute discretion to juries to
impose the death penalty, without any standards to guide them,
did not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 73 While the contention that conferring on juries unconfined discretion may result in arbitrary infliction of the death
penalty had an "undeniable surface appeal,"2 7 4 Harlan emphasized that it was impossible to identify the myriad factors which
jurors in capital trials may consider. Thus, he concluded that,
"[i] n light of history, experience, and the present limitations of
human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to
pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything
in the Constitution."2 7 5 The Court did not explicitly state
whether the death penalty per se violated the Eighth Amendment; it merely indicated that states may choose to punish
offenses as capital and to devise trial proceedings free from judicial interference.
Only fourteen months after McGautha and Crampton were
decided, the Court retracted its position by expressing concern
for the alleged arbitrary enforcement of capital statutes and commanding states to reexamine their modes of proceeding in trials
where the death penalty may be inflicted. In the landmark case
of Furman v. Georgia,2 76 decided on June 29, 1972, the Court,
believing that statutes in Georgia and Texas enabled arbitrary
imposition of capital punishment, ruled per curiam that "the
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
'27 7
Eighth and Fourteenth amendments.
This brief statement was followed by nine separate opinions
totaling 217 pages.2 78 In varying degrees and levels of intensity,
the justices elaborated on the constitutionality of capital punishment, the infrequency with which it is imposed, the alleged arbitrariness and racial bias accompanying its infliction, its alleged
deterrent effect, its acceptability in contemporary society, and
273.

Id. at 221; see also supra note 57.

274. 402 U.S. at 206-07.
275. Id. at 207.
276. 408 U.S. 238 (1972), reh'gdenied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972). (This case was
decided together withJackson v. Georgiaand Branch v. Texas. In Furman, the jury
recommended the death penalty for the petitioner, who killed the head of
household in a burglary attempt. Id. at 239, 252. In both Jackson and Branch, an
individual arrested for rape was sentenced by the jury to death.
277. 408 U.S. at 239-40 (emphasis added).
278. 408 U.S. at 240-470.
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the role of the judiciary regarding supervision of criminal justice
in the states.Y19 The Furmanruling, categorized by one scholar as
a 'jurisprudential debacle," 28 0 left unanswered whether capital
punishment violated the Eighth Amendment, and, absent procedural guidelines, failed to instruct thirty-five states and the District of Columbia which had death penalty statutes how to revise
their laws and deal with six hundred forty-two persons then on
death row 28who
at least temporarily had been granted a stay of
1
execution.
By confining itself to the jury's pronouncements "in these
cases," the Furman decision avoided ruling that capital punishment per se was unconstitutional, that the death penalty is impermissible for certain types of crimes, or that mandatory death
sentences are "cruel and unusual." Failing to furnish standards 2 2 for determining what penalties or procedures constituted "cruel and unusual" punishment, the Furman ruling
presented a difficult obstacle for state statutes which established
discretionary rather than mandatory capital punishment. The
opinions of the concurring justices (Brennan, Marshall, Douglas,
Stewart, and White) in Furman, taken together, suggested that
the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment
because of its arbitrary and infrequent imposition. 2 3 This
presented states with a paradox in that unlimited discretion enabled jurors to arbitrarily inflict the death penalty, while
mandatory capital punishment laws eliminated discretion but
prevented jurors from weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In addition, the McGautha and Furman rulings contradictorily told states, respectively, that unlimited jury
discretion in sentencing was not unconstitutional, and that too
much discretion may result in discriminatory infliction of the
death penalty.
After Furmanwas decided, all thirty-five states that had death
penalty statutes revised their laws, narrowing the range of discretion available to jurors. 2 4 Twenty-five of these statutes established a bifurcated process whereby judges and juries were
required to take into account specific aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in determining guilt or innocence, and, in a sec279. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 54-59; Daniel D. Polsby, The
Death of CapitalPunishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
280. MargaretJ. Radin, The Jurisprudenceof Death: Evolving Standardsfor the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 998 (1978).
281. GoREcKi, supra note 124, at 93.
282. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
283. Id.

284.

GomcKi, supra note 124, at 17.
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ond trial, the decision whether to impose the death penalty
would be rendered.2 8 5 Ten other statutes sought to eliminate
any possibility that capital punishment might be arbitrarily
imposed by enacting mandatory death sentences for those convicted of specific offenses. 2 6 Four years after the Furman ruling,
the Court examined five of these revised death penalty statutes,
all decided on July 2, 1976: Gregg v. Georgia,2 87 Jurek v. Texas,288
Proffitt v. Forida,28 9 Woodson v. North Carolina,290 and Roberts v.
Louisiana.2 9 1 In 1978, Ohio's revised
statute was considered in
29 3
2
Bell v. Ohio29 and Lockett v. Ohio.

The Court upheld statutes which allowed the sentencing
body to refrain from imposing the death penalty even after finding the accused guilty (Georgia, Texas, and Florida),294 and
struck down those imposing mandatory death sentences (North
Carolina, Louisiana, Ohio).2 9 5 States which provided a discretionary death sentence established a bifurcated trial in which a
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, of guilt or innocence would
be determined in the first stage, and sentence imposed in the
second. 29 6 At least one aggravating factor among a list of statutorily enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances had to
be linked to the accused in order to impose the sentence of
death.2 9 7 Though jurors retained considerable discretion,298 the
285.
286.
287.
288.

See generally id.
Id.
428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
428 U.S. 262, reh'g denied sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 875

(1976).
289.

428 U.S. 242, reh'g denied sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 875
(1976).
290. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
291. 428 U.S. 325, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
292. 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
293. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
294. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, reh'g denied sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 875
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, reh'g denied sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia,
429 U.S. 875 (1976).
295. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 325; Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 637; Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. at 586.
296. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158;Jurek, 428 U.S. at 267; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 24546.
297. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9;Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at
250 n.6.
298. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262. Jurors, according to Texas law, had to find
two aggravating circumstances in order for the death penalty to be imposed:
First, the conduct that caused the victim's death had to be "committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased
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Court believed that limiting the category of offenses for which
the death penalty might be imposed, and requiring jurors to
weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances, confined their
discretion and, presumably, reduced the likelihood of arbitrary
infliction of capital punishment. 299 By contrast, the Court held
that statutes which required imposition of the death penalty once
guilt of a capital offense was established °° were "unduly harsh
and unworkably rigid"3 °1 alternatives. This arrangement, the
Court believed, could result in capricious sentencing if jurors,
aware that the death penalty must be imposed for certain crimes,
purposely found guilt for a lesser offense if they believed that a
particular defendant did not warrant execution.30 2 In addition,
the Court pointed out that, by taking away all discretion,
mandatory capital statutes precluded jurors from fully taking into
consideration the particular circumstances of the accused.
These cases made permissible imposition of the death penalty for some crimes; indeed, in Gregg the Court for the first time
explicitly acknowledged that capital punishment "does not invariably violate the Constitution."30 3 However, the Court refrained
from specifying which crimes are capital, and acknowledged the
power of states to refuse to "select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or
disproportionate to the crime involved."30 4 In sum, the Court
concluded that unconfined discretion made possible arbitrariness in reaching a verdict, while removing all discretion (by
mandatory capital statutes) might inhibit jury flexibility by precluding consideration of individual circumstances. 0 5 The Court
or another would result." Second, the jury had to find "a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society." Id. If jurors could not definitively find both
aggravating circumstances, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Id. The Woodson case involved a North Carolina statute which provided for a
mandatory death penalty for all persons convicted of first-degree murder,
defined as "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing" or murder in the
course of committing particular crimes. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286.
299. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-98, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 262, 276, reh'g denied sub nom. Gregg v.
Georgia, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251-52, reh'g
denied sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
300. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. -280-86 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329 n.3.
301. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293.
302. Id. at 303.
303. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
304. Id. at 175.
305. Id. at 206. For an analysis of Gregg and its companion cases, see
Charles L. Black, Jr., Due Process For Death:Jurek v. Texas and Companion Cases,
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wished to give juries the option of recommending death or a
term of imprisonment after fully examining an array of aggravating and mitigating evidence, and preclude their ability to base a
verdict on extraneous factors. Its position in Bell30 6 and Lockett,30 7 however, indicated that, once jury discretion is accorded,
arbitrariness cannot be fully prevented.
The Bell and Lockett cases, decided on the same day in 1978,
dealt with an Ohio statute which mandated death for seven
classes of murder if the defendant failed to establish one of the
following mitigating factors: the victim of the offense induced it;
the offender was under duress or provoked; or the offender suffered from a mental deficiency. 3°8 Unable to meet this statutory
requirement, the defendants were convicted and sentenced to
death. °9
The Court struck down this law, holding that it did not adequately permit individual consideration of mitigating circumstances.3 10 Conceding that standards to be followed in capital
trials are difficult to enumerate and that the kinds of mitigating
factors to be considered had never been specified in earlier rulings, the Court held that sentencing authorities must consider,
"as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."3 l1
By allowing consideration of only three mitigating factors, the
Court believed that adequate examination of the range of events
which may have accompanied the defendant's circumstances had
not transpired.
The Bell and Lockett decisions, seeking to prevent arbitrariness in sentencing, made it inevitable. The Court, hoping to
confine jury discretion to consideration of factors relating to the
particular circumstances of an accused, instead enabled raising
of issues - such as the race of the victim and accused compared
with statistical patterns in the state as a whole - which may merit
investigation but are not relevant to the determination of guilt.
26 CATH. U. L. REv. 1 (1976); Kenneth M. Murchison, Toward A Perspective on the
Death Penalty Cases, 27 EMORY L.J. 469, 491-508 (1978); L.S. Tao, The
ConstitutionalStatus of Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Gregg, Jurek, Roberts,
and Woodson, 54 U. DET.J. URB. L. 345 (1977); Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon
Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the Eighth Amendment: Furman and Gregg in
Retrospect, 18 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 927 (1985); Radin, supra note 280, at 1002-13.
306. Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
307. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
308. Id. at 593.
309. Id. at 594.
310. Id. at 608-09.
311. Id. at 604 (emphasis in original).
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Moreover,3 12
these decisions,
along with the positions taken in
McGautha,
Furman,s 1s Gregg s 14 and its companion cases, s 15
communicated ambiguous and contradictory guidelines to states.
After telling states, in 1971,16 that the Court would not attempt
to prepare a list of factors to be considered by jurors, thus leading the states to believe that they were free to devise capital trial
proceedings according to their own notions of justice, the states
were subsequently directed, one year later,3 17 to eliminate
alleged arbitrariness in deliberations, but were not furnished guidance on how this might be accomplished. In 1976, the Court
indicated that it would approve statutes which displayed a sincere
effort to confine jurors' discretion but simultaneously warned
states not to attempt this too severely;"' two years later, a state,
seeking to comply with this directive by confining discretion, was
told to expand it subject only to the parameters of the range of
issues a litigant seeks to introduce.3 1 9 The Lockett opinion, which
reminded states that they must not allow jurors unconfined discretion but simultaneously insisted that they were free to take
into account any mitigating circumstances, 2 ' unleashed, noted
one scholar, "the floodgates of discretion
that the Court's
3 21
demand for 'standards' was meant to limit."

After its Furmanruling in 1972, the Burger Court, not counting petitions for certiorari and stays of execution decided without an opinion, examined the death penalty in thirty-seven
cases. 22 The issues presented included: the weighing by jurors
312. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh'g denied, 406 U.S.
978 (1972).
313. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
314. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 288-91.
316. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207-08.
317. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 287-91.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 292-93.
320. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-05 (1978).
321.

BERGER, supra note 113, at 151.

322. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Turner v. Murray, 476
U.S. 28 (1986); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Cabana v. Bullock,
474 U.S. 376 (1986); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372 (1985); Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985);
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203
(1984); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267
(1984); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984); Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46
(1983); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S.
939, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S.
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of aggravating and mitigating circumstances;. 23 sentencing dis3 25
cretion at the appellate stage;3 2 4 method of empanelingjurors
and conveying information on their responsibilities in assessing
guilt or innocence; 32 6 presentence introduction of testimony or a
written report; 32 7 the death penalty for accomplices;328 the death
penalty for commission of rape, 2 9 and for the mentally
insane; 3 30 comments made by a prosecutor or judge prior to sentencing; 3 3' competency of counsel for the accused;3 32 and revision by a state of its capital statute. 3 Its pronouncements, taken
in the aggregate, indicated that states may enact capital statutes
provided that application is limited to clearly defined classes of
murder, and that due process requirements have been fol430 (1981); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625
(1980); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510 (1979); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
637 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977);
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, reh'g denied
sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
reh'g denied sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637 (1974).
323. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 1; Ramos, 463 U.S. at 992; Barclay, 463 U.S. at 939;
Zant, 462 U.S. at 862; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 104; Beck, 447 U.S. at 625; Godfrey, 446
U.S. at 420; Bell, 438 U.S. at 637; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 586; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325;
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242; Gregg,
428 U.S. at 153.
324. Baldwin, 472 U.S. at 372; Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 447; Arizona, 467 U.S.
at 203; Pulley, 465 U.S. at 37; Bullington, 451 U.S. at 430.
325. Turner,476 U.S. at 28; Wainwright,469 U.S. at 412; Adams, 448 U.S. at
38; Davis, 428 U.S. at 122.
326. Francis, 471 U.S. at 307; Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 510.
327. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95
(1979); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
328. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 376 (1986); Enmund, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
329. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
330. Ford, 447 U.S. at 399. For a discussion of execution of the mentally
insane prior to the Ford decision, see James S. Liebman & Michael J. Shepard,
Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the 'BoilerPlate'. Mental Disorder as a
Mitigating Factor, 66 GEORGETOWN L.J. 757 (1978). For an analysis of the Ford
ruling, see John Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to Death:
An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REv. 725, 756-757 (1988).
331.
Caldwe4 472 U.S. at 320; Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 637.
332. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668. For a discussion of circumstances
confronted by attorneys in capital trials, see, generally, WHrrE, supra note 205;
Gary Goodpaster, The Trial ForLife: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299 (1983).
333. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 282.
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lowed."3 4 Though the Burger Court, after 1972, overturned convictions in twenty-two cases,33 it never articulated clear standards
to be followed ,bystates, prompting one scholar to conclude that
its opinions "engendered confusion" and "created a minefield
through which the perplexed legislators tread at their peril." 3 6
D.

The Rehnquist Court (1986- ) and CapitalPunishment Up to
the Retirements of Brennan and Marshall

Up to the time of Marshall's retirement on June 28, 1991
(Brennan announced his decision to step down on July 20,
1990), the Rehnquist Court had handed down thirty-nine rulings
on the death penalty - seven in 1987,"' 7 six in 1988,338 seven in
1989," 39 twelve in 1990,340 and seven in 1991.41 With the excep334. BERGER, supra note 113, at 131.
335. Ford, 477 U.S. at 399; Turner, 476 U.S. at 28; Skipper, 476 U.S. at 1;
Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 320; Francis, 471 U.S. at 307; Ake, 470 U.S. at 68; Arizona,
467 U.S. at 203; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782; Eddings, 455 U.S. at 104; Bullington,
451 U.S. at 430; Adams, 448 U.S. at 38; Beck, 447 U.S. at 625; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at
420; Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 510; Green, 442 U.S. at 95; Bell 438 U.S. at 637;
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 586; Coker, 433 U.S. at 584; Gardner, 430 U.S. at 349; Davis,
429 U.S. at 122; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280.
336. BERGER, supra note 113, at 152.
337. Burger v. Kemp, 438 U.S. 776, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987);
Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, reh'g
denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987), and overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597 (1991); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 921 (1987); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
338. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Johnson v.
Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988);
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249
(1988); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 944 (1988).
339. Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989);
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S.
805, reh'gdenied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989), and overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.
Ct. 2597 (1991); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 927
(1989); Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1301 (1989).
340. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990); Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1
(1990); Lewis v.Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, rehgdenied, 497 U.S. 1050 (1990); Walton
v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050 (1990); Sawyer v. Smith, 497
U.S. 227, reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050 (1990); Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731
(1990); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738 (1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); McKoy v. North Carolina,
494 U.S. 433 (1990); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, reh'g denied, 495 U.S. 924
(1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
341. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, reh'gdenied, 112 S. Ct. 28 (1991);
Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 28 (1991); Mu'Min v.
Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, reh'gdenied, 112 S. Ct. 13 (1991);Yates v. Evatt, 111 S.
Ct. 1884 (1991); Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991); McCleskey v. Zant,
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tion of four issues - the admissibility of testimony on the emotional impact of a victim's death on family members, 4 2 right to
counsel in appellate capital proceedings, 343 abuse of the writ of
habeas corpus,34 4 and the death penalty for minors 45 - none of
these cases presented questions which had not been considered
by the Burger Court. Early in its tenure, the Rehnquist Court
signaled that it would be guided in its consideration of capital
proceedings by precedents established in earlier cases. In the
1987 case of McCleskey v. Kemp,146 one of its first rulings on the
death penalty,3 47 the Rehnquist Court elaborated on its intended
examination of state capital statutes:
In sum, our decisions since Furman have identified a
constitutionally permissible range of discretion in imposing the death penalty. First, there is a required threshold
below which the death penalty cannot be imposed. In this
context, the State must establish rational criteria that narrow the decision maker's judgment as to whether the circumstances of a particular defendant's case meet the
threshold. Moreover, a societal consensus that the death
penalty is disproportionate to a particular offense prevents
a State from imposing the death penalty for that offense.
Second, States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration
of any relevant circumstances that could cause it to decline
to impose the penalty. In this respect, the State cannot
channel the sentencer's discretion, but must allow it to
consider any
relevant information offered by the
3 48
defendant.
111 S. Ct. 1454, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 2841 (1991); Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct.
731, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 1340 (1991).
342. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987),
and overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).

343.

Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).

344.

McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 2841

(1991).
345. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989),
decided together with Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937
(1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). In Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the majority refrained from deciding whether
the execution of minors is constitutional.
346. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
347. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (decided the same day,
as McCleskey, Apr. 22, 1987); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (decided Apr. 21,
1987).
348. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 306-07. The Court reiterated its adherence to
this standard in Payne, 111 S.Ct. at 2597, and Blystone, 494 U.S. at 299.

74

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

Up to the time of Brennan and Marshall's departure, the
Rehnquist Court continued to adhere to this standard. However,
this did not produce a coherent approach in capital adjudication; of 39 cases,34 9 the Court reversed 19 convictions perceived
to have violated the defendant's right to due process of law.3 5 ° A
consistent position has appeared neither in the frequency with
which state convictions have been overturned 351 nor in the application of precedents. This has been most evident in the Court's
examination of statutory enumeration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the most frequently adjudicated issue in
the Rehnquist Court's first five Terms. Of eighteen cases, 35 2 ten
convictions, examined in light of precedents established in Gregg
and

its companion
55

cases, 3

53

and

Lockett v.

Ohio,354

were

reversed.
While this may suggest that the Court has been
more sympathetic to protection of due process of law than states,
other decisions - such as those disallowing alleged patterns of
racial discrimination in capital sentencing to be considered in an
instance where a black defendant is convicted of killing a white
349. See supra notes 337-41.
350. Parker,498 U.S. at 308; Yates, 111 S. Ct. at 1884; Lankford, 111 S. Ct.
at 1723; Cage, 498 U.S. at 39; Shell, 498 U.S. at 1; McKoy, 494 U.S. at 433; Powel4
492 U.S. at 680; Murray, 492 U.S. at 1; Gathers,490 U.S. at 805; Dugger, 489 U.S.
at 401; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815;Johnson,486 U.S. at 578; Maynard,486 U.S. at
356; Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 249; Mills, 486 U.S. at 367; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279;
Sumner, 483 U.S. at 66; Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 393; Booth, 482 U.S. at 496.
351. The breakdown of reversed convictions for each Term is as follows:
Number of Cases
Reversed State
Term
Decided
Convictions
October, 1990
7
3
October, 1989
12
3
October, 1988
7
4
October, 1987
6
5
October, 1986
7
4
352. Parker,498 U.S. at 308; Shell, 498 U.S. at 1; Lewis, 497 U.S. at 764;
Walton, 497 U.S. at 639; Clemons, 494 U.S. at 738; Saffle, 494 U.S. at 484; McKoy,
494 U.S. at 433; Boyde, 494 U.S. at 370; Blystone, 494 U.S. at 299; Penry, 492 U.S.
at 302; Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 638; Johnson, 486 U.S. at 578; Mills, 486 U.S. at 367;
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 356; Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 231; Sumner, 483 U.S. at 66;
Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 393; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279.
353. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, reh'g denied sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 875
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, reh'g denied sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia,
429 U.S. 875 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
354. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See also Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
355. Parker,498 U.S. at 308; Shell, 498 U.S. at 1; McKoy, 494 U.S. at 433;
Penry, 492 U.S. at 302;Johnson,486 U.S. at 578; Maynard, 486 U.S. at 356; Mills,
486 U.S. at 367; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279; Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 393; Sumner,
483 U.S. at 66.
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victim, 56 upholding the death penalty for minors 1 7 and the
mentally retarded,35 8 and filing a petition for habeas corpus.5 9
indicate insensitiveness to the position of the accused. The
Court's adherence to precedent - as evidenced in its overturning, afterjust four years, of its initial decision to disallow, as irrelevant to the culpability of the accused, use of testimony on the
3 60
psychological trauma suffered by the victim's family members;
its contention that the death penalty is permissible, in light of
evolving societal standards of decency, for sixteen and seventeen2 and
year-olds, 36 1 but not for those who are fifteen years of age; 36363
accomplices
for
penalty
death
the
of
reinterpretation
its
was also uneven.
In short, the Rehnquist Court, like its immediate predecessor, has not articulated and implemented a coherent position on
capital punishment. Its rulings appear to have been based on
subjective perceptions of fairness to the accused as determined
by a fluctuating majority. 3 64 This trend, as well as a belief that
the range of issues surrounding the death penalty have not been
satisfactorily addressed, impelled both Brennan and Marshall to
forcefully elaborate on their views of capital punishment.
IV.

A.

JUSTICE BRENNAN'S OPINIONS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Early Voting Pattern and FirstElaboration of Position in
McGautha v. California (1971)

The Burger Court, it will be recalled, did not examine
whether the death penalty constituted "cruel and unusual" pun356. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987).
See infra text accompanying notes 506-25.
357. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989),
and its companion, Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937
(1989). But see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).

358. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
359. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
360. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987),
and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989)
and both overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
361.

Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361 (upheld death penalty for seventeen-year-

old); Wilkins, 492 U.S. at 361 (upheld death penalty for sixteen-year-old).
362. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815.
363. Cf Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 921 (1987);
Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982).
364. For a detailed examination of the Rehnquist Court's approach to
capital punishment in its first five Terms (1986-1991), see Alan I. Bigel, The
Rehnquist Court on Right to Life: Forecastfor the 1990s, 18 OHio N.U. L. REv. 515,
531-56 (1992).
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ishment in several 1970 cases which largely focused on admissibility of testimony in trial proceedings for offenses statutorily
punishable by death.3 65 Brennan also refrained from addressing
this question, focusing instead on assessing voluntariness of a
confession. In the companion 1970 cases of Parkerv. North Carolina36 6 and Brady v. United States,3 6 7 Brennan, writing a single
opinion expressing both dissent from and concurrence with the
majority's position, respectively,3 6 8 discussed application of precedent. In United States v. Jackson, 6 9 decided in 1968, the Warren

Court indicated that statutory provisions which made possible a
less severe penalty for capital defendants who choose to forego
trial by jury were invalid.3 7 0 Brennan maintained that the major37 1
ity failed to adhere to this position in Parker.
The Parkercase involved a North Carolina law which authorized a jury to recommend a penalty of death or life imprisonment for first-degree burglary. 7 2 After consulting with counsel,
the accused, aware that entering a plea of guilty would result in a
7 4 which
sentence of life imprisonment, 7 3 signed a confession,
373
the Court upheld as an informed and voluntary act.

Acknowledging the difficulty which the Court has encountered in seeking to assess the myriad factors potentially affecting
the voluntariness of a confession,37 6 Brennan nevertheless
emphasized that, based on the precedent in Jackson, 7 7 Parker's
guilty plea was unconstitutional. Unlike plea bargaining, where a
defendant may elect to plead guilty to an offense based on an
assessment of the weight of evidence and its possible affect on a
jury, an accused who exercised a statutory provision mandating
life imprisonment for a crime punishable by death by entering a
plea of guilty was coerced to relinquish the constitutional protec365. See supra note 267. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 512; Maxwell v. Bishop,
398 U.S. 262 (1970); Davis, 384 U.S. at 737; Brady, 397 U.S. at 742; Parker,397
U.S. at 790; Alford, 400 U.S. at 25; Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).

366.

397 U.S. 790 (1970).

367. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
368. Parker,397 U.S. at 799 (Brennan,J., dissenting in part, concurring in
part); Brady, 397 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

369. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
370. See supra text accompanying notes 250-54.
371. 397 U.S. at 799.
372. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-51, and 52 (1969). (Current version at N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-52). Parker,397 U.S. at 792 n.1.
373. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-162.1 (1965), repealed by 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws
c.1225. Parker,397 U.S. at 792, n.2.
374.

Parker,397 U.S. at 792.

375.
376.
377.

Id. at 795-96.
Id. at 799-804.
390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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tion of trial byjury.17 1 Moreover, Brennan maintained, potential
exercise of constitutional rights is more compelling when death,
"the most severe and awesome penalty known to our law," 79 may
be imposed. Noting that the Court "has recognized that capital
cases are treated differently in some respects from noncapital
cases,"38 0 and that "the threat of a death penalty [has been raised]
as a factor to be given considerable weight in determining
whether a defendant has deliberately waived his constitutional
rights," 8 ' Brennan suggested that heightened judicial scrutiny
of statutory provisions is imperative where the death penalty may
result. In 1971, however, the Court, in McGautha v. California 2
and its companion, Crampton v. Ohio,38 3 expressed unwillingness

to undertake detailed examination of state capital guidelines.3 8 4
The Court's contention in McGautha that it is both impossible and inappropriate to devise a list of factors to be considered
by ajury in a capital trial,38 5 and thatjurors, "confronted with the
truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow
human,"38 6 will undoubtedly consider a wide range of circum87
stances in careful deliberation, brought forth a lengthy dissent
by Brennan (which Marshall and Douglas joined) which, primarily, addressed the importance of, and prior rulings on, preserving
due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment,3 8 8 as well
as historical delegation of power by a legislature. 89 While
acknowledging a state's considerable discretion to devise policy
and select methods of implementation, Brennan emphasized
that this power is not unlimited. The purpose of the due process
clause,3 90 Brennan pointed out, is "to protect individuals against
the arbitrary exercise of state power."391 This is constitutionally
fulfilled by explicitly articulating the objectives of legislation and
channeling the range of discretion to be exercised by those
authorized to implement statutory policy. By proceeding in this
378. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See supra note 253.
379. Parker, 397 U.S. at 809.
380. Id. at 809-10 (citing Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955)).
381. Id. at 810 (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) and
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)).
382. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
383. Id.

384.

See supra text accompanying notes 268-75.

385. Id. 402 U.S. at 207.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

402 U.S. at 208.
402 U.S. at 248-312.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
402 U.S. at 271-87.
See supra note 57.
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 270.
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manner, allegations of abuse of power may be more readily
detected. Capital statutes enacted in California and Ohio, Brennan argued, did not meet this standard; they merely directed the
jury to reach a verdict and recommend death or life imprisonment after examining evidence deemed pertinent. This standardless discretion, Brennan maintained, violated both due process
and delegation of power requirements formulated by the Court
since the late nineteenth century.3 9 2
Brennan did not believe that McGautha directly addressed
the meaning of "cruel and unusual punishments;" indeed, he
pointed out that the issue presented did not "in the slightest way
draw into question the power of States to determine whether or
not to impose the death penalty itself,"393 or whether the penalty
of death "'is appropriate punishment' for the petitioners before
US." 3 9 4 The obligation of a state to comply with due process of
law in formulating and providing for the application of penal
codes was, as perceived by Brennan, the key issue presented, and
he objected to the majority's failure to address this concern by
merely asserting, as if it were necessary to devise "predetermined
standards so precise as to be capable of purely mechanical application," s95 that this subject is inappropriate for judicial
consideration.
It is impossible to definitively determine Brennan's position
on the death penalty in McGautha, though it may appear that he
would not object to a capital statute which explicitly confined the
range of discretion to be exercised in trial proceedings. Brennan
could have declared that the death penalty violated the Eighth
Amendment irrespective of the meticulous procedural protections which a state may have devised. Instead, however, he
seemed to encourage state innovation on assessing appropriate
punishment for criminal offenses, and did not foreclose the possibility that capital punishment may be enacted. He declared:
...I

do not believe that the legislatures of the 50 States are

so devoid of wisdom and the power of rational thought
that they are unable to face the problem of capital punishment directly, and to determine for themselves the criteria
under which convicted capital felons should be chosen to
live or die.39 6
392.

Id. at 252-57.

393.
394.
395.
396.

Id. at 310.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Id.

1994]

JUSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL ON CAPJTAL PUNISHMENT

79

In other words, Brennan's dissent focused not on the majority's willingness to sanction the death penalty but rather on its
assumption that this issue was too complex to be subject to due
process and delegation of power standards traditionally applied
to other areas of criminal law. Rather than "stark legislative abdication"3 9 7 by which a state, absent any direction, merely authorizes juries to weigh evidence and issue a recommendation of
death or life imprisonment, a statute must address: the "ends any
given State seeks to achieve by imposing the death penalty" and
whether they "will or will not be served in any given case; "398 a
state's possible desire to execute "only those first-degree murderers who cannot be rehabilitated;"3 99 its attitude toward retributhe
tion, deterrence, recidivism, and rehabilitation; °°
willingness of lawmakers to authorize jurors to examine a range
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; 40 ' and the opportunity, by judicial review, to examine
the reasons which impelled a
40 2

jury to issue a particular verdict.

Though he expressed dissatisfaction that these factors were
not incorporated into the California and Ohio statutes, and
objected to the majority's unwillingness to examine them, Brennan did not categorize execution as a constitutionally impermissible form of punishment. "[L]ife itself," Brennan concluded, "is
an interest of such transcendent importance that a decision to
take a life may require procedural regularity far beyond a decision simply to set a sentence at one or another term of years."403
He urged states

-

and the Court -

to give this careful consider-

ation where capital punishment may be inflicted.
B.

Brennan's Most ElaborateDiscussion of CapitalPunishment:
Furman v. Georgia (1972)

The Court's rejection, in Furman v. Georgia,40 4 of capital trial
procedures in Georgia and Texas, and its implicit objection to
the alleged arbitrariness of capital statutes as then administered
in all thirty-five states (and the District of Columbia) which sanctioned the death penalty,40 5 elicited a far-ranging concurring
opinion by Brennan which addressed the original understanding
397.
398.

Id. at 252.
Id. at 283.

399.
400.

Id.
Id. at 284.

401.

Id. at 285-86.

402.
403.
404.
405.

Id. at 286.
Id. at 311.
408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
See supra text accompanying notes 276-83.
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of capital punishment, judicial precedents, and the perceived
meaning of "cruel and unusual punishment" in contemporary
society. For the first time, Brennan explicitly concluded that the
death penalty is categorically unconstitutional. °6
Brennan began with an inquiry into the Framers' perception
of punishment. He pointed out that few statements were made
on the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause; the brief comments in the First Congress,4 0 7 as well as concerns put forward in
the Massachusetts and Virginia ratifying conventions, 40

fur-

nished inconclusive evidence on the original understanding of
this phrase. While Brennan believed that the Framers "intended
to ban torturous punishments," 0 9 he envisioned an original purpose wider in scope. Though he conceded that the original
meaning of "cruel and unusual" was unclear, Brennan interestingly asserted that "the reach of the Clause," as the framers
intended, "was not limited to the proscription of unspeakable
atrocities," and was not perceived "simply to forbid
punishments
4 10
considered 'cruel and unusual' at the time."

Brennan might have declared that widespread existence of
the death penalty at the time the Eighth Amendment was drafted
and submitted to the states for ratification,"' as well as failure by
anyone to explicitly express opposition to this form of punishment, rendered it constitutionally acceptable for states wishing to
enact capital offenses. After all, it may have been a "cruel" sanction, but it was not "unusual." Does use of the word "unusual" in
the Eighth Amendment refer to the infrequency with which a
punishment is inflicted or the number of legislatures willing to
adopt it? Seeking to obtain a more clear understanding of "cruel
406.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 305.
See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
408. Abraham Holmes and Patrick Henry, delegates to the Massachusetts
and Virginia ratifying conventions, respectively, expressed concern that the
original Constitution contained no provision expressly limiting Congress'
power to punish. Holmes pointed out that Congress would not be "restrained
from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing
them to crimes,"J. ELUOT'S DEBATES 2:111 (1876), while Henry, noting that the
Virginia bill of rights prohibited infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments,"
and restrained legislators from mandating "tortures, or cruel and barbarous
punishment," objected to the absence of a comparable clause for Congress.
This omission, Henry feared, would place no limits on the kinds of
punishments Congress might impose; members would be "let . . . loose" to
prescribe sanctions which "depart from the genius of ... [the] country." J.
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 3:447 (1876) (quoted in Furman, 408 U.S. at 258-60
(Brennan, J., concurring).
409. Furman, 408 U.S. at 263.
410. Id.
411. See supra text accompanying note 123.

407.
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and unusual," Brennan examined statements made by the Court
in precedents on capital punishment.4"'
The Court, Brennan pointed out, put forward an evolving
interpretation of the death penalty which gradually went beyond
the original understanding of "cruel and unusual." At first, the
Court restricted its position on capital punishment to practices in
effect during the founding generation;4 1 however, beginning in
the early twentieth century, a perception of "cruel and unusual"
which emphasized flexible construction of provisions in light of
changing expectations was adopted.4" 4 Precedents, Brennan
noted, emphasized that a provision of the Constitution is not to
be interpreted with a fixed and unalterable meaning.
Brennan envisioned an active role by the judiciary in developing changing applications of cruel and unusual punishments.
The Framers, he believed, inserted ambiguous words into the
Constitution to enable future generations to revise the original
understanding. While this conferred considerable policymaking
discretion to the legislative branch, it was limited by the Bill of
Rights, which, Brennan maintained, placed "'certain subjects...
beyond the reach of majorities and officials . .

"415

Enforce-

ment of this objective, Brennan emphasized, "lies with the
courts '4

16

by preventing exercises of legislative power which may

4 17
jeopardize "maintenance of individual freedom."
Brennan insisted that the Court's role was not to assess legislation based on its perceived reasonableness or necessity; indeed,
he quoted approvingly a statement in Weems v. United States'
which pointed out that, in examining the constitutionality of
punishments challenged as "cruel and unusual," the justices
"must avoid the insertion of 'judicial conception [s] of... wisdom

or propriety.'"

4 19

However, it appeared that Brennan was willing

to make value judgments on the death penalty. After noting that
the Court must assess sanctions "'from the evolving standards of

decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,' ,4 2 0 Bren412. See supra text accompanying notes 220-39.
413. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130
(1878). See supra text accompanying notes 220-25.
414. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910). See supra text accompanying notes 226-32, 236-39.
415. Furman, 408 U.S. at 268-69 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
416. Furman, 408 U.S. at 267.
417. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 377).
418. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
419. Id. at 379 (quoted in Furman, 408 U.S. at 269).
420. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). See supra text accompanying
notes 236-39 (quoted in Furman, 408 U.S. at 269-70).
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nan declared that the constitutionality of punishment is to be
examined by the following four criteria: A punishment "must
not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human
beings;"4 2 1 it "must not [be] arbitrarily inflict[ed] ;422 it "must not
be unacceptable to contemporary society;"4 23 and it "must not be
excessive." 4 24 Brennan concluded that capital punishment could
not be reconciled with any of these conditions.
Judicial precedents, Brennan pointed out, have indicated
that punishments which, by their severity, offend human dignity,
are impermissible.4 25 Primitive forms of punishment, such as the
pillory, gallows, and stretching of limbs, among other measures
inflicted earlier in history,4 26 have in time been rejected not only
for the degree of physical pain inflicted but, primarily, because
"they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects
to be toyed with and discarded."4 27 While the Court had initially
recognized forms of punishment which appeared to involve a
minimum degree of pain and suffering due to the relative swiftness in execution,4 2 8 in time the requirement of proportionality
between an offense and punishment had been adopted 429 on the
premise that "even the vilest criminal remains a human being
possessed of common human dignity." 430 The death penalty,
Brennan believed, violated this principle.
Brennan also maintained that the arbitrary infliction of capital punishment rendered it cruel and unusual. Again he cited
precedents4 3 1 to indicate that punishments which have been carried out with relative frequency following conviction left "little
413 2
likelihood that the State... [has been] inflicting it arbitrarily."
The frequency with which a punishment is imposed, Brennan
added, is related to its degree of acceptance by contemporary
society in that a penalty rarely inflicted is perceived disproportionate to the offense committed. The infrequent execution of
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
Kemmler,

Furman, 408 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 305.
See supra notes 129-30.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 272-3.
See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); In re
136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878); see also

supra text accompanying notes 220-25, 233-35.
429.

See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see also supra text

accompanying notes 226-32.
430. Furman, 408 U.S. at 273.
431.
432.

See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 130.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 276.
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individuals convicted of a capital offense has underscored its
increasing rejection as a humane form of punishment, and lack
of predictability as to which defendants will be executed makes
the death penalty arbitrary and thus irreconcilable with the prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishments.
Brennan also believed that the "pointless infliction of suffering"4 3 3 rendered

the death

penalty unconstitutional.

The

Court's early recognition of the need for punishment to be proportionate to the offense committed4 34 has underscored that the
legislature, in adopting particular penalties, must demonstrate
an objective to discourage recidivism by seeking to rehabilitate
the offender, and to compensate society for the injustice committed. Brennan believed that the death penalty, intended to exact
retribution,43 5 failed to achieve the educational purpose of punishment, and thus violated the Eighth Amendment.
Having put forward four principles by which the constitutionality of the death penalty is to be assessed,43 6 Brennan proceeded to examine provisions of the Constitution which made
reference to capital punishment, legislative trends, frequency of
executions, and perceived social attitudes. Brennan' acknowledged that capital offenses were recognized in the Fifth Amendment, 43 7 but insisted that this was not permissible in light of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual" punishments. He also maintained that the Framers' insertion of the
word "capital," which recognized "the existence of what was then
a common punishment,"438 was no longer applicable in view of
evolving conceptions of treatment of defendants.
Brennan did not attempt to ignore the views of the founders. He believed that the Framers put forward not practices
which were to be unwaveringly followed but rather principles of
justice which each generation will be compelled to apply in light
of perceived contemporary needs. One may argue that the death
penalty itself is explicitly recognized in the Fifth and Fourteenth
433. Id. at 279.
434. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 349; see
230-32. This principle, Brennan argued,
century. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99
U.S. 349, 381 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont,

also supra text accompanying notes
was recognized in the nineteenth
(1958); Weems v. United States, 217
144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J.,

dissenting), supranote 229; Pervear v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 5 Wall.
475, 480 (1867) (cited Furman, 408 U.S. at 279-81 n. 23-25).

435.
175-88.
436.
437.
438.

For a discussion of this concept, see supra text accompanying notes
See text accompanying supra notes 421-24.
See text accompanying supra note 132.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 283.
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Amendments. 9 and that power to regulate its mode of infliction,
based on compliance with due process of law," 0 does not authorize proscription of capital punishment; hence, the scope of
"cruel and unusual" is limited either to noncapital offenses or
methods employed by a state in the trial and execution of individuals. Brennan, however, argued that the "cruel and unusual
punishments" clause confined the scope of the Fifth Amendment
on the ground that open-ended provisions of the Bill of Rights,
reflecting the Framers' aspirational goals of constitutional protections, are controlling over specific words such as "capital"
which merely depicted a practice in effect in their time. Notwithstanding the Framers' possible belief that the meaning of the
Constitution is to evolve, one may argue that explicit recognition
of the death penalty in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as
an option of punishment did not compel states to adopt it but
also precluded the Court from prohibiting its infliction. The
four criteria 44 1 set forth by Brennan to assess punishment, however, furnished discretion to the Court to establish parameters
which legislative policy choices may not exceed.
Brennan argued that the death penalty, "an unusually severe
punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity,"442 is unacceptable in "a society that so strongly affirms the
sanctity of life." 44 ' Brennan noted that there has been "no

national debate about punishment, in general or by imprisonment, comparable to the debate about punishment by death," 44
but this did not prove that the death penalty was abhorrent to
contemporary society. The moratorium on further execution, in
effect for five years prior to the Furmandecision,44 5 was instituted
not because of increasing opposition to capital punishment but
rather because states were unclear as to the process by which it
was to be carried out; indeed, thirty-five states and the District of
Columbia authorized the death penalty at the time of the Furman
decision, 446 and public opinion polls conducted from 1969 and

up to the time of Furman indicated that a majority of Americans
surveyed favored the death penalty." 7 To be sure, Brennan's citing of statistics indicating a decline in the number of executions
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

See supra text accompanying note 133.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
See supra text accompanying notes 421-24.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 287.
Id. at 286.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 173.
HUGo BEDAU, THE DmATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 248-49 (1982).
Id. at 85-92. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
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for each succeeding decade beginning with the 1930s 448 may

indicate increasing attention and concern over the utility of capital punishment;4 49 however, this trend does not establish the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty.
Brennan compared the death penalty to other forms of
severe punishment, such as lengthy imprisonment 45 0 and expatriation,"' and contended that "the deliberate extinguishment of
human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity. "452 Unlike all other penalties, where an individual may suffer constriction of mobility, diminished reputation,
embarrassment, and monetary burdens from exorbitant fines
and orders for restitution, among other consequences, death
"involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's
humanity."4 5 3 Arguably, however, subjecting an individual to
confinement for many years, absent the comforts of modern life
and an opportunity to interact with a wide circle of individuals
both in the workplace and in one's neighborhood, and confronting the constant fear of harm from inmates, prolongs suffering which may be more psychologically devastating than
execution. Brennan did not distinguish the punishment of
death from its method of infliction. Does "cruel and unusual"
refer to the penalty itself or the manner in which it is administered? Perhaps the Eighth Amendment proscribed barbaric
treatment of criminals 45 4 while leaving open the type of penalty
to be imposed. Death may be perceived as the only appropriate
commensurate punishment for extremely heinous acts,4 55 and, it
may be argued, refraining from imposing it would deny not "the
executed person's humanity"4 5 6 but rather the humanity comprising communal existence by which citizens engage in lawful
behavior and, to validate this arrangement, expect severe transgressors to be strongly penalized. 4 57 Brennan did not address
this subject.
448. Furman,408 U.S. at 291-93 nn. 40-44. Brennan pointed out that"[i] n
the 1930's, executions averaged 167 per year; in the 1940's, the average was 128;

in the 1950's, it was 72; and in the years 1960-1962, it was 48. There have been a
total of 46 executions since then, 36 of them in 1963-1964." Furman, 408 U.S. at
291.
449. See supra text accompanying notes 175-88.
450. Furman, 408 U.S. at 290.
451. Id. at 289-90.
452. Id. at 291.
453. Id. at 290.
454. See supra notes 129-130.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 175-88.
456. Furman, 408 U.S. at 290.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 175-88.
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The possibility that an innocent person may be executed,
and the allegedly arbitrary infliction of the death penalty, were
also cited by Brennan to bolster his contention that capital punishment is unconstitutional. To the extent that human beings
are not infallible, one may realistically surmise that "the punishment of death must inevitably be inflicted upon innocent
men," 458 and, should this occur, "the finality of death precludes
relief."4 9 Brennan did not explore this contention. Though one
who has been executed obviously cannot receive some form of
compensation available to an innocent individual who has been
imprisoned, has the incidence of wrongful infliction of death
been sufficient to warrant abolition of capital punishment? A
study completed in 1987 indicated that at least twenty-three innocent persons were executed between 1900 and 1982;460 however,
an article published in 1962 which advocated abolition of capital
punishment cited only one instance -

in 1898 -

of a wrongfully

executed individual.4 6 ' The precise number - or, indeed,
whether any verifiable instances of wrongful execution have
taken place - can never be determined because methods of
ascertaining the reliability or admissibility of evidence, both at
the time of an arrest and trial many years after a sentence is pronounced, are imprecise. Brennan's position is speculative, and
the severity, awesomeness, and uniqueness of a punishment does
not establish or negate its constitutionality.
In view of the potentially numerous opportunities to appeal
a verdict in capital proceedings,4 62 and the range of civil liberties
challenges likely to be raised, 465 Brennan expressed concern
about possible arbitrariness in sentencing. After citing the steady
statistical decline in the number of executions since the 1930s, 46
Brennan declared that, "[w]hen a country of over 200 million
people inflicts an unusually severe punishment no more than 50
times a year, the inference is strong that the punishment is not
being regularly and fairly applied. '46 5 He did not believe that
statutes and trial procedures could be sufficiently meticulous to
properly determine which defendants should be sentenced to
458. Furman, 408 U.S. at 290.
459. Id.
460. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially CapitalCases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 72-73 (1987).
461. Sarah R. Ehrmann, For Whom The Chair Waits, FED. PROB. Q. March
1962, 14-25 (quoted in CARRINGTON, supra note 172, at 122-23).
462. See supra note 200.

463.
464.
465.

supra note 193, at 192.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 291-93 nn.40-44.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 293.
PATERNOSTER,
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death or a term of imprisonment, and maintained that this obstacle is reflected in the small number of sentences for execution.
While studies on the alleged racially discriminatory patterns of
capital sentencing 46 6 lend credence to Brennan's concern, it is
interesting, in view of his confidence expressed one year earlier
in McGautha that state legislatures may be presumed competent
to devise trial proceedings with sufficient procedural safeguards,4 67 that he no longer believed states could conduct capital
trials in an unbiased manner. Infrequent execution of individuals may signify either arbitrariness in sentencing or evidence that,
after careful deliberation, only those defendants found to have
committed the most heinous crimes are executed. In other
words, a relatively high rate of execution may indicate mechanical infliction of the death penalty, while its seldom imposition
may reflect meticulous attention to the circumstances of the
crime and defendant. Brennan did not explore these possibilities; he could have made reference to the handful of studies
undertaken prior to Furmanon alleged patterns of racial discrimination in capital sentencing4 6s to assess whether trial proceedings are irremediably unconstitutional. Instead, he merely
asserted that infrequent executions furnish a "compelling [pre'
sumption] that there is a deep-seated reluctance to inflict it."469
The final area of inquiry examined by Brennan addressed a
state's perceived interest in the death penalty. At the time
Furmanwas decided, only a handful of studies had been done on
the alleged deterrent effect of capital punishment,4 7 9 and none
had furnished conclusive evidence that states which had the
death penalty experienced a statistically significant reduction in
homicide rates than those which punished murder by life imprisonment. 4 71 Brennan made reference to this empirical evidence,4 7 2 and observed that it is virtually impossible to assess the
frequency with which an accused murderer had contemplated
the prospect of death or long imprisonment.4 7 Of paramount
concern for Brennan was the current administration of capital
statutes. Unwilling to explore abstract theories of deterrence,4 7 4
466. See supra text accompanying notes 205-19.

467. See supra text accompanying note 396.
468. See supra text accompanying note 212.
469. Furman, 408 U.S. at 300.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 155-63. For studies of deterrence
prior to the Furman ruling, see supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
471. See supra text accompanying notes 155-61.
472. Furman, 408 U.S. at 301.
473. But see supra text accompanying note 172.

474. See supra text accompanying notes 155-74.
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Brennan maintained that the small number of individuals convicted of murder who are executed, as well as the likelihood that
many years will elapse before a death sentence is carried out,
undermined the potency of state assertions that capital punishment is the only suitable measure to reduce homicide rates.
Brennan also did not agree with the contention that the death
penalty is needed to protect society from possible repeat offenders; he believed that "effective administration of the State's pardon and parole laws," as well as strict "techniques of isolation,"4 75
may effectively achieve this objective.
Brennan was unsympathetic to arguments that the death
penalty was an appropriate means for society to express its outrage toward a heinous act. In view of the small number of convicted murderers who are executed, Brennan believed that
retribution, a sense that "criminals are put to death because they
deserve it," 4 7 1 is not a justifiable objective. Brennan refrained
from exploring philosophical arguments on retribution; 77 infrequent execution of individuals undermined a state's contention
that there is a public desire for revenge which needs to be fulfilled, and precluded the need to elaborate on this concept.
Brennan's perception of judicial power is evident in his
Furman opinion. His belief that the meaning of constitutional
provisions evolves was reflected in construing the death penalty
as incompatible with enlightened notions of "cruel and unusual"
punishment. As "concepts of justice change,"478 the Court must
reassess principles bequeathed by the founders. This may entail
vigorous exercise of judicial power in which perceptions of
morality affect adjudication. Notwithstanding that a majority of
479
states (and the District of Columbia) had the death penalty,
and that public opinion polls indicated support for its infliction,480 Brennan insisted that death "stands condemned as fatally
offensive to human dignity,"4s ' and that the states, consistent
with the Eighth Amendment, "may no longer inflict it as a punishment for crimes."48 2 His position suggests that it is permissible for the Court to devise a moral code of conduct for the states
independent of the perceived position of the populace. Brennan
might have confined his reservations about the death penalty to
475.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 300-01.

476.
477.

Id. at 304.
See supra text accompanying notes 175-88.

478. Furman,408 U.S. at 304.

479.
480.

See supra text accompanying note 446.
See supra text accompanying note 447.

481.
482.

Furman,408 U.S. at 305.
Id.
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its alleged arbitrary application at the time Furmanwas decided,
and put forward guidelines to be addressed by states during revision of statutes. This would have established an ongoing dialogue between the Court and the states and perhaps resulted in
elaborate due process safeguards designed to accommodate
Brennan's procedural concerns.48 3
Brennan's categorical rejection of the death penalty as irreconcilable with the Eighth Amendment was based on a belief that
it inherently violated his four criteria4 4 by which punishment
was to be assessed. He significantly restricted policymaking discretion to punish heinous offenders based on legislative perceptions of justice by imposing a moral judgment on states which
limited prospects of the majority to statutorily achieve capital
punishment in those states where the death penalty is believed to
be representative of the peoples' views. The per curiam opinion,
however, expressed disapproval with capital statutes as then
administered,4 " 5 and, without precluding retention of the death
penalty, directed states to reexamine their laws. A few years after
the Furman decision, several revised statutes were considered by
the Court.
C.

1976: Brennan Responds to the Court's Explicit Acknowledgment
of the Death Penalty's Constitutionality

The Court's first opportunity to reexamine the death penalty was presented in 1976, when, in five cases,4 8 6 mandatory and
discretionary capital statutory proceedings were considered.48 7
The position of the Court, expressing support for statutes which
gave jurors and judges, after considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the option of recommending a sentence of
death or imprisonment,4 88 while rejecting as too inflexible those
which required a death sentence for defendants linked with one
or more aggravating factors,48 9 was criticized as ambiguous and
483.
484.

Id.
Id.

485. Id. at 239-40.
486. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, reh'g denied sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 875
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, reh'g denied sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia,
429 U.S. 875 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
487. See supra text accompanying notes 284-305.
488. Gregg,428 U.S. at 153;Jurek,428 U.S. at 262; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242.
See supra text accompanying notes 294-99.

489. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280; Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325. See supra text
accompanying notes 300-02.
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failing to furnish clear standards to states.4 9 ° In Gregg49 1 Brennan wrote a brief dissenting opinion 49 2 expressing disapproval of
493
both mandatory and discretionary capital statutes.
Reaffirming his position in Furman, Brennan maintained
that "'evolving standards of decency' "94 render the death penalty "degrading to human dignity"49 5 and unconstitutional
regardless of procedural safeguards contained in a statute. Brennan did not examine whether revised statutes minimized arbitrariness in sentencing or consider public support of the death
penalty reflected in legislative retention of capital punishment
following the Furmanruling. The prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," Brennan emphasized, embodied "in unique
degree moral principles restraining the punishments that our civilized society may impose on those persons who transgress its
49 6
laws."

Brennan believed that constitutional provisions erect a
moral code of behavior which the Court was bound to apply to
the citizenry. He did not perceive this as discretion to impose a
value judgment on the nation; rather, Brennan maintained that
the Court "inescapably has the duty, as the ultimate arbiter of the
meaning of our Constitution, to say whether... 'moral concepts'
require us to hold that... [particular] punishments... [are] no
longer morally tolerable in our civilized society."49 7 These standards of morality, Brennan argued, are not derived from the justices' personal perception of civility but rather are contained in
the principles of the Bill of Rights.
Brennan's position indicated that morality is an integral
component of constitutional adjudication, and that its application may be counter to the sentiments of the majority. The
Court's role, Brennan believed, is not to merely endorse public
opinion but rather to embark the nation on a moral plane
embodied in the aspirational tone of the Eighth Amendment.
490. See Charles L. Black, Jr., Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and
Companion Cases, 26 CATH.U. L. REv. 1 (1976); L.S. Tao, The ConstitutionalStatus
of CapitalPunishment: An Analysis ofGregg, Jurek, Roberts, and Woodson, 54 U.
DET. J. URB. L. 345 (1977); Murchison, supra note 305, at 491-508.
491.
492.
493.
494.
(1958)).

428 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 227-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. See also Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325, 336 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153, 227 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101

495.
496.

428 U.S. at 229.
Id.

497.

Id.
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Brennan Unwaveringly Continues to Oppose CapitalPunishment
(1977-1990)

The Court's recognition, in Gregg, of the constitutionality of
capital punishment,4 9 and its indication that statutes which
make a careful effort to confine the discretion ofjurors would be
upheld,4 9 9 appeared to give states considerable flexibility in revising procedural provisions. The lack of clarity displayed in Gregg
and its companion cases,5"' however, left uncertainty as to what
types of capital trial proceedings would be deemed constitutional, and, between 1977 and 1990, Brennan's last thirteen years
on the bench, the Court decided 63 cases on the death penalty
31 from 1977 up to the retirement of Chief Justice Warren
Burger in 1986,501 and 32 during the first four Terms of the
Rehnquist Court in which Brennan served. 0 2 The most frequent
issue examined by the Court was the weighing by jurors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Of 18 cases50 3 dealing with
this subject, Brennan wrote an opinion on five occasions,54 and,
in a brief concurring statement, reiterated his categorical opposition to capital punishment in five others.50 5 His first lengthy
opinion on consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors,
498. See supra text accompanying note 303.
499. See supra text accompanying notes 284-305.
500. Id.
501. See supra note 322.
502. See supra notes 337-40 (Cage, 498 U.S. at 39, and Shell 498 U.S. at 1,
were decided after Brennan's retirement).
503. See supra note 352 (Parker,498 U.S. at 308, and Shell 498 U.S. at 1,
were decided after Brennan left the bench).
504. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1050 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Brennan,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 482
U.S. 920 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
505. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 755 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 927
(1989) (Brennan, J., concurring); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 366
(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 389 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 591 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982)
(Brennan, J., concurring). In these cases Brennan wrote a two or three
sentence concurring statement expressing, at the outset, support of the
majority's judgment, and typically ending with the following declaration:
"Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
[citation omitted], I would direct that the resentencing proceedings be
circumscribed such that the State may not reimpose the death sentence." Mills,
486 U.S. 367, 389.
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and the possibility of racial bias in pronouncing a verdict,
did not
50 6
appear until the 1987 case of McCeskey v. Kemp.
The McCleskey petitioner was a black man convicted for the
murder of a white police officer.5 0 7 Though statutorily eligible to
receive the death penalty for failing to furnish any mitigating evidence, McCleskey, based on a study by University of Iowa law professor David Baldus and associates, 508 argued that there was a
disparity in Georgia between the percentage of black and white
murderers sentenced to death and the frequency with which the
death penalty is inflicted for the murder of black and white individuals. 0 9 McCleskey also contended that sentencing of capital
defendants is racially discriminatory in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 51 0 Without questioning the legitimacy of the Baldus study, the Court, by a 5-4
vote, concluded that an individual must prove discrimination in
Brennan on several occasions expressed this sentiment in cases which did
not focus on the weighing by jurors of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. See, e.g., Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (addressing death penalty for accomplices); Green v. Georgia, 442
U.S. 95 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring) (involving introduction of testimony
furnished at one trial in separate proceedings of an accomplice); Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (furnishing an accused
a parole commission's presentence report); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282,
reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (involving conviction
of a capital defendant following judicial invalidation of applicable statutory
provisions); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(considering death penalty for rape).
506. 481 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987).
507. Id. at 283.
508. See supra note 213. Examining over 2000 murder cases in Georgia
during the 1970s, Baldus et al. discovered a pattern in capital sentencing based
on the race of the victim and the defendant. They concluded that "defendants
charged with killing white persons received the death penalty in 11% of the
cases, but defendants charged with killing blacks received the death penalty in
only 1% of the cases;" that "the death penalty was assessed in 22% of the cases
involving black defendants and white victims; 8% of the cases involving white
defendants and white victims; 1% of the cases involving black defendants and
black victims; and 3% of the cases involving white defendants and black
victims;" that "prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases
involving black defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases involving white
defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving black defendants and
black victims; and 1% of the cases involving white defendants and black
victims;" and that "defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times
as likely to receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks,"
while "black defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as
other defendants." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
509. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
510. Id.
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his own case, rather than citing statewide statistical trends, to
demonstrate an equal protection
violation and discriminatory
5 11
application of a state statute.
At the outset of his dissenting opinion, Brennan reiterated
his categorical opposition to capital punishment. 5 12 The Baldus
study underscored the validity of objections to capital punishment which Brennan put forward in Furman.5 13 Brennan disagreed with the majority's contention that it was necessary for the
defendant to prove that he was personally subjected to discriminatory treatment; in its examination of capital proceedings, the
Court, he emphasized, "has been concerned with the risk of the
imposition of an arbitrary sentence, rather than the proven fact
of one."5" 4 He believed that this had been amply demonstrated
by the Baldus study, which "relentlessly documents" that "there is
a better than even chance in Georgia that race will influence the
decision to impose the death penalty.... 515
More fundamentally, Brennan believed that the Baldus
study confirmed the inherent arbitrariness of capital trial proceedings, based in large part on historically entrenched discrimination in state penal codes which has persisted to the present
time. After briefly reviewing statutory provisions, dating back to
the colonial period, which punished as capital offenses commit511. Id. at 306-07. For an analysis of the McCleskey case while it was under
review in the lower federal courts, see FredricJ. Bendremer et al., McCleskey v.
Kemp: Constitutional Tolerance for Racially Disparate Capital Sentencing, 41 U.
MIAMI L. Riv. 295 (1986). For an examination of the Court's ruling, see
Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388 (1988).
512. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 320.
513. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305. See also supra text accompanying notes 42124.
514. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 322 (emphasis in original).
515. Id. at 328. After examining the statistical evidence put forward in
the Baldus study, Brennan concluded that "blacks who kill whites are sentenced
to death at nearly 22 times the rate of blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7
times the rate of whites who kill blacks." McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 327 (emphasis in
original). By the time McCleskey was decided, several studies indicating a
lingering pattern of racial disparities in capital sentencing had been published.
See, e.g. Steven D. Arkin, Discrimination and Arbitrariness in Capital Punishment:
An Analysis of Post-Furman Murder Cases in Dade County, Florida, 1973-1976," 33
STAN. L. Rv. 75 (1980); Arnold Barnett, Some DistributionPatternsfor the Georgia
Death Sentence, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1327 (1985); Ursula Bentele, The Death
Penalty in Georgia: Still Arbitrary, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 573 (1985); Samuel R. Gross,
Race and Death: The Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of Discrimination in Capital
Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1275 (1985); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L.
Pierce, Race and ProsecutorialDiscretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAw & Soc'v REv.
587 (1985).
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ted by blacks but not by whites,51 6 Brennan observed that Georgia has operated under the "legacy of a race-conscious criminal
justice system."517 The Court, he pointed out, has always been
cognizant of the magnitude of capital as opposed to noncapital
proceedings, and has accordingly placed the burden on the state,
rather than the accused, to demonstrate that sentencing has not
been arbitrarily conducted. While "every nuance of decision cannot be statistically captured," 5 18 the totality of circumstances,
measured in large part by the political and social environment
which has shaped a state's criminal justice system, compelled
rejection of a sentence in capital cases where there existed any
indication that arbitrariness has infected - much less permeated
-

deliberations.

Brennan did not believe that arbitrariness could be removed
from capital proceedings. The number of subjective considerations which characterized the trial of capital defendants "provides considerable opportunity for racial considerations, however
subtle and unconscious, to influence charging and sentencing
decisions."5 19 Brennan seemed to indicate that trial participants
are incapable of overcoming racial bias, both individual and societal, regardless of the elaborateness of statutory procedural protections, and that, in view of the enormity of capital punishment,
the only realistic alternative is prohibition of this penalty.
Brennan's position in McCleskey was that a defendant's culpability is to be assessed in light of the perceived social environment which has affected comparably situated litigants. The
death penalty, an expression of society's moral degradation, can
never be acceptable regardless of how extensive a range of procedural protections may have been available to a defendant, and,
Brennan believed, the mere existence of this punishment constituted abridgment of a constitutional commitment to respect the
humanity of each individual. Brennan was not primarily concerned with the treatment McCleskey received; indeed, other
than citing the Baldus study to allege an ongoing pattern of
racial discrimination in capital sentencing,5 2 ° the petitioner did
not challenge his opportunity to offer mitigating evidence.
Arguably, then, Georgia's treatment of McCleskey fulfilled the
Court's earlier pronouncements that each defendant in a capital
case should be treated "with that degree of respect due the uni516.

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 329-30.

517.
518.
519.
520.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
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334.
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queness of the individual,"5 2 ' and that there must be "particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and
record of each convicted defendant."5 22 Brennan, however,
believed that any indication of racial disparity in sentencing patterns compromised the objectivity of individual trial deliberations, and rendered a guilty verdict suspect, and thus
unconstitutional. He objected that Georgia "provides juries with
no list of aggravating and mitigating factors, nor any standard for
balancing them against one another; '52 3 however, no enumeration, or degree of explicitness, would have been sufficient for
Brennan to render McCleskey's sentence valid.
Aside from the majority's willingness to sustain the constitutionality of capital punishment, the most fervent objection
expressed by Brennan in McCleskey was that the Court failed to
adhere to precedents. Specifically, Brennan believed that the
underpinning of Lockett v. Ohio 2 4 - where the Court maintained that any mitigating factor raised by the defendant had to
be examined by jurors 25 - was ignored in McCleskey by refusing
to consider the allegedly racially biased environment in which
capital trials proceeded. His perception that the Rehnquist
Court was too willing to recognize considerable state discretion
in administering the death penalty without carefully assessing
adherence by jurors to due process requirements established in
precedents was evident in three dissenting opinions written in
v. Arizona,5 26 Saffle v. Parks,5 27 and Blysthe 1990 cases of Walton
5 28
tone v. Pennsylvania.
All three of these cases examined whether statutory provisions precluded giving full consideration to mitigating evidence.
In Walton, the Court held that an aggravating circumstance
requiring the trial judge to determine whether an alleged offense
was "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved,"5 2 9 sufficiently channeled the sentencing authority's discretion and facilitated concentration on aspects of the defendant's background and alleged
521.
522.
523.
524.

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976).
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 333.
438 U.S. 586 (1978).

525. See supra text accompanying note 311.
526. 497 U.S. 639, 674 (1990), reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan indicated that his objections also applied to
Lewis v.Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 784, reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050 (1990) (Brennan,
J., joining the dissenting opinion of Blackmun, J.).
527. 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (Brennan,J., dissenting).

528.
529.
(1989)).

494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Walton, 497 U.S. at 643 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (6)
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actions which most directly related to culpability. The extent to
which a jury's ability to examine mitigating evidence may have
been undermined was also at issue in Saffle, where the majority
ruled that a judge's instructions that the jurors "avoid any influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor when imposing sentence,"53 ° did not undermine
consideration of mitigating factors. The judge, pointed out the
Court, merely cautioned members to refrain from basing a sentencing decision "on the vagaries of particular jurors' emotional
sensitivities"5 3 1 without impairing the jurors' ability to consider
mitigating evidence. Broad discretion to administer capital statutory provisions was also recognized in Blystone, where a Pennsylvania statute which stipulated that the "verdict must be a
sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one
aggravating circumstance... and no mitigating circumstance or
if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances,"5" 2 was
held as sufficiently confining the range of factors to be considered by sentencing authorities. In all three cases the Court
emphasized that the impossibility of devising precise rules to be
followed in capital trials compelled examination of proceedings
in totality to assess whether fairness has been accorded to the
accused.
Brennan objected in all three cases that the Court allowed
sentencing authorities to issue verdicts without fully examining
the individual circumstances of the accused. His brief dissent in
Walton expressed concern that the Court, by upholding ambiguously worded aggravating circumstances, enabled states "to execute prisoners with as little interference as possible from our
established Eighth Amendment doctrine" 3 3 which compelled
consideration of the particular situation of an accused.53 4 While
the majority believed that the absence of proof that jurors were
improperly instructed established the validity of trial proceedings, Brennan argued that the existence of imprecise phrasing in
statutory provisions rendered a verdict unconstitutional on its
face by making possible introduction and consideration of extraneous matters.
530.
531.
532.

Saffle, 494 U.S. at 487.
Id. at 493.
Blystone, 494 U.S. at

302

(quoting

42

PA.

CONS.

STAT.

§ 9711(C) (1)(iv)(1988)).
533. Walton, 497 U.S. at 676-77.

534. Brennan cited precedents in Furman, 408 U.S. 238; Gregg, 428 U.S.
153; Woodson, 428 U.S. 280; Eddings, 455 U.S. 104. He also cited Walton, 497
U.S. at 675-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Brennan's concern that the Court was departing from guidelines put forward in precedents was more extensively addressed
in Saffle. Comparable to his position in McCleskey, which
expressed apprehension that the Court was abandoning its traditional concern for the prospect of discriminatory action in light
of the general environment of trial proceedings, 535 Brennan
argued in Saffle that, irrespective of evidence indicating arbitrary
proceeding against an accused, the mere possibility that this may
occur with ambiguous wording of aggravating and mitigating circumstances was sufficient to invalidate a conviction. Agreeing
with the respondent's contention that the judge's instructions to
jurors to reach a verdict without being influenced by personal
biases5" 6 "could have [been] interpreted... as barring consideration of mitigating evidence," 53 7 Brennan maintained that full
examination of the character and circumstances of the accused
was precluded. This violated the express command of Lockett v.
Ohio138 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,5" 9 both of which mandated that
"a jury may not be prohibited from considering and giving effect
to all relevant mitigating evidence when deciding whether to
impose the death penalty."54 ° Brennan also disagreed with the
majority's contention that these precedents merely required an
opportunity to introduce mitigating evidence without addressing
how it is to be examined. This distinction, Brennan insisted, is
"meaningless" in that "a rule that limits the manner in which the
jury considers mitigating evidence is unconstitutional if it limits
the jury's ability to consider and give effect to that evidence."541
Brennan concluded that, in all likelihood, the jury "interpreted
the antisympathy instruction as a command to ignore the mitigating evidence."542

A fundamental concern of Brennan's was that the Court
might shift the burden of proof to the accused. He sensed that
the majority's "growing displeasure with the litigation of capital
cases on collateral review"5 4 3 encouraged deference to proceedings which may not have explicitly based a verdict and sentence
on an arbitrary factor but which operated in an atmosphere
which did not foreclose this possibility. This, Brennan con535.

See supra text accompanying notes 514-18.

536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.

See supra text accompanying note 530.
Saffle, 494 U.S. at 498-99 (emphasis in original).
438 U.S. 586 (1978).
455 U.S. 104 (1982).
Saffle, 494 U.S. at 499-500.
Id. at 504 (emphasis in original).

542.
543.

Id. at 508.
Id. at 507.
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tended, "denied an individualized sentencing determination as
required by the Eighth Amendment."5 4 4
In addition to the method by which a judge communicated
instructions to the jury, Brennan believed that preserving the
individualized element of sentencing proceedings required
examination of aggravating and mitigating factors and giving
greater weight to those deemed compelling. This may be circumvented by an arrangement, presented in Blystone, 4 5 which
enabled jurors to reach a verdict without having to consider mitigating evidence.5 4 6 A jury which, at the outset of deliberations,
has unanimously found an aggravating circumstance, may "end
the decisionmaking process"5 47 by claiming that the need to
examine possible mitigating factors has been precluded. Unlike
the majority in Blystone, which believed that constitutional
requirements are met by furnishing a forum to examine, in varying degrees, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Brennan
maintained that prevention of arbitrariness required the Court
to ascertain whether both types of evidence have been introduced and considered.
Brennan insisted that prevention of arbitrariness in capital
sentencing required careful examination of all phases of trial
proceedings. This was especially important with regard to jury
deliberations; jurors who are improperly empaneled or
instructed, or compelled to listen to prejudicial comments of a
judge or prosecutor, are unlikely to apply even the most comprehensive statutory provisions in an unbiased manner. On behalf
of the majority, Brennan addressed the manner in which instructions are communicated to the jury in the 1979 case of Sandstrom
v. Montana.548
The Sandstrom case examined instructions to the jury to presume that "a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts." 549 Speculating that the likelihood of conviction
would increase, Brennan declared that this command in effect
shifted to the defendant the burden of proving that he was mentally incapable of comprehending the magnitude of his alleged
crime, and unconstitutionally relieved the state of having to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.5 5 Whether the jury
actually formed biases on the culpability of the accused was
544.
545.

Id. at 508.
494 U.S. 299.

546.

See supra text accompanying note 532.

547.
548.
549.

Blystone, 494 U.S. at 322.
442 U.S. 510 (1979).
Id. at 512.

550.

Id. at 513.
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immaterial for Brennan, who maintained that its mere possibility
rendered proceedings invalid.
Six years after the Sandstrom ruling, the Court, in Francis v.
Franklin (1985),"' once again considered whether jury instructions conceivably enabled members to make unsubstantiated
inferences regarding the motives of an accused. The Franciscase
dealt with jury instructions stating in part that "[t] he acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person's will, but the presumption may be
rebutted."5 5' 2 Relying on the position in Sandstrom, Brennan, on
behalf of the majority, again held that this instruction unconstitutionally relieved the state of its burden of proving the charges
against the accused.
Brennan examined whether the tone of the instructions
imparted a "mandatory presumption" that the jury "must infer
the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts,"5 5
or a "permissive inference" that jurors may draw "a possible conclusion . . . if the State proves predicate facts,"554 but are not
compelled to do so. While the state argued that communication
to the jurors that a presumption of voluntariness "may be rebutted"55 5 compelled trial participants, if the accused presented an
appropriate challenge, to establish guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, Brennan emphasized that instructions to the jury must be
construed not by taking words "in isolation" but by examining
"the potentially offending words ... in the context of the charge
as a whole."5'56 He believed that the instructions were "cast in the
language of command"5 5 7 in that the trial judge did not explain
that jurors were not obligated to construe failure by the accused
to satisfactorily prove that the alleged offense was unintended as
a presumption of guilt. This, Brennan believed, diminished the
jury's perception of its responsibility to independently establish
guilt or innocence. Brennan also rejected arguments that other
aspects of the instructions to the jury - that the state was
required to prove "the defendant's guilt as charged... beyond a
reasonable doubt;" 5 58 that a person "will not be presumed to act
with criminal intention;"5 5 9 and that a jury "may find criminal
551.
552.
553.
554.

471 U.S. 307 (1985).
Id. at 311.
Id. at 314.
Id.

555.
556.

See supra text accompanying note 552.
Francis, 471 U.S. at 315.

557.

Id. at 316.

558.
559.

Id. at 319 n.6.
Id. at 319.

100

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

intention upon a consideration of the words, conduct,
demeanor, motive and all other circumstances connected with
the act for which the accused is prosecuted;" 560 - compelled it
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jurors, he concluded, were compelled to deliberate with ambiguous and contradictory instructions which may diminish their sense of
responsibility.
In both Sandstrom and Francis, Brennan was concerned not
primarily with specific actions of sentencing authorities but
rather with the environment in which trial proceedings were conducted. In the 1987 case of California v. Brown,5 6 ' Brennan once
again elaborated on the affect jury instructions may have on consideration of a range of possible mitigating factors.
The Brown case focused on instructions during the penalty
stage that the jury must not "be swayed by 'mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public
feeling""' in its deliberations. Believing that this directive confined jury discretion "by cautioning it against reliance on extraneous emotional factors"5 6 which have no bearing on the
culpability of the accused, the majority concluded that appropriate guidance had been furnished. Brennan, in dissent, argued
that this wording, and the tone of its communication, discouraged jurors from examining a wide range of mitigating circumstances. Citing precedent in Lockett v. Ohio,56 4 where the majority
directed that any mitigating factors introduced by the defendant
must be considered,5 65 Brennan declared that instructions which
leave a jury "unclear as to whether it may consider such evidence" 56 are invalid. This, he believed, was evident by the wording of the instruction. For example, what kind of "sympathy" is
the jury to disregard? How does one distinguish adverse circumstances which a defendant may have endured from subjective
emotions which have no relationship to the offense or alleged
offender? Citing Eddings v. Oklahoma,56 7 where the Court overturned a conviction on the ground that all pertinent mitigating
evidence had not been considered, 6 8 Brennan maintained that
560. Id. at 320.
561. 479 U.S. 538 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
562. Id. at 542.
563. Id. at 543.
564. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
565. See supra text accompanying note 311.
566. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 547 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
567. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
568. Eddings, a sixteen-year-old defendant convicted of murder,
introduced evidence concerning physical abuse by his father and neglect by his
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instructions must be clearly worded and explained to make clear
the kinds of testimony which is relevant to a defendant's circumstances. After examining state precedents dating back to 1970,5"9
Brennan observed a pattern in which jurors had not been clearly
instructed as to what kinds of mitigating evidence are impertinent, and concluded that this trend has persisted in Brown.
Unlike the majority, which could find no evidence that the
instructions had been misconstrued and thus no justification to
rule that an unlawful conviction had occurred, Brennan, as he
had maintained in Sandstrom and Francis, declared that its mere
possibility warranted invalidation of trial proceedings. The
potential for diminution of due process safeguards, apart from its
actual occurrence, was his underlying focus. This concern was
also apparent in cases dealing with empaneling of jurors, which
5 70
was first addressed in the 1968 case of Witherspoon v. Illinois,
and examined
by the Burger Court twelve years later in Adams v.
71
Texas.

5

The Adams case addressed a statutory provision which provided that a prospective juror would be excluded unless the individual could state under oath "that the mandatory penalty of
death5 7 2 or imprisonment for life would not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact."5 73 The Court struck down the oath
requirement 574 on the belief that a jury likely to be composed of
individuals firmly against or in favor of capital punishment would
bias the verdict and result in a jury unrepresentative of a cross
alcoholic mother. Stating that statutory provisions precluded consideration of
this evidence, the trial judge ruled that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed mitigating factors. The Court declared that full consideration of
mitigating evidence had not taken place, and struck down the death sentence.
Id. at 114-15. Brennan wrote a concurring statement. Id. at 117. See also, Beck
v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). Brennan wrote a
brief statement joining the majority opinion but reiterating his categorical
opposition to capital punishment. Id. at 646.
569. Brown, 479 U.S. at 552-55. Brennan cited People v. Walker, 711
P.2d 465 (1985); People v. Robertson, 655 P.2d 279 (1982); and People v.
Bandhauser, 463 P.2d 408 (1970).
570. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
571. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
572. Texas statutes provided for a bifurcated capital trial. If a jury in the
second stage of the trial answered "yes" to three questions - "(1) whether the
defendant's conduct causing the death at issue was deliberate, (2) whether the
defendant's conduct in the future would constitute a continuing threat to
society, and (3) whether his conduct in killing the victim was unreasonable in
response to the victim's provocation, if any" - a death sentence was
mandatory. Id.
573. Id. at 42.
574. Id. at 49-51.
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section of the community.57 5 Instead of asking whether automatic imposition of the death penalty might affect their performance, jurors, the Court ruled, should have been asked whether
they would follow the trial judge's instructions. While a state may
continue to excuse potential jurors who declared that they would
automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of evidence presented, the Court emphasized that persons opposed to
capital punishment may not be excluded unless their views would
impair performance of their duties as stipulated by an oath.5 7 6
Brennan, concurring in Adams,5 77 wrote a brief statement
5 78
reiterating his categorical opposition to capital punishment.
He did, however, express his views on empaneling jurors in capital trials in two cases - Wainuright v. Witt 79 and Turner v. Murray58 0

_

which examined the applicability of the Witherspoon and

Adams pronouncements.
The Wainwright case examined procedures under which prospective jurors may be excluded and considered standards to be
followed by federal courts in assessing challenges of a trial
judge's disqualification order. Respondent Johnny Paul Witt
argued that three of eleven prospective jurors, after alluding to
religious reservations against the death penalty, and responding
affirmatively to the prosecutor's question that this would "interfere with judging the guilt or innocence"5 8 1 of the accused, were
improperly excluded.
Citing precedents in Witherspoon v. Illinois5 8 2 and Adams v.

Texas,5 83 the majority pointed out that, unlike a potential juror
who expressed personal reservations about capital punishment,
one who claimed that opposition to the death penalty would
inhibit reaching a verdict of guilty irrespective of the validity of
575.

Id. at 43-45. For an examination, prior to the Adams decision, of the

perceived effect of questions concerning attitudes toward capital punishment
on the objectivity ofjuries, see supranote 263. For an analysis of issues raised by
the Adams v. Texas ruling, see Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death
Qualificationon Jurors'Predispositionto Convict and On the Quality of Deliberations,8
L. & HuM. BEHAV. 53 (1984); Michael Finch & Mark Ferraro, The Empirical
Challenge to Death- QualifiedJuries: On FurtherExamination, 65 NEB. L. REv. 21
(1986); Samuel R. Gross, Determining the Neutrality of Death- Qualified Juries:
JudicialAppraisal of EmpiricalData, 8 L. & HuM. BEH-Av. 7 (1984).
576. Adams, 448 U.S. at 50.
577. Id. at 51.
578. See supra note 505.
579.

469 U.S. 412, 439 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

580.

476 U.S. 28, 38 (1986)

(Brennan, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).

581.
582.
583.

469 U.S. at 416.
391 U.S. 510 (1968). See supra text accompanying notes 260-63.
448 U.S. 38 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 572-76.
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incriminating evidence which may be presented, violated the
Sixth Amendment's command for trial by an "impartial jury." ' 4
This, the majority declared, cannot be ascertained with "'unmistakable clarity';"585 a trial judge, unable to absolutely conclude
whether a prospective juror would permit personal biases to
affect consideration of evidence and pronouncement of a verdict, must be accorded discretion to ask a range of questions in
seeking to assess possible objectivity, and federal appellate
judges, in examining a petition for habeas corpus, are to adopt a
"'presumption of correctness"' regarding a state court determination on the "'factual issues' "586 presented during voir dire.
Brennan, in dissent, objected that the Court conferred too
wide a range of discretion on trial judges to exclude potential
jurors. Disagreeing with the majority's position that Witherspoon
did not preclude judges from asking a range of questions on the
attitudes of potential jurors toward capital punishment to more
fully determine whether they would likely reach a verdict based
on an objective weighing of evidence, Brennan maintained that
this ruling,5 87 along with Adams,5 8 preventedjudges from inquiring into areas which had no bearing on the potential jurors' fitness to discharge obligations set forth in the oath. "Exclusion of
those opposed to capital punishment," Brennan pointed out,
"keeps an identifiable class of people off the jury in capital cases
and is likely systematically to bias juries.""'9 This, Brennan
believed, would occur if there were exclusion of potential jurors
"whose views [on capital punishment] would simply make these
tasks [concerning abidance to an oath] more psychologically or
emotionally difficult,"5"' whose "responses to death-qualification
inquiries are ambiguous or vacillating,"5"' or who "do not know
at voir dire whether their views about the death penalty will prevent them abiding by their oaths at trial."59 2 In short, Brennan
argued that the majority diminished the significance of Witherspoon's prohibition against
exclusion "of the ambiguous, evasive,
59
or uncertain juror." 3
584.
585.

See supra note 253.
Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424.

586.

Id. at 426. (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(D)).

587.

Witherspoon v.

Illinois,

391

U.S. 510

accompanying notes 260-63.
588. See supra text accompanying notes 572-76.
589.
590.

448 U.S. at 38; Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 442.
Id. at 443.

591.
592.

Id. at 444.
Id.

593.

Id. at 445.

(1968).

See supra text
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Fundamentally, Brennan believed that the Court had
departed from its precedents insisting that the discretion of trial
participants be confined to prevent infusion of arbitrariness.
Acknowledging a broad range of discretion by the trial judge to
examine and exclude potential jurors on their views toward capital punishment, and discouraging federal appellate courts from
questioning assessments regarding fitness to serve,59 4 Brennan
maintained, diminished the Court's earlier insistence on stricter
standards of due process in capital proceedings.5 95 This, Brennan maintained, reduced the risk that the "'overzealous prosecutor and ... the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge"'5 9 6 may,
particularly when "elected, or when they harbor political ambitions,"5 9 7 work to obtain convictions.
Brennan concluded with a denunciation of the Court's
increasing insensitiveness to compelling procedural safeguards
relied on by defendants in capital trials. He decried the majority's unwillingness to hold sentencing authorities to strict standards, and declared that the Court "increasingly acts as the
adjunct of the State and its prosecutors in facilitating efficient
and expedient conviction and execution irrespective of the Constitution's fundamental guarantees."598
Brennan's opinion in Wainurright presented a dilemma for
trial judges. On the one hand, Brennan did not wish to accord a
trial judge unconfined discretion to question prospective jurors,
which potentially may result in disqualification of those who
expressed ambivalent positions on capital punishment, or who
revealed attitudes toward crime and heinous offenders incompatible with the judge's personal beliefs; at the same time, Brennan's desire for an unbiased jury may induce a judge to ask a
range of questions touching on the circumstances of an accused,
and thereby compelling elicitation of testimony which has no
bearing on one's fitness to discharge an oath. This prospect was
presented in the 1986 case of Turner v. Murray,59 9 which dealt
with an alleged murder committed by a black defendant in Virginia. The jury, consisting of eight whites and four blacks, had
not been told during empaneling that the victim was white. The
594. See id. at 426-29 for the discussion of discretion on habeas review in
the majority opinion.
595. Id. at 454 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)).
596. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 459 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968)).
597. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 459.
598.

Id. at 463.

599.

476 U.S. 28 (1986).
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majority ruled that, to ensure trial by an impartial jury, "a capital
defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have prospectivejurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned
on the issue of racial bias."6"'
Brennan, concurring and dissenting in part, declared that
the "reality of race relations in this country is such that we simply
may not presume impartiality,"60 1 and supported questioning of
potential jurors on possible racial overtones of an alleged
offense. He disagreed, however, with the majority's vacating of
the petitioner's death sentence without ordering a retrial on the
issue of guilt.60 2 The "risk of bias," Brennan argued, is not less
compelling than the "consequences of bias," both of which may be
displayed by ajury "at a guilt trial and . . .at a sentencing hearing .... ... Thus, Brennan declared, the conviction, as well as

the sentence itself, should be vacated.60 4
Brennan emphasized that the Sixth Amendment's protection of trial by an impartial jury required judges "to strike those
jurors who manifest an inability to try the case solely on the basis
of the evidence."60 5 This, the Court pointed out in Witherspoon
and Adams, confined judges to inquire as to whether prospective
jurors could discharge an oath based on the weight of evidence
and irrespective of their personal views on capital punishment.6 "6
Arguably, requiring judges to determine whether a prospective
juror embraced racial biases violated the pronouncements of
Witherspoon and Adams in that this, in the abstract, did not implicate one's ability to reach a verdict with a specific accused based
on evidence presented. The Court's pronouncement may result
in the disqualification of potential jurors who give an ambiguous
response to questions on racial bias - which Brennan opposed
with regard to questioning on one's support of, or opposition to,
capital punishment.60 7 In Turner, Brennan agreed that "'essential demands of fairness' may require a judge to ask jurors
whether they entertain any racial prejudice;"60 ' however, unlike
the majority, which did not foreclose inquiries into whether
600.

Id. at 36-37.

601. Id. at 39.
602. Id.
603. Id. (emphasis in original).
604. Id. at 39-40.
605. Id. at 40.
606. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Adams v. Texas, 448
U.S. 38 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 260-63, 571-76.
607. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See supra text accompanying notes 587-93.
608. Turner, 476 U.S. at 40 (quoting Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S.
308 (1931)).
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potential jurors had stereotypes on the perceived behavior of
blacks or the absence of racial parity,6 ° 9 Brennan confined questioning to whether "the race of either the victim or the accused
will bear on... Uurors'] ability to render a decision based solely on
the evidence."6 10 Brennan's position was more consistent with the
tone of Witherspoon and Adams than that of the majority.
Brennan's insistence that the possibility of racial bias was no
less present at the time a verdict of guilt or innocence is issued
than during pronouncement of sentence underscored his belief
that phases in capital proceedings are not separate and distinct
components but rather are a comprehensive demonstration of a
state's commitment to protection of civil liberties. The presence
of racial bias, he maintained, "should be of [no] less concern at
the guilt phase than at the sentencing phase"6 1 1 in that a trial "to
determine guilt or innocence is, at bottom, nothing more than
the sum total of a countless number of small discretionary decisions made by each individual who sits in the jury box."6 1 2 The
totality of proceedings must be examined, and suspicion of
racially biased deliberations in one part of a trial equally compromised objectivity in its earlier stages. As Brennan had pointed
out in Sandstrom, Franklin,and Brown, 6 1 3 and strongly emphasized
in McCleskey v. Kemp,614 the possibility of jury bias, apart from its
actual existence, compelled invalidation of trial proceedings.
Brennan's concern with potential abridgment of due process safeguards, which may occur in jury deliberations if racial
biases preclude reaching a verdict based on an objective assessment of admissibility and applicability of evidence, was also
apparent in other aspects of trial proceedings. In the 1984 case
of Strickland v. Washington,6 15 the Court for the first time established standards to determine whether a defendant had been
effectively represented by counsel. A two-prong test had to be
satisfied by an accused who challenged a conviction based on
inadequate performance by a defense attorney. It stipulated
that:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This required showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amend609.
610.

Turner, 476 U.S. at 35.
Id. at 41 (emphasis added).

611.
612.
613.
614.

Id. at 42.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 548-69.
481 U.S. 279, 322 (1987); see supra text accompanying note 514.

615.

466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).
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ment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 6 16
The Court did not articulate what type of behavior by
defense counsel needed to be exhibited for the defendant to
prove inadequate representation, except to state that "[a] ctual or
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is
legally presumed to result in prejudice."6 17 In effect, an accused
somehow needed to furnish evidence that the outcome of the
trial would have been different if not for the alleged improper
actions or omissions by the defense attorney.
Brennan, concurring and dissenting in part, supported the
majority's attempt to enable a defendant to prove negligence by
a defense attorney, and believed that lower courts will receive
"helpful guidance... [in] considering claims of actual ineffectiveness of counsel" and opportunities "to achieve progressive development of this area of the law."6 18 However, Brennan believed
that assessing performance of counsel should not be confined to
the penalty stage. Mindful of the potential for violation of due
process protections at any point in deliberations, Brennan
emphasized that "capital proceedings [needed to] be policed at
all stages by an especially vigilant concern for procedural fairness
and for the accuracy of factfinding."6 1 9 Conceding that varying
circumstances and conceivable measures which a defense attorney may employ precluded erection of a "particular set of
detailed rules for counsel's conduct, '6 20 Brennan nevertheless
insisted on holding a lawyer accountable for quality of representation at the time mitigating evidence is presented for determination of guilt or innocence. This, he believed, would "minimize
the possibility" of a death sentence being "'imposed out of whim,
passion, prejudice, or mistake"' 6 21 by accentuating commitment
to due process requirements throughout the developmental
stages of capital proceedings.
Brennan's unwavering opposition to capital punishment, in
part based on a perception that sufficiently extensive due process
protections could not be formulated to prevent the risk of arbitrariness entering into proceedings, impelled him to address
616.
617.
618.
619.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 704.

620. This was the phrase used by the majority opinion. Id. at 688.
621. Id. at 705 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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stages of deliberations which the majority had not focused on.
The tone of Brennan's opinion in Strickland was that the potential for abridgment of Bill of Rights protections needed to be
anticipated to prevent conviction arising from denial of opportunities to introduce mitigating evidence or attempts to misrepresent the circumstances of the accused. This was reiterated by
Brennan in the 1989 case of South Carolina v. Gathers.62 2 In a
brief opinion on behalf of the majority, Brennan invalidated, as
irrelevant to the defendant's culpability and potentially distorting the jury's perception of aggravating and mitigating evidence, comments by the prosecutor on religious messages found
on the person of the accused.6 2 3 Irrespective of whether jurors
were influenced by testimony pertaining to the defendant's
alleged religious beliefs, the possibility that deliberations may
have been diverted from the blameworthiness of the accused
tainted proceedings and compelled reversal of a death sentence.
While Brennan's opinions on capital punishment tended to
focus on procedural inadequacies, he never wavered from his
Furman pronouncement that the death penalty was offensive to
human dignity.6 24 This sentiment induced him, in the late
1980s, to strongly oppose capital punishment for those - such as
minors,6 25 the mentally retarded, 6 26 and the insane6 2 7 - who he
believed were incapable of comprehending their behavior, as
well as those who, arguably, could not be shown to be responsible
for a homicide. The Court addressed the death penalty for
accomplices in the 1982 case of Enmund v. Florida6 28 and again
four years later in Cabanav. Bullock;6 29 in 1987, Brennan, dissenting in Tison v. Arizona,6 3 first addressed this subject at length.6 "'
622. 409 U.S. 805 (1989), overuled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597
(1991).
623. Id. at 2211. See also Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, reh'g denied, 483
U.S. 1056 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
624. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305. See supra text accompanying notes 452-53.
625. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Brennan,J., dissenting);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (Brennan,J.,joining the majority
opinion of Stevens, J.).
626. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
627. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (Brennan, J., joining the
majority opinion of Marshall, J.). See infra text accompanying notes 880-91.
628. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
629. 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
630. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 921 (1987).
631. In Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782, and Cabana, 474 U.S. at 376, Brennan
wrote brief statements confined to expressing his categorical opposition to
capital punishment. Enmund, id. at 801 (Brennan, J., concurring); Cabana, id.

at 393 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The Tison case involved three sons who, following a successful attempt to help their father escape from prison, killed a
driver and three passengers after the motorist, led to believe that
the Tisons needed assistance, stopped to examine a flat tire.
Though it was uncertain whether the entire Tison family was
equally responsible for the killings, all were convicted of firstdegree murder.
Modifying its earlier rulings in Enmund and Cabana,where
the Court held that an accomplice did not sufficiently participate
in the commission of murder to qualify for the death penalty,63 2
a 5-4 majority declared in Tison that it was permissible for abettors "whose participation is major and whose mental state is one
of reckless indifference to the value of human life"6"3 to be sentenced to death. Given that only eleven of the thirty-seven states
which authorized capital punishment prohibited its imposition
for accomplices who significantly participated in the commission
of murder, the Court concluded that its ruling is consistent with
prevailing societal attitudes.63 4
The dissenting opinion written by Brennan criticized infliction of the death penalty on those whose degree of involvement
in commission of murder cannot be precisely ascertained. After
attempting to reconstruct the factual evidence, Brennan
observed that it was impossible to assess which individuals were
primarily or tangentially responsible for the murders, 635 and
objected to the state statute for failing to articulate degrees of
complicity63 6among several individuals who are charged with
homicide.
Brennan strongly opposed the death penalty for accomplices as a "living fossil"6 3 from a bygone period during which
sentencing authorities summarily subjected all participants in a
killing, however indirect or remote involvement of some may
have been, to execution. This concept, Brennan maintained, is
contrary to enlightened notions of justice followed "in most
American jurisdictions and in virtually all European and Commonwealth countries" which refrain from executing an individual "for a murder that he or she
did not commit or specifically
63 8
intend or attempt to commit."
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.
638.

Edmund, 458 U.S. at 782; Cabana, 474 U.S. at 376.
Tison, 481 U.S. at 152.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 164-68.
Id. at 159.
Id.
Id. at 160.
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Brennan objected to the Court's departure from precedent
and its uneven application of principles established in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. The position in Enmund,6" 9 which
refused to support the death penalty for individuals whose
degree of involvement in a homicide did not indicate an intention to kill,6 4 ° was, insisted Brennan, controlling in the present
case because sentencing authorities did not establish that all petitioners convicted of murder actually committed a killing or
expected to do so. An accomplice sentenced to death who has
not killed is, in effect, being punished for one's "mental state
with regard to an act committed by another."6 ' This, Brennan
argued, "cannot serve ... as independent grounds for imposing

the death penalty."64 2 He also maintained that the Court's categorization of the petitioners' behavior as "reckless indifference to
the value of human life"64 3 did not prove intent to kill. Acting
"with intent is qualitatively different from a determination that
the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life" in
that the "reckless actor has not chosen to bring about the killing
in the way the intentional actor has."64 4 This statute, Brennan
insisted, failed to require a finding that those who kill intended
the consequences of their behavior.
Brennan also did not agree with the majority's contention
that the death penalty for accomplices was in accord with prevailing national sentiment. Examining states which have abolished
capital punishment, as well as those which authorize it for a narrow class of offenses, Brennan maintained that "three-fifths of
American jurisdictions did not authorize the death penalty for a
nontriggerman absent a finding that he intended to kill."64 5 He
also pointed out that, in the quarter century preceding the
Enmund decision, as well as the 65 executions which have taken
place since its adjudication, not a single individual who did not
kill or intend to commit murder was put to death.6 4 6
The objections which Brennan raised in Furman concerning
capital punishment were, he believed, implicated in the Tison
opinion. 64 7 The death penalty for accomplices, he insisted, was
offensive to contemporary society, and the Court's failure to
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.

458 U.S. 782.
Id. at 801.
Tison, 481 U.S. at 170.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 170 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 175.
Id. at 176-79.
See supra text accompanying notes 420-24.
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articulate clear standards concerning physical and mental
responsibility for murder contradicted precedent which mandated examination of the proportionality between an offense
and its punishment.6 4 8 Brennan acknowledged the Court's earlier recognition of retribution as a legitimate outlet for society to
express its anger at a heinous act;6 49 however, he insisted that the
Court's failure in Tison to compel the state to impose punishment based on the individual culpability of an accused made this
argument inapplicable. 0 °
The Tison case, Brennan concluded, illustrated the futility of
attempting to remove arbitrariness from capital trial proceedings. Adoption of the death penalty encouraged resorting to
excessive punishment based on emotional outrage which, invariably, did not follow due process safeguards; with regard to its
infliction on accomplices to a homicide, Brennan insisted, a state
gave expression to its "retributive instincts" in a manner "tragically anachronistic in a society governed by our Constitution. "651
This sentiment was reiterated in the 1989 cases of Stanford v. Kentucky6 52 and Penry v. Lynaugh,65 3 which dealt with the death penalty for minors and the mentally retarded, respectively.
The Court in Stanford upheld statutory provisions which
authorized capital punishment for seventeen-year-olds. 65 4 Pointing out that capital statutes are to be examined in light of evolving societal standards of decency,65 5 the Court noted that a
majority of states which sanctioned the death penalty authorized
it for offenders who are sixteen or older.65 6 Brennan, in dissent,
disagreed with the majority's contention that the death penalty
for minors is consistent with contemporary notions of justice,6 5 7
and insisted that "'evolving standards of decency' "65 rendered
capital punishment for juveniles abhorrent.
648.

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).

See supra text

accompanying notes 226-32.
649. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 308 (1972). Tison, 481 U.S. at 181. For a discussion of this concept,

see supra text accompanying notes 175-88.
650. Tison, 481 U.S. at 181.
651. Id. at 184.
652.
653.
654.

109 S. Ct. 2969, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 23 (1989).
109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
In the companion case of Wilkins v. Missouri, the Court upheld a

statute which mandated the death penalty for sixteen-year-olds. 109 S.Ct. at
2969. See, however, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), which

invalidated the death penalty for fifteen-year-olds.
655. 109 S. Ct. at 2974.
656.
657.

Id. at 2976.
Id. at 2980.

658.

Id. at 2982 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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Examining statistical trends, Brennan maintained that the
death penalty for minors was unacceptable to contemporary society. Of thirty-five states which then authorized capital punishment, twelve, calculated Brennan, "specifically mandate that
offenders under age 18 not be sentenced to death," while three
others "explicitly refuse to authorize sentences of death for those
who committed their offense when under 17. "659 When these
states are added to the fifteen which prohibited capital punishment, Brennan concluded that thirty do not allow execution of
minors under age 17.6" He also cited the infrequency with
which minors have been executed, as well as widespread opposition to the death penalty in industrialized European nations, to
further challenge the majority's contention
that this punishment
6 61
was not repugnant to modem society.
More fundamentally, however, Brennan believed that execution of minors violated the prohibition of "cruel and unusual
punishments" on its face. This wording, he insisted, as well as a
series of precedents, 66 2 compelled evaluation of the severity of
punishment in relation to the offense and offender. Though he
conceded that some individuals "mature more quickly than their
peers,"6 63 Brennan maintained that minors "so generally lack the
degree of responsibility for their crimes that it is a predicate for
the constitutional imposition of the death penalty that the
Eighth Amendment forbids that they receive that punishment."664 Employing a comparable position in Penry,6 65 Brennan, in a brief dissent, insisted that subjecting the mentally
retarded to the death penalty constituted a disproportionate
punishment which did not take into account the blameworthi659. Id. at 2982-83.
660. Id. at 2983.
661. Brennan pointed out that only "[e]leven minors were sentenced to
die in 1982; 9 in 1983; 6 in 1984; 5 in 1985; 7 in 1986; and 2 in 1987." Stanford,
109 S. Ct. at 2984. He also noted the "small proportion of Uuvenile offenders
on] the current death row population: 30 out of a total of 2,186 inmates, or 1.37
percent." Id. at 2984. Moreover, Brennan emphasized that the death penalty
itself has been abolished or "limited ... to exceptional crimes such as treason"
in "over 50" countries, and "not enforced in 27 others." Id. at 2985.
662. Brennan cited Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502, reh'g denied, 483
U.S. 1056 (1987), and overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991);
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286
(1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 815 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 369 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1892) (Field,J., dissenting).
663. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2989.
664. Id. at 2988.
665. 109 S. Ct. 2934.
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ness of the accused or66the
ability to comprehend the magnitude
6
of an alleged offense.
In both his Stanford and Penry opinions, Brennan addressed,
as he had done in Furman,667 the relevance of retribution and
deterrence as factors which may induce authorization of capital
punishment.6 6 Without elaboration, he declared that a punishment disproportionate to the culpability of the offender "by definition is not justly deserved"66 9 and thus cannot be said to
further alleged objectives of retribution; similarly, Brennan maintained that execution of juveniles and the mentally retarded did
not "measurably contribute to the goal of deterrence. 6 7 ° In
both instances Brennan speculated on the possible gain to society by extending capital punishment to these offenders. A punishment, he declared, has deterrent value only if an individual
refrained from criminal activity after having determined that the
penalty outweighed any possible benefits from unlawful conduct.
It is highly unlikely, Brennan reasoned, thatjuveniles, having "littie fear of death, 6 7 1 will take this into consideration, and the
intellectual and cognitive impairment of the mentally retarded
similarly made remote the possibility that they would examine
aforethought the consequences of contemplated action.67 2
Brennan's contention that the alleged purposes of retribution and deterrence were inapplicable with regard to these
classes of defendants was based on his moral outrage toward capital punishment as "'nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering."' 6 73 It is conceivable,
however, that jurors, taking into account the individualized
666. Id. at 2960-62. The majority opinion written by Justice O'Connor in
Pery, id. at 2934, objected that jurors were not informed that they may consider
an accused's mental state (the petitioner, arrested for murder, was diagnosed as
mildly to moderately retarded and having "the mental age of a 6 1/2 year
old. . . ."), id. at 2941, and concluded that full consideration of mitigating
evidence was precluded. Id. at 2947. The Court did not, however, rule that the
mentally retarded may not be subject to capital punishment; rather, it
concluded that "at present, there is insufficient evidence of a national
consensus against executing mentally retarded people" to warrant its
categorical prohibition by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2955.
667. 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
See supra text
accompanying notes 433-35, 470-72.
668. See supra text accompanying notes 155-88.
669. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2993. See also, Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2962
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
670. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2993; Peny, 109 S. Ct. at 2962.
671. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2993.
672. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2962-63.
673. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2994 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,

592 (1977)).-
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circumstances of the accused and the alleged offense, may conclude that a particular defendant, though a minor or of subnormal intelligence, comprehended the magnitude of one's
conduct and committed an act with knowledge of its consequences. By categorizing an entire class of offenders as free from
culpability for homicide, Brennan made possible inconsistent
pronouncement of verdicts in that jurors, aware that minors and
the mentally retarded cannot receive the death penalty, may
weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances differently than
what would transpire with defendants who were eligible for exesentencing - which
cution. This may introduce arbitrariness in
6 74
the majority sought to prevent in Furman.
Brennan's pronouncements on capital punishment were
motivated by compassion. While his foremost objective was to
proscribe the death penalty, Brennan also emphasized the
importance -

given the enormity and finality of execution -

of

preserving due process safeguards in trial proceedings through
the appellate stages and extending to petitions for writ of
certiorari.
The Court's role in reviewing petitions for certiorari may
have a major impact on an accused's ability to challenge the
legality of capital proceedings. A petition for certiorari affords
an accused an opportunity to request the Court to review the
proceedings of a lower court and assess whether constitutional
guidelines have been followed. A stay of execution is typically
requested; however, whether granted or denied, further opportunities to appeal capital sentences are not foreclosed.
A petition for a writ of certiorari raises issues concerning the
degree to which the Court should examine capital proceedings.
Should the Court overturn state convictions only when explicit
constitutional violations have been found, or is it appropriate for
the justices to examine proceedings based on subjective notions
concerning the morality or perceived reasonableness of statutory
provisions? Granting a petition for certiorari may result in
prompt execution of the sentence if no violation is found; on the
other hand, denial may give rise to protracted litigation - and
affect prompt administration of criminal justice - in that a
defendant who has already exhausted numerous opportunities to
appeal a capital conviction may feel encouraged to challenge the
Court's refusal to consider a petition for certiorari, and thereby
raise legal issues which likely have been examined.
674.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. See supra text accompanying notes 276-
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A related option available to capital defendants is a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. A litigant who has incurred an
abridgment of personal liberty may, by filing this petition,
request a judge to examine the legality of incarceration. The
Constitution does not define unlawful imprisonment or specify
circumstances in which the writ is to be granted.6 75
Both petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus relate to
standing, which deals with one's eligibility to have a grievance
heard in the federal courts. The Court noted in two 1990 cases
that, "before a federal court can consider the merits of a legal
claim, the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court
must establish the requisite standing to sue. "676 To satisfy the
requirement in Article III that gives federal courts jurisdiction
over "cases" and "controversies," a litigant must demonstrate that
a direct and personal impairment of constitutional or statutory
rights has been sustained.67 7 Establishing one's alleged deprivation of rights is difficult because this is often not apparent until
all appellate challenges have been exhausted, compelling a
defendant, while litigation is pending, to speculate on the eventual outcome. In Whitmore v. Arkansas,6 71 the Court ruled that an
inmate's claim that legal rulings which might emanate from
appellate proceedings may someday benefit him is "nothing
more than conjecture" 679 and insufficient to meet the "case" and
"controversies" requirement. The possibility of applying a rule
formulated in appellate review retroactively to other litigants was
rejected in the 1989 case of Teague v. Lane,68 ° where the Court
declared that "new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will
not be applicable to those cases which have become final before
the new rules are announced."6 8 A new ruling will only be
applied retroactively, the majority in Teague pronounced, if it
675.

The Constitution forbids suspension of the writ "unless when in

Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 9. For an analysis of concerns presented by petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in capital cases, see Robert S. Catz, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death
Penalty:Need for a PreclusionDoctrineException, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1177 (1985);
TimothyJ. Foley, The New Arbitrariness: ProceduralDefault of FederalHabeas Corpus
Claims in Capital Cases, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 193 (1989). See also Demosthenes v.
Baal, 110 S. Ct. 2223 (1990).
676. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717, 1722 (1990). See also,
Demosthenes v. Baal, 110 S. Ct. 2223, 2226 (1990).

677.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

678.
679.

110 S. Ct. at 1717.
Id. at 1724. See also Demosthenes v. Baal, 110 S. Ct. 2223 (1990)

(Brennan, J., dissenting).
680.

489 U.S. 288, reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989).

681.

Id. at 310.
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"places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe,' "682 and if it demands new procedures without which the
likelihood of obtaining a valid conviction is significantly
impaired." 5
By placing a formidable burden of proof on the defendant,
the Court underscored its desire to leave state capital proceedings subject to minimal federal intervention. Moreover, its contention in Sawyer v. Smith,6 84 decided one year after Teague, that
the purpose of a habeas corpus petition "is to ensure that state
convictions comply with the federal law in existence at the time
the conviction became final, and not to provide a mechanism for
the continuing reexamination of final judgments based upon
later emerging legal doctrine,"68 5 diminished the likelihood
that the Court would agree to review capital proceedings alleged
to violate evolving standards of decency, morality, and proportionality - a major component of Brennan's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Unsurprisingly, Brennan objected that these guidelines
would make it difficult to appeal capital convictions beyond allegations that narrowly defined due process guidelines have been
violated. In the 1980s, the Burger Court, usually without divulging individual votes, denied petitions for writ of certiorari on a
number of occasions;" in two cases - Smith v. Kemrp8 7 and
Campbellv. Washington6 88 - Brennan appended a brief statement
682. Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
683. Id. at 315. In Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct.
1960 (1990), the Court applied this standard to both capital and noncapital
cases.
684. 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
685. Id. at 234. One year later, the Court in McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct.
1454 (1991), addressed the proper exercise of a habeas corpus petition in

capital proceedings. It held that one who fails to raise a legal claim in an initial
petition for a writ of habeas corpus must demonstrate, in a second or
subsequent application seeking to refute the government's assertion that the
writ had been abused, that "a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result
from failure to entertain the claim." Id. at 1470.

686. See, e.g., Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 955
(1981); Williams v. King, 719 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1027
(1983); Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), affd, 463 U.S. 880, and reh'g
denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983); Estelle v. Jurek, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1001, and cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1014, and reh'g denied, 451 U.S.

1011 (1981).
687. 849 F.2d 481 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1032 (1983).
688. 691 P.2d 929, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).
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reiterating his categorical opposition to capital punishment; 6 9 in
two others - Maggio v. Williams (1983)690 and Glass v. Louisiana
(1985)691 - which also involved denial of certiorari and rejection of a request for stay of execution - Brennan elaborated on
his concern for making appellate proceedings accessible.
Dissenting in Maggio, Brennan maintained that the petitioner's claim, in part, that the state supreme court had not
examined the proportionality of his death sentence based on
statewide rather than regional sentencing patterns, merited
review by the Court of a petition for certiorari. This type of allegation, he declared, is "nonfrivolous,"6 9 2 and the failure of the
Court to have formulated clear standards on the review of proportionality challenges compelled granting the petition. Examining state sentencing patterns, Brennan believed that disparities
existed in different judicial districts,6 9 and urged the Court to
avoid appearing to condone "arbitrary and capricious imposition
of the death penalty" 69 4 by refusing to approve a state mode of
appellate review which "results in different sentences for similarly
situated defendants."6 95 In the Glass decision, where the Court
denied a petition for certiorari from a defendant sentenced to
death by electrocution, Brennan, in dissent, maintained that a
form of punishment which is inconsistent with contemporary
perceptions of human dignity "demands measured judicial

consideration. "696
These opinions make clear that Brennan wished the Court
to exercise wide discretion in deciding to consider petitions for
writ of certiorari. The magnitude of capital punishment compelled furnishing the accused with unrestricted appellate opportunities to challenge a death sentence on both substantive and
procedural grounds, and evolving conceptions of acceptable
forms of punishment convinced Brennan that new interpretations of trial proceedings which hold sentencing authorities to
increasingly meticulous standards are to be applied retroactively.
This position was contrary to the Court's pronouncements in
689.

Smith, 464 U.S. at 1032 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Campbel4 471 U.S.

at 1094 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 505.

690.

719 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 46 (1983) (Brennan,J.,

dissenting).
691. 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
692. Maggio, 464 U.S. at 57.

693.

Id. at 60-61.

694.

Id. at 61.

695.
696.

Id.
Glass, 471 U.S. at 1081.
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Teague, 97 which Brennan, in dissent,69 9addressed in two cases:
Penry v. Lynaugh6 98 and Saffle v. Parks.
In Penry, Brennan insisted that standards for appellate
review are not similar in capital and noncapital proceedings.
The Teague case dealt with a noncapital proceeding, and Brennan, who dissented in that decision, 700 emphasized in Penry that
its pronouncements were inapplicable to capital trials. The
Teague plurality, he insisted, put forward "a novel threshold test
for federal review of state criminal convictions" 70 1 which erected
a formidable burden of proof on litigants to justify applying new
judicial interpretations retroactively. Ability to benefit from
revised rulings should not be limited to defendants whose conviction and sentence have not yet been pronounced.70 2
In Saffle, Brennan elaborated further on the diminished ability of litigants, based on Teague, to successfully appeal capital proceedings. Saffle, it will be recalled, declared that the judge's
instruction to the jury to reach a verdict free from personal
biases and emotions did not prevent unrestricted consideration
of mitigating evidence. 7 ' Brennan, in dissent, objected that
Teague would make it virtually impossible for defendants to challenge the jurors' mode of deliberation. To obtain appellate
relief, it was necessary for the accused to show that failure to
apply a revised judicial pronouncement to capital proceedings
already completed would "'implicat[e] the fundamental fairness
and accuracy of the criminal proceeding."' 704 In Saffle, Brennan
contended, the majority, other than stating that the "precise contours of this exception may be difficult to discern, "705 did not
articulate how an accused may demonstrate that retroactive
application of a new rule was warranted.
Brennan's objections to capital punishment were underscored in his opinions concerning appellate review of trial proceedings.
Brennan did not believe that the Court's
pronouncements concerning the need for jurors, free from prejudicial comments of a judge or prosecutor, to take into account
697. 489 U.S. at 288. See supra text accompanying notes 680-83.
698. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra text
accompanying notes 665-66.
699. 494 U.S. 484 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
700. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989)

(Brennan, J., dissenting).
701.
702.
703.
704.

Penry, 492 U.S. at 341.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 530-31.
Saffle, 494 U.S. at 505 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 311).

705.

Id.
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the individualized circumstances of the accused based on an
unbiased assessment of mitigating evidence, could be implemented. He maintained that jury bias, often based on psychological prejudices against a particular class of offender, is difficult to
prove, and the mere risk of its appearance is sufficient to justify
prohibition of a punishment which could furnish no recourse to
an accused later found to be wrongly executed. In short, beyond
generalizations on the need to confine the discretion of sentencing authorities, Brennan believed that clear standards concerning admissibility and examination of evidence, pronouncement
of sentence, and appeal of trial proceedings, could not be articulated. He
expressed this sentiment in the 1984 case of Pulley v.
70 6
Harris.

Dissenting from an opinion which held that it was unnecessary for a state supreme court to determine whether a sentence
of death was proportionate to the manner in which other
defendants were treated in comparable cases,70 7 Brennan
expressed doubt that capital proceedings could ever be administered in an unbiased manner. The Court, declared Brennan in
Pulley, is "simply deluding itself, and also the American public,
when it insists that those defendants who have already been executed or are today condemned to death have been selected on a
basis that is neither arbitrary nor capricious, under any meaningful definition of those terms."708 He also stated that, "[g] iven the
emotions generated by capital crimes, it may well be that juries,
trial judges, and appellate courts considering sentences of death
are invariably affected by impermissible considerations."709
While "we may tolerate such irrationality in other sentencing
contexts,"710 it is inexcusable in proceedings which may result in
the extinguishment of life.
This perception, along with his belief that the meaning of
constitutional provisions is shaped by evolving conceptions of
morality and compassion in the dispensation of justice, was the
basis for Brennan's unwavering insistence that capital punishment is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The
706.

465 U.S. 37 (1984).

707.

Id. at 43-44.

708. Id. at 60. The same year Pulley was decided, a study of eight states Oklahoma, North Carolina, Mississippi, Virginia, Arkansas, Georgia, Florida,
and Illinois - indicated persistence of racial discrimination and arbitrariness
in capital sentencing. See Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death:
An Analysis of RacialDisparitiesin CapitalSentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37
STAN. L. REv. 27 (1984).
709. Gross & Mauro, supra note 708, at 64.
710. Id.
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only other member of the Court who completely embraced Brennan's position was Justice Thurgood Marshall.
V.

A.

JUSTICE MARSHALL'S OPINIONS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Marshall'sFirst Opinion on the Death Penalty: Furman v.
Georgia (1972)

Justice Marshall, who did not participate in any of the Warren Court decisions on the death penalty, 7 11 first communicated
his categorical opposition to capital punishment byjoining Brennan's McGauthaopinion which expressed this sentiment. 7 12 Marshall's first, and most detailed, discussion of the death penalty
appeared in his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia.713 At
the outset, Marshall pointed out that determining "with objectivity and a proper measure of self-restraint" 7 14 whether the death
penalty was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment required careful examination of its original understanding, judicial precedents, and perception in contemporary society.
The prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," Marshall pointed out, "derive [d] from English law;" 7 15 however, prior
to adoption of the Bill of Rights of 1689, barbaric forms of punishment, sometimes culminating in execution, were widespread.
711. Of six cases decided by the Warren Court (see supra text
accompanying notes 236-64), Marshall had taken his seat prior to the
adjudication of just two decisions - United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968), and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) - but did not
participate.
712. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh'g denied, 406 U.S.
978 (1972), decided with Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated, 408
U.S. 941 (1972) (Marshall, J., joining the dissent of Brennan, J.). See supra text
accompanying notes 383-485.
713. 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972). For the ruling and
general sentiments of the Court, see supra text accompanying notes 276-84.
Prior to Furman, Marshall had written just one opinion in a death penalty case.
In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), the Court held that introduction by one
of twenty witnesses for the prosecution in a capital trial of testimony concerning
a statement allegedly made by the accused which conveyed an inference of guilt
did not constitute hearsay evidence or an abridgment of the Sixth
Amendment's command that a defendant have an opportunity "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The
dissent written by Marshall focused on the meaning of the confrontation clause
without addressing the constitutionality of capital punishment. 400 U.S. at 10011 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
714. Furman, 408 U.S. at 316.
715. Id. at 317 n.7 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 37677). For an overview of this period, see supra text accompanying notes 111-16.
For Blackstone's comment on the widespread use of capital punishment, as well
as his position on noncapital offenses, see supra note 129.
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While acknowledging that the precise meaning of the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" cannot be ascertained,7 1 6 Marshall believed that the founding generation
adopted this phrase from the Bill of Rights of 1689 "to outlaw
torture and other cruel punishments."7 1 7 He noted that a portion of the Virginia "Declaration of Rights" of 1776 contained
"language... drawn verbatim from the English Bill of Rights 7of
19
1689, "71 and that four other states adopted its phraseology. 720
Patrick Henry's comments at the Virginia ratifying convention,
as well as sentiments expressed in the First Congress, 7 2 1 convinced Marshall that "the history of the [cruel and unusual punishments] clause clearly establishe[d]
that it was intended to
722
prohibit cruel punishments."
Turning to judicial precedents, 723 Marshall reasoned that
punishments which involved "unnecessary cruelty" 7 24 and which

were excessive in relation to the offense committed were proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Two key components of the
Court's jurisprudence are the concepts of proportionality, put
forward in Weems v. United States, 725 and the notion that the

degree and severity of726punishment must evolve as perceptions of
justice are redefined.
Based on prior rulings, Marshall put forward a set of principles, virtually identical to Brennan's, 727 by
which punishments are to be reconciled with the Eighth Amendment. Guiding his formulation was the statement in Trop v. Dul7 28
/es
which Marshall said was "[p]erhaps the most important
principle in analyzing 'cruel and unusual' punishment ques716.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 319.

717. Id. For a discussion of views expressed in the First Congress, see
supra text accompanying notes 121-23.

718. Id.
719. Id. n.16.
720. Id. at 320-21. Advocating inclusion of a bill of rights in the
Constitution, Henry maintained that a clause prohibiting "cruel and unusual
punishments" would prevent governmental attempts to "extort confession by

torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity." Id. at 321.
721. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
722. Furman, 408 U.S. at 322.
723. For a discussion of major Court rulings prior to Furman, see supra
text accompanying notes 220-42.
724. Furman, 408 U.S. at 322.
725. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). For a discussion of this case, see supra text
accompanying notes 226-32.
726. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). For a discussion of this case, see
supra text accompanying notes 236-39.
727. See supra text accompanying notes 421-24. Furman, 408 U.S. at 27179 (Brennan, J., concurring).
728. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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tions"7 2 9
that the wording of the Eighth Amendment "'must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."'"" 0 With this pronouncement foremost in mind, Marshall put forward four criteria by which to assess whether punishment was cruel and
unusual:
First, there are certain punishments that inherendy
involve so much physical pain and suffering that civilized
people cannot tolerate them .... 731

Second, there are punishments that are unusual, signipreviously unknown as penalties for a
fying that they73were
2
given offense.
it
Third, a penalty may be cruel and unusual because
733
is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose.
Fourth, where a punishment is not excessive and
it still may be invalid if
serves a valid legislative purpose,
73 4
popular sentiment abhors it.
Though he acknowledged the Court's support of the death
penalty in the past,73 5 Marshall maintained that this did not pre-

clude reexamination of the issue. He pointed out that some
7 6
forms of punishment - such as the rack and thumbscrew which were once practiced "have been barred since the adoption
of the Bill of Rights., 73 7 Marshall also indicated that history and
judicial precedents have not furnished a clear definition of the
phrase "cruel and unusual," but believed that they pertain to the
humaneness of punishment and the length of time it has
existed.7 38 Conceptions of proportionality, Marshall noted, also
evolve over time, and a punishment deemed by contemporary
society as excessive is invalid even though it may not have been
considered unacceptably harsh in the past. 73 9 In addition, Mar729.
730.
731.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 329.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 330.

732. Id. at 331.
733. Id.
734. Id. at 332.
735. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879). See supra
text accompanying notes 220-35.
736. Furman, 408 U.S. at 330.
737. Id.
738. Id. at 331.
739. Id. at 331-32.
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shall maintained that a punishment "found ... to be morally
unacceptable"7 4 ° is in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Marshall's four criteria by which to assess capital punishment underscored that the Eighth Amendment mandated constant reevaluation of a principle intended to be aspirational. The
authors of the Bill of Rights bequeathed to posterity not the practices of their generation but rather a vision of morality concerning the relationship between government and the citizenry which
needed to be reexamined throughout history.
Marshall's examination of the death penalty, from its early
history in England prior to Magna Carta, through the founding
generation and up to the Civil War, and encompassing the evolution of the abolitionist movement during its periods of popularity
and weakness up to the Furman decision,7 4 1 pointed out that, in
varying degrees of intensity, sentiment against capital punishment has always been expressed. In England, Marshall declared
that the death penalty, probably originating as an act of "private
vengeance" on the part of those seeking "violent retaliation by
members of a tribe or group, or by the tribe or group itself,
against persons committing hostile acts toward group members,"7 42 became increasingly widespread from the 1 100s onward,
and, by the early 1800s, was statutorily authorized for more than
200 offenses. 743 In the American colonies, Marshall noted, capital punishment was prominent7 4 4 but less widespread, and, as
early as the 1600s, opposition to the death penalty was being
expressed.7 4 5 During the founding generation, abolitionist societies were conspicuous, 746 and, by the 1850s, movements to invalidate the death penalty had spread to a number of states.7 4 7
Several states had abolished the death penalty in the generation
following the Civil War, 748 and the movement, which "lost its
740. Id. at 332.
741. Id. at 333-42. For a discussion of the history of capital punishment
from the period of Magna Carta up to the Civil War, see supra text
accompanying notes 111-27. For an examination of abolitionist trends after
1865, see GoRECai, supranote 124, at 142-43; PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 8-

15.
742.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 333.

743.

Id. at 334.

744.
745.

See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 335-36.

746. Id. at 336-37. For an examination of the abolitionist movements
discussed by Marshall, see supra text accompanying notes 145-54.
747.

GoREcxi, supranote 124, at 142-43; PATERNOSTER, supranote 116, at

748.

Id.

8-15.
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vigor"" during the period between World Wars I and II, experienced "renewed interest""' in the years leading up to Furman.
In addition, Marshall pointed out that the barbarity with which
the death penalty had once been inflicted gradually abated as the
twentieth century progressed.7 5 This history, concluded Marshall, has indicated increasing uneasiness with retention of the
death penalty.
Though he acknowledged that the abolitionist movement
has been able to bring about repeal of the death penalty in "no
more than one-quarter of the States... at any one time,"75 2 Marshall inquired whether "American society has reached a point
where abolition is not dependent on a successful grass roots
movement in particular jurisdictions, but is demanded by the
Eighth Amendment."75 3 He proceeded to examine whether the
reasons which have impelled states to adopt capital punishment
are valid.
Retribution, Marshall pointed out, has stemmed from society's desire to punish those who have violated the law and, hopefully, rehabilitate offenders. Infliction of punishments for
vengeance and retaliation, however, "have been roundly condemned as intolerable aspirations for a government in a free
society,"75 4 rejected "by scholars for centuries," 75 5 and antithetical to the purpose of the Eighth Amendment.7 5 6 Marshall did
not elaborate on these assertions. The alleged justification of
punishment has been extensively debated by proponents of utilitarianism and retributivism, and neither position can, in the
abstract, be categorized as morally superior;75 7 indeed, contrary
to Marshall's position, a consensus on retribution, in theory and
application, has never emerged, and there is no empirical evidence of its repudiation at any point in history.7 5 8 Marshall cited
Weems v. United States,759 where the Court declared that sanctions
must be proportionate to an offense,76 ° to underscore his contention that "punishment for the sake of retribution was not per749.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 340.

750.

Id.

751.

Id.

752.

Id. at 341.

753.
754.

Id. at 341-42.
Id. at 343.

755.
756.
757.
758.

Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 175-82.
Id.

759.
760.

217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Id. at 365-66. See supra text accompanying notes 226-32.
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missible under the Eighth Amendment." 761 However, a
punishment motivated by retribution may be proportionate to
unlawful behavior. Would retribution be appropriate in this
instance? There is no evidence that the Eighth Amendment was
adopted to proscribe retribution; Marshall himself declared that
its original understanding was "to outlaw torture and other cruel
punishments," 762 suggesting that the authors sought to address
the degree of physical suffering inflicted on defendants rather
than the motives of legislators for adopting a particular penalty.
In short, Marshall did not substantiate his assertion that "retribution for its own sake" 761 violated the founders' perception of the
Eighth Amendment.
Marshall also did not believe that deterrence was a valid justification for capital punishment. Relying primarily on the pioneering studies of Thorsten Sellin, 764 Marshall maintained that
there is no evidence indicating that capital punishment is an
effective deterrent to the commission of homicide. 76 5 He conceded that Sellin's findings may be inconclusive, 766 and that abolitionists "have not proved non-deterrence beyond a reasonable
doubt; ' 767 however, Marshall believed that there was "clear and
convincing evidence that capital punishment is not necessary as a
deterrent to crime in our society. "768 This, however, does not
make it unconstitutional. Marshall did not explain why the failure of punishment to achieve a socially desirable objective rendered it "cruel and unusual." Marshall's other arguments against
the death penalty - that the rate of recidivism by convicted murderers is not high; 7 69 that the ability of a state to obtain a confession by plea bargaining would not be impaired; 77° and that it is
offensive for a state to seek to eliminate perceived undesirable
761.
762.
763.

Furman, 408

U.S. at 344.

Id. at 319.
Id. at 345.

764. See supra text accompanying notes 157-61. At the time Furman was
decided, not many studies on the alleged deterrent effect of capital punishment
had been completed; however, there was some evidence, along with Sellin's
findings, that the death penalty was not a statistically demonstrable method to
prevent homicide, id., that the prospect of execution affected the behavior of
potential murderers. See supra text accompanying note 172.
765. Furman, 408 U.S. at 349-50.
766. Id. at 350-53. For a discussion of the debate between abolitionists
and retentionists, see supra text accompanying notes 155-74.
767. Furman, 408 U.S. at 350.
768.

Id. at 353. See also PATERNOSTER, supra note 116, at 217-46; supra text

accompanying notes 189-90.
769. Furman, 408 U.S. at 355-56.
770. Id. at 356.
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criminal offenders from society; 7 71 - may demonstrate lack of
circumspection in formulating policy planning and poor fiscal
judgment, but do not establish constitutional invalidity.
The central component of Marshall's jurisprudence on capital punishment was summarized in his statement that "the Eighth
Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves. ' ' 772 In other
words, the meaning of the Eighth Amendment is aspirational; it
embodies a vision of morality which the citizenry seeks to
achieve. Marshall's objective was not primarily to dictate policymaking priorities to states but rather to shape a psychological
bond between government and the populace. In this regard, he
contended that the death penalty "is an excessive and unnecessary punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment" 773 not
because it was fiscally burdensome or unable to achieve social
ends better than other forms of punishment but because it violated principles of justice which evolved with each generation.
Enabling the citizenry to aspire to the vision and promise of the
Eighth Amendment, contended Marshall, was the responsibility
of the judiciary.
At some point, Marshall declared, it is necessary for the
Court to ask itself whether "deference to the legislatures is tantamount to abdication of our judicial roles as factfinders, judges,
and ultimate arbiters of the Constitution. " 774 He wished to confer on the Court wide discretion to examine both the procedural
and substantive components of legislation; it was necessary, Marshall declared, to determine "not whether the legislature acted
but whether it had any rational basis whatsoever for actwisely,
ing."775 This required the justices to formulate a perception of
the moral underpinnings of constitutional provisions and assess
whether legislation has fulfilled it. According to Marshall, striking down legislation - though enacted with majority support which has undermined or contradicted the moral vision of a constitutional command was not a usurpation of judicial power but
rather an appropriate expression of the Court's responsibility to
elevate the citizenry to an enlightened conception of justice.
Accordingly, he did not believe that adoption of capital punishment by a majority of the states established its constitutionality.
He attributed widespread sanctioning of the death penalty to the
ignorance of the citizenry regarding its costs, alleged deterrent
771.

Id. at 356-57.

772.

Id. at 345.

773.
774.
775.

Id. at 358.
Id. at 359.
Id.
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effect, and usefulness to society. 776 If individuals were factually
"find it shocking
informed about the death penalty, they would
77 7
to [the] conscience and sense of justice."
The uninformed citizenry, Marshall declared, does not realize that the death penalty has been arbitrarily inflicted. He cited
statistics indicating that blacks "were executed far more often
than whites in proportion to their percentage of the population, '77 8 and that men have been executed far more frequently
than women. 7 79 Also unknown to the public, according to Marshall, is that "the burden of capital punishment falls upon the
poor, the ignorant, and the underprivileged members of society, " 780 and that efforts to prevent wrongful execution are "not
fool-proof."781' Though he conceded that it is "difficult to ascer-

tain with certainty the degree to which the death penalty is discriminatorily imposed or the number of innocent persons
sentenced to die," 78 2 its mere possibility justified abolition.
Marshall did not discuss how revisions in penal codes might
reduce the likelihood of discriminatory trial proceedings and
erroneous convictions because he did not believe capital punishment could be legitimized with elaborate due process safeguards.
The immorality of capital punishment, he concluded, was inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment's command to evolve progressively enlightened conceptions of justice between the
government and the citizenry, and the Court's role was to enable
the nation to transcend contemporary notions of punishment which often stemmed from ignorance - and fulfill the aspirational tone of the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments." Marshall believed that his position was based not on a
subjective value judgment but rather on views representative of
the people who are not yet able to comprehend that abhorrence
of the death penalty is their actual sentiment. Thus, while moral776. Id. at 362-63.
777. Id. at 369.
778. Id. at 364. Marshall pointed out that: "A total of 3,859 persons have
been executed since 1930, of whom 1,751 were white and 2,066 were Negro. Of

the executions, 3,334 were for murder; 1,664 of the executed murderers were
white and 1,630 were Negro; 455 persons, including 48 whites and 405 Negroes,
were executed for rape." Id. For an examination of a number of studies which
confirmed Marshall's contention, up to the Furman decision, that the
administration of capital punishment has been racially biased, see supra text
accompanying notes 210-12, 217.
779. Id. at 365. Marshall declared that, "[o]nly 32 women have been
executed since 1930, while 3,827 men have met a similar fate." Id.
780. Id. at 365-66.
781. Id. at 366.
782. Id. at 368.
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ity played a large role in Marshall's concurrence, it was intended
to vindicate the underlying objective of the Eighth Amendment.
This sentiment guided Marshall as the Court considered a range
of issues presented by capital punishment.
B.

Marshall Opposes ProceduralGuidelines Put Forward by the
Burger Court (1976-1986)

In the 1976 case of Gregg v. Georgia,783 the Court, for the first
time, explicitly acknowledged the constitutionality of the death
penalty, 784 and, in companion cases, 785 discussed the type of discretion statutes needed to provide juries in trial proceedings.7 8 6
Marshall, in dissent, reiterated his categorical opposition to capital punishment, 78 7 and explained why he believed statutory
guidelines could not preclude arbitrariness in sentencing.
Relying on pronouncements in Furman, Marshall once again
maintained that the death penalty is excessive in that it has not
been shown to be a deterrent to the commission of homicide.
Marshall examined studies by Isaac Ehrlich, published since the
Furman decision, which suggested that capital punishment may
have lowered the rate of murder, 78 8 as well as those seeking to
discredit his position,78 9 and concluded that Ehrlich's findings
are "of little, if any, assistance in assessing the deterrent impact of
the death penalty." 79 ° Marshall declared that his discussion in
Furman denying a deterrent effect of capital punishment 791
783. 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
784. Id. at 169.
785. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 890 .(1976).
786. See supra text accompanying notes 287-305.
787. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also, Marshall's
brief statement in Woodson, 428 U.S. at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring), and
Roberts, 428 U.S. at 337 (Marshall, J., concurring).
788. Isaac Ehrlich, The DeterrentEffect of CapitalPunishment: A Question of
Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. Rv. 397 (1975); IssAc EHRLICH, THE DETERRENT
EFFECT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A QUESTION OF LIFE AND DEATH, (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 18, 1973) (cited by Marshall
in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 234 n.4). For a discussion of Ehrlich's position, see supra
text accompanying note 163.
789. For an analysis of several studies in response to Ehrlich completed
prior to Gregg,see supra note 164. These studies were cited by Marshall in Gregg,
428 U.S. at 235 n.8.
790. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 236. For an analysis of arguments made by
abolitionists and retentionists concerning the alleged deterrent effect of the
death penalty, see supra text accompanying notes 155-74.
791.
See supra text accompanying notes 764-68.
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"remains convincing," 792 and that no new evidence refuting his
position has emerged.
Marshall also left undisturbed his contention from Furman
that the citizenry is not well-informed on the death penalty.79 3
He noted in Gregg that thirty-five states (and the District of
Columbia) have enacted new capital punishment statutes since
the Furmandecision, 9 but adhered to his position, "confirmed"
by a study published in 1976, 795 that "the American people know
792. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 236.
793. See supra text accompanying notes 778-82.
794. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232.
795. Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the
Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 171 (1976).
To test the accuracy of Marshall's contention that the public is not well
informed on the death penalty, Furman, 408 U.S. at 362-63, Sarat and Vidmar
randomly interviewed, during the spring and summer of 1975, 200 residents of
Amherst, Massachusetts. Sarat & Vidmar, id. at 180. Nineteen of these
interviews were unused, confining the sample to 181 individuals. Id. at 180-81.
Based on a questionnaire containing 18 statements, the following responses
were tabulated: "54 percent of our subjects favored the death penalty to some
degree, 13 percent indicated that they were uncertain and 33 percent were
opposed to it." Id. at 183. Concerning recent trends, "72 percent indicated
that they knew that there are people currently awaiting execution in the United
States; 29 percent indicated they knew that no one had actually been executed
in the five years preceding the Furmandecision." Id. at 185. With regard to the
alleged racial and socioeconomic bias in capital sentencing, "almost 60 percent
of the subjects of this study indicated that they also knew about these inequities
in the application of the death penalty." Id. at 186. In addition, "52 percent of
those favoring it did so even though they indicated that they knew that it has
been imposed infrequently and disproportionately against poor people." Id. It
was also found that "approximately one-third of our subjects indicated that they
knew about the weight of evidence on the question of deterrence, and only 22
percent indicated that they knew that the murder rate does not generally fall in
the weeks following a well publicized execution." Id. Thus, concerning
Marshall's assertion on the public's ignorance about capital punishment, Sarat
and Vidmar concluded that this position "needs some modification":
People appear to know more about the way that capital punishment is
applied, but are less well informed about its effects. In the strict sense
that Justice Marshall meant when he used the term, however, few
persons in our sample could be labelled 'informed' about the death
penalty.
Id. at 187.
To test whether public attitudes had changed as information about the
death penalty is furnished, the researchers prepared two 1500-word essays. The
first dealt with "the 'Utilitarian' aspects of capital punishment and consisted of
summaries of statistical studies, reports of personal experience and arguments
about the psychology of deterrence as well as data on the recidivism rate among
released murderers." Id. at 182. The second focused on the "'Humanitarian'"
aspects of the death penalty: "first, the way capital punishment has typically
been applied and administered and, second, the psychological and physical
aspects of execution." Id. This material was then broken down into four cate-
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little about the death penalty,"7 96 and, had the citizenry been better informed, execution would not be acceptable. 9 7 More fundamentally, however, Marshall again insisted that the death
penalty "is unconstitutional because it is excessive; "798 it is a form
of punishment which cannot be reconciled with deterrence which is empirically unprovable _71 or retribution, which is
morally reprehensible. ° °
Marshall acknowledged that retribution exhibited a community's desire to encourage obedience to the law by imposing penalties on its transgressors, but added that the degree to which it
may be expressed with particular offenses was limited. Punishment inflicted purely to exact retribution - irrespective of its
proportionality to an offense and its likelihood to rehabilitate an
offender - is impermissible. The death penalty, Marshall
argued, satisfied neither of these objectives of punishment; it is
disproportionate by denying "the wrongdoer's dignity and
worth,"8" 1 and valueless as an educational remedy because an
accused "concerned about conforming his conduct to what society says is 'right' and sentenced to life imprisonment "would [not]
fail to realize that murder is 'wrong.' "802 In other words, Margories

-

"(1) utilitarian information only, (2) humanitarian information only,

(3) utilitarian and humanitarian information combined, and (4) a control condition consisting of an essay about law which was entirely unrelated to death
penalty issues." Id. at 182-83. The researchers found that expression of support
for the death penalty after reading the material declined from its initial level: in
the group which read "utilitarian" perspectives (studies on the alleged deterrent effect of capital punishment), support declined from 51 to 38%; among
those who read "humanitarian" material (concerning the humaneness and barbarity of capital punishment), support declined from 54 to 49%; after reading

perspectives combining information on the utilitarian and humanitarian
aspects, support for the death penalty declined from 62 to 42%; and the control
group showed no change. Id. at 189-90.
Emphasizing that their findings "must be dealt with cautiously," Sarat and
Vidmar concluded:
It was found that our subjects knew little about the death penalty, particularly its effectiveness. It was also found that when exposed to information about capital punishment, especially information regarding its

utilitarian aspects, a substantial proportion of the subjects altered
their opinions toward it.
Id. at 195.
796. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232.

797. Id.
798. Id. at 233-36. See also Furman, 408 U.S. at 345, 358-69. See supra text
accompanying notes 773-82.
799. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 233-36.
800. Id. at 236-37.
801. Id. at 241.
802. Id. at 238.
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shall insisted that punishment must be meted out without disregarding the intrinsic humanity of an offender and in a manner
which hopefully will communicate to the offender and the community at large that certain conduct is antithetical to the norms
of social behavior. Capital punishment, Marshall claimed, was
intended merely to unleash society's outrage in the form of vengeance toward the accused, rendering this penalty "unnecessary
to promote the goal of deterrence or to further any legitimate
notion of retribution,"803 and an "excessive"8 0 4 act prohibited by
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Marshall disagreed that the death penalty was an acceptable
expression of society's moral outrage against a heinous offense.
Proponents of capital punishment, he declared, seek to justify
their position as "utilitarian" by "portray[ing] the death penalty as
valuable because of its beneficial results."' 5 However, absent evidence that capital punishment has achieved socially desirable
ends, it must be categorized as an act of vengeance, and unacceptably retributive. 0 6 Moreover, Marshall maintained that even
where a law has majority support it cannot be sustained merely to
express "society's judgment that the murderer 'deserves'
death."8 0 y
In Gregg, Marshall imposed his own perception of morality
on the states. Retribution may be one of many factors which
impelled a state to sanction capital punishment, and, depending
on how meticulous a statute has enumerated aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and compelled their consideration by
jurors, this element may not be a substantial component of trial
deliberations. Rather than focusing on procedural due process
protections accorded a particular accused, Marshall categorically
opposed enactment of capital punishment on an abstract belief
that it inherently accentuated vindictive facets of human behavior. In devising penal codes, Marshall erected a threshold which
states may not cross but did not explain why his understanding of
morality, which viewed punishment in a rehabilitative context,
was more compelling than a legislature's possible assumption
that this objective was not the only justification for a severe penalty. Marshall expressed his position on the proper use of punishment in other death penalty cases which came to the Court
after Gregg.
803. Id. at 241.
804. Id.
805. Id. at 239.
806. For a discussion of the concepts of utilitarianism and retributivism,
see supra text accompanying notes 175-88.
807. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 240.

132

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

From 1977 to 1986, the last ten years of the Burger Court,
Marshall wrote an opinion in fourteen capital punishment
cases, 80 8 and added a brief concurring statement, similar to what
Brennan had done on several occasions,8" 9 reiterating his unconditional opposition to the death penalty even when a conviction
had been invalidated, in five others.8 " 0 Three of Marshall's opinions dealt with the weighing by jurors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,8 " and two others examined instructions to
the jury in considering evidence;8" four focused on the introduction of oral and written evidence into trial proceedings;8 1
two examined the death penalty for particular types of offenders,8 1 4 and three examined the filing of a petition for certiorari
and habeas corpus.8 1 5
The Court's pronouncement in Gregg that jurors were
required to weigh statutorily enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances before recommending sentence did not
clearly articulate what factors needed to be examined and how
much emphasis should be placed on the circumstances of an
808. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (Marshall, J., for the
majority); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)
(Marshall,J., for the majority); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (Marshall,
J., for the majority); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467
U.S. 1267 (1984) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (Marshall,J., dissenting);
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, reh'g denied 464 U.S. 874 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977).
809. See supra note 505.
810. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 51 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(empaneling a jury); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 646 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (instructions to jury); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 98 (1979)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (introduction of testimony); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
637, 643-44 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring) (death penalty for accomplices);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600-01 (1977) (Marshall,J., concurring) (death
penalty for rape).
811. Zant, 462 U.S. at 862; Barclay, 463 U.S. at 939; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at
420.
812. Turner, 476 U.S. at 28; Ramos, 463 U.S. at 992.
813. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 320; Ake, 470 U.S. at 68; Stnckland, 466 U.S. at
668; Gardner,430 U.S. at 349.
814. Ford, 477 U.S. at 399 (mentally insane); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 586
(accomplices).
815. Gray, 463 U.S. at 1237 (certiorari); Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 880 (habeas
corpus); Balkcom, 451 U.S. at 949 (certiorari).
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offense and offender during trial deliberations, and, after 1976,
the mode of proceeding by juries was litigated frequently.8 16
Marshall addressed the wording of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in the 1980 case of Godfrey v. Georgia,8

Stephens"' a

Florida,1 9

17

and in

Zant v.
and Barclay v.
both decided in 1983.
The Godfrey case involved a statutory provision allowing the
death penalty to be imposed in the second stage of a trial if sentencing authorities concluded that an offense "was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. "820
Though it held that the petitioner's homicide was no more atrocious than the circumstances of other murders, and that the statute was thus unconstitutionally applied to the accused, 2 1 the
Court believed that the judge's instructions were sufficiently precise to channel the jury's discretion, and thus left the wording of
this provision intact.
Marshall, in dissent, objected that this provision did not
meet the requirement stipulated in Gregg that the discretion of
sentencing authorities needed to be channeled to prevent arbitrariness. The wording of the aggravating circumstances is
"hopelessly ambiguous and could be understood to apply to any
murder," in effect conferring on the jury "unbridled discretion
to impose the death penalty." 822 Thus, individualized consideration of the particular circumstances of an accused and alleged
offense was precluded. Marshall did not believe, however, that
aggravating and mitigating circumstances could ever be worded
with sufficient precision to prevent arbitrariness in sentencing.
The lingering and "disgraceful distorting effects of racial discrimination and poverty continue to be painfully visible in the imposition of death sentences,"823 and their elimination was beyond the
capability of the criminal justice system.8 2 4 Marshall expressed
hope that this realization would lead legislatures to conclude that
"the effort to eliminate arbitrariness ... is so plainly doomed to
failure that . . . the death penalty [ ] must be abandoned alto816.
817.

See supra note 323.
446 U.S. 420 (1980).

818.
819.
820.

462 U.S. 862 (1983).
463 U.S. 939, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983).
446 U.S. at 422.

821.
822.
823.
824.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

428-29.
437.
439.
440.
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gether."882275 Marshall reiterated this sentiment in Zant 826 and
Barclay.
Both of these cases examined whether a death sentence was
invalid if a state supreme court had struck down one of the aggravating circumstances on which a jury based its verdict. The
Court, in Zant and Barclay, refused to vacate a death sentence on
the ground that a single aggravating circumstance is but one of
many factors considered by a jury, and a verdict, based on assessment of evidence in the aggregate, is not diminished when one
portion of an entire record is to be disregarded.8 28
Dissenting in Zant, Marshall declared that the trial judge was
delinquent for submitting an invalidated aggravating circumstance to the jury, and it is uncertain whether the jury would have
recommended a sentence of death if it had not been allowed to
consider this provision. 2 9 Citing precedents, Marshall emphasized that the tone of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been that, to reduce the risk of arbitrariness, the
sentencing discretion of juries must be confined so that factors
unrelated to the circumstances of the accused may not be considered.8"' This, Marshall insisted, has not been observed. He condemned the majority's reliance on the "threshold theory" by
which a jury may consider an unconfined range of aggravating
and mitigating factors once it has determined that a particular
defendant is statutorily eligible to receive the death penalty. 3 1
Enumeration of aggravating circumstances, Marshall declared, is
intended to confine jurors' discretion at every stage of deliberations; if jurors were free to consider an unspecified array of
potentially aggravating factors after having concluded that an
accused was not precluded from receiving a capital sentence,
there would be "no point in requiring state legislatures to identify specific aggravating circumstances." 3 2 In addition, Marshall
believed that failure of the trial judge to explicitly inform jurors
to weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence precluded judicial
determination as to whether full assessment of the accused's individualized circumstances had been conducted. 3 3
825.

Id. at 442.

826.

462 U.S. at 862.
463 U.S. at 939.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 879-80;
Zant, 462 U.S. at 916.
Zant, 462 U.S. at 907-10

827.

828.
829.
830.

Barclay, 463 U.S. at 949.

(citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 238; Gregg, 428
U.S. at 153;Jurek,428 U.S. at 262; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242; and Godfrey, 446 U.S.

at 420).
831.
832.
833.

Zant, 462 U.S. at 878.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 915.
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Two weeks after Zant was decided, Marshall, dissenting in
Barclay, objected that reliance by a trial judge, during pronouncement of sentence, on an aggravating circumstance not
statutorily enumerated, also violated a central component of
prior decisions which mandated channeling of discretion in trial
proceedings. The Barclay case involved five black defendants
who, motivated by racial animosity, killed a white youth. Prior to
sentencing, the trial judge compared the racial motive of the
accused's murder to what he personally witnessed at the opening
of the Nazi concentration camps during World War

11.834

Mar-

shall disagreed with the majority's position that, though the
alleged racial motivations of an offense are not specifically designated as an aggravating factor, a judge may reflect on this implication to assess the magnitude of criminal action and determine
whether the death penalty is warranted. 3 5 Such action, Marshall
protested, enabled sentencing based on arbitrary considerations,
and negated the Court's concern that the discretion of sentencing authorities be confined. If judges, contrary to express statutory provisions requiring examination of evidence against an
accused to be confined only to those aggravating circumstances
explicitly listed, 36 are permitted to make speculative extraneous
observations, capital defendants
may be sentenced on factors
"randomly introduced." 3 7 This would preclude "consistency
and fairness" in that "the fate of an individual defendant will
inevitably depend on whether a given day his sentencer happened to respect the constraint imposed by . .. [state] law" or

whether a judge "injects into the weighing process any number
of nonstatutory factors in aggravation .. ."838
Marshall's objection to the introduction at the time of sentencing of statements unspecified in statutory provisions underscored a deeper concern that capital proceedings could not
unfold without injection of arbitrary sentiments. The Court,
mindful of the enormity of the death penalty, has mandated that
sentencing authorities give full consideration to the particular
circumstances of the accused within the framework of carefully
worded aggravating and mitigating factors. Both misinterpretation of statutory provisions and bias, among other factors, invariably tend to expand discretion, compelling lower judges and the
Court, operating under these same limitations, to assess a sentence based on perceptions of fairness to the accused. The
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.

Barclay, 463 U.S. at 948.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 985.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 986-87.
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potential for arbitrariness, both at the trial and appellate levels,
was addressed by Marshall as the Court examined different stages
39
of trial proceedings. In the 1983 case of California v. Ramos,1
4
°
and in Caldwell v. Mississippi, decided two years later, Marshall
examined guidelines concerning instructions to the jury.
The Ramos case considered a statutory requirement that a
trial judge, in addition to communicating instructions on weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, inform jurors that
a sentence of life imprisonment without parole may be commuted by the governor.8 4 1 The majority did not believe that this
introduced an impertinent factor which may divert the jury's
attention from concentrating on aggravating and mitigating evidence or that jurors would perceive a diminished sense of importance concerning their pivotal role in trial deliberations. The
Court believed that jurors, made aware that a defendant might
not be indefinitely incarcerated, would more carefully weigh the
individual circumstances of the accused when confronting the
possibility that society may be penalized for inadequate consideration of all aggravating and mitigating factors. The majority also
concluded that this instruction by the judge, encompassing but
one of many components considered by the jury, did not undermine its ability to weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence in
totality.
Marshall, in dissent, argued that communication of the possibility of gubernatorial commutation of a sentence "injects into
the capital sentencing process a factor that bears no relation 84to2
the nature of the offense or the character of the offender."
He reminded the majority that jurors are required to examine
the individual culpability of the accused, which has no relationship to the sentence ultimately imposed. A jury, told that a sentence of life imprisonment but not death may be commuted,
"may impose the death sentence to prevent the Governor from
exercising his power .. ."843 While this consideration may not
necessarily be
"more or less advantageous to defendants," it is
"misleading"8 4 4 by diverting the jury's attention away from the
evidence presented and toward "ad hoc speculation about the
likelihood of a release."8 4 Without elaboration, Marshall also
declared that commutation contradicted any professed goal of
839.
840.
841.
842.
843.
844.
845.

463 U.S. 992 (1983).
472 U.S. 320 (1985).
Ramos, 463 U.S. at 995.
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1018.

1994]

JUSTICES BRENAN AND MARSHALL ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

137

retribution and deterrence to keep potentially dangerous individuals off the streets, and thus cannot be supported
8 46 as justification of a state's adoption of capital punishment.
The Caldwell case also examined whether comments to the
jury that its verdict would be reviewed by the state supreme court
diminished the members' sense of responsibility to carefully evaluate evidence. On behalf of the majority, Marshall declared that
this communication by the prosecutor unconstitutionally conveyed to the jury a perception that it was not ultimately responsible for the fate of the accused.8 4 7 Marshall believed that this may
diminish a defendant's ability to have all evidence examined in
trial deliberations. Unlike jurors, who are present to "hear the
evidence and arguments and see the witnesses,"8 4 an appellate
proceeding, which can only examine the written record, cannot
assess "intangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing determination."8 49 Appellate courts, Marshall maintained, review sentencing decisions "with a presumption of correctness,"850 and do
not take into account the individualized circumstances of the
accused.
Marshall speculated that communication to the jury that its
verdict may not be final would, in subtle ways, induce it to deliberate on factors unrelated to the accused and alleged offense. A
jury, made aware that its pronouncement would be reexamined,
may be coerced by a prosecutor's pressure to issue a verdict of
guilty and "'send a message' of extreme disapproval for the
defendant's acts."8 51 In addition, some jurors, after being
informed that a sentence of life imprisonment "could not be
increased to a death sentence on appeal," '5 2 may, given the
assurance that any errors they might have committed will be subsequently corrected, feel pressured to recommend execution. 5 3
Marshall did not believe this possibility was remote; a jury, he
846, Id. at 1023.
847. Caldwell 472 U.S. at 329-30.
848. Id. at 331.
849. Id. at 330. At the time of the Caldwell decision, several studies had
been published indicating that full examination of the accused's circumstances
had not been conducted in appellate proceedings and that arbitrariness had
entered this stage. See F. Patrick Hubbard, 'ReasonableLevels of Arbitrariness' in
Death SentencingPatterns: A TragicPerspective on CapitalPunishment, 18 U.C. DAvis
L. REv. 1113 (1985); Ellen Liebman, Appellate Review of Death Sentences: A Critique
of Proportionality Review, 18 U.C. DAvis L. Rnv. 1433 (1985).
850. Caldwell 472 U.S. at 331.

851. Id. (quoting Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1983) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
852.
853.

Id. at 332.
Id.

138

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 8

declared, "is made up of individuals placed in a very unfamiliar
situation and called on to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice, " "' enhancing the possibility that it would engage in
actions likely to involve ultimate participation by trained appellate judges. This type of coercion, Marshall concluded, is contrary to the tone of the Court's evolving position that sentence be
based on the individualized circumstances of the accused.
Three years after the Ramos and Caldwell decisions, Marshall
once again addressed introduction into trial proceedings of evidence which did not directly relate to the culpability of the
accused. In Turner v. Murray (1986),855 Marshall, in a brief statement concurring and dissenting in part, declared that a defendant, in an interracial crime, should not be prevented from
inquiring into the possible racial bias of jurors.85 6 Prevention of
possible arbitrariness in deliberations was emphasized by Marshall in other stages of trial proceedings. In the 1977 case of
Gardner v. Florida,157 Marshall, writing in dissent, agreed with the
majority's pronouncement that a state "must administer its capital-sentencing procedures with an even hand" 5 8 by making available to an accused a parole commission's presentence report,
but expressed anger that the trial judge ignored the jury's recommendation and pronounced sentence with blatant disregard of a
defendant's due process expectations.8 59 The risk of arbitrariness in capital proceedings impelled Marshall to express doubt as
to whether the Court had been improperly optimistic in believing that deliberations could be objectively conducted.86 ° Seven
years later, in the 1984 case of Strickland v. Washington,86 1 Marshall again raised similar concerns.
In a strong dissent from the majority's willingness to allow
states to gradually develop standards for assessing the quality of
legal representation in capital proceedings,8 6 2 Marshall insisted
that, over time, defense attorneys will undermine due process
854.

Id. at 333.

855. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
856. Id. at 45 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 599-600.
857. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
858. Id. at 361.
859. Id. at 365.
860. Id. Marshall spoke at length on the failure to adhere to guidelines
put forward in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).

Gardner, 430 U.S. at 366-70. For a discussion of the Court's position in Proffitt
and companion cases, see supra text accompanying notes 287-305.
861. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
862. For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 615-
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safeguards. The quality of legal counsel, Marshall pointed out,
has varied considerably from case to case, depending, in part, on
the attorney's caseload and the ability of a defendant to afford
representation. 63 In view of the enormity of capital proceedings, Marshall believed it was inappropriate for standards concerning competency of counsel to fluctuate in different localities;
this, he argued, would reintroduce randomness in deliberations
which had been deemed objectionable in evolving Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.8 6 4 Marshall did not believe uniform
guidelines to assess the performance of counsel could be articulated. It is "often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he was ineffectively represented
would have fared better if his lawyer had been competent,"86 5
and compelling the defendant to demonstrate incompetence
imposed a formidable burden.8 6 6 Marshall insisted that evidence
of inadequate legal representation required a retrial "regardless of whether the defendant suffered demonstrable
prejudice....

867

Marshall strongly objected to the majority's seeming unwillingness to demand stricter adherence to due process safeguards
in capital as opposed to noncapital proceedings. The "severity
and irrevocability of the sanction at stake" required that thoroughness of legal representation "be applied especially stringently in capital sentencing proceedings."8 68 Marshall did not
believe the defendant had been adequately represented in this
case, 869 and his concern that arbitrariness would permeate capital proceedings made arguments in favor of abolition of the
death penalty compelling. Marshall reiterated this sentiment in
the 1985 case of Ake v. Oklahoma,870 which also addressed procedural requirements concerning introduction of evidence.
The Ake case focused on the right of an indigent capital
defendant to have a psychiatric examination conducted at state
expense for use during trial deliberations. The accused, found
by a psychiatrist to be incompetent to stand trial, was later
declared by a mental hospital to be fit for courtroom delibera863.

864.
865.
866.
may prove
867.
868.
869.
870.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 708.

Id. at 715.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 713. For a discussion of how the majority believed a defendant
ineffective counsel, see supra text accompanying note 616.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 712.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 717-19.
470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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tions while under continued sedation. 7 1 The defense attorney's
request for a psychiatric examination was denied, and, following
the psychiatrist's comment at the guilt phase that the accused was
a threat to the community, the jury, absent testimony on the
defendant's competency at the time of the alleged offense,
decided to convict.8 72 Agreeing with the state's emphasis on the
psychiatrist's assessment of the accused's perceived danger to
society, a sentence of death was issued.8 7
On behalf of the majority, Marshall declared that the state is
required to comply with an accused's request for psychiatric
assistance during trial. Citing precedents in which the Court
required right to counsel for indigents in noncapital proceedings, 74 Marshall insisted that a state's obligation "to assure that
the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense" 7 5 is
more compelling in capital trials. This, he claimed, is particularly apparent with
regard to psychiatric assistance. Rejecting as
"not substantial"8 7 6 the state's argument that furnishing this
assistance would be financially burdensome, Marshall emphasized that over forty states, as well as the Federal government,
have statutorily recognized the pivotal role that psychiatry has
come to play in criminal proceedings. 7 7 Professional examination of an accused's mental condition is of invaluable assistance
in apprising sentencing authorities of an accused's blameworthiness, and, when a defendant "demonstrates to the trial judge that
his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at
trial,"8 78 the state must furnish psychiatric expertise. One year
after the Ake decision, Marshall, on behalf of the majority in the
1986 case of Ford v. Wainwright, 79 ruled that executing the mentally insane was unconstitutional.
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is
intended not only to limit the kinds of penalties imposed but also
to restrict their infliction to specific classes of offenders. While
871.

Id. at 71-72.

872.

Id. at 72-73.

873.
874.
335 (1963)
875.
876.
877.

Id. at 73.
See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 76 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)).
Ake, 470 U.S. at 76.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 83.

878. Id.
879. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). For an examination of the psychiatric analysis
performed on the petitioner, as well as an account of judicial proceedings in
the Fordcase up through its appeal to the Court, see KENT S. MILLER & MICHAEL

L.

RADELET, EXECUTING THE MENTALLY ILL: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND

THE CASE OF ALVIN FoRD (1993).
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Marshall unwaveringly opposed capital punishment per se, he
strongly insisted that those who did not commit murder8 8 0 and
who are incapable of comprehending the magnitude of their
conduct"'1 should not be subjected to the death penalty. In Ford,
Marshall explained why he believed the Eighth Amendment proscribed the death penalty for the mentally insane.
Marshall explained that the prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishments" embodied an evolving attitude toward
penalties whose origins are steeped in Anglo-American tradition.
Dating back to the writings of Sir Edward Coke, British common
law has opposed execution of the insane. 8 2 The language of the
Eighth Amendment, Marshall declared, "embrace [d], at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was
adopted;"88 3 however, it also transcended "practices condemned
by the common law in 1789 "884 and anticipated "'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'"85 In the United States, Marshall noted that prohibition of
the death penalty for the mentally insane was followed during
the colonial period, 8 6 and that no state has sanctioned it in contemporary times.887 He attributed this to an "intuition that such
an execution simply offends humanity....888

880. See Marshall's brief concurring statement in Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978), which invalidated the death penalty for accomplices. Id. at
619-21. See also, Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 921 (1987)
(Marshall, J., joining the dissenting opinion of Brennan,J.). For a discussion of
the Tison ruling, see supra text accompanying notes 630-50.
881. See, e.g.,
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, decided together with
Wilkins v. Missouri, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989) (death penalty for seventeen-yearolds) (Marshall, J., joining the dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (death penalty for the mentally retarded)
(Marshall,J., joining the dissenting opinion of Brennan,J.). For a discussion of
these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 652-58.
882. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-07. Marshall quoted Coke's statement that
execution of " 'a mad man'" was " 'a miserable spectacle, both against Law, and
of extream [sic] inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others."'
Ford, 477 U.S. at 407 (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE,INSTrrVTIONS 6 (1680). Marshall
also pointed out that Blackstone categorized execution of the mentally insane
as "'savage and inhuman.'"
Ford, 477 U.S. at 406 (quoting WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24-25 (1769)).
883. Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
884. Id. at 406.
885. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (concurring
opinion)).
886. Id. at 408. This attitude found its roots in several centuries of
English common law. Id.
887. Id. at 408-09.
888. Id. at 409.
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Marshall also pointed out that defendants who are to be
examined by a psychiatrist are entitled to submit material which
might affect assessment of their mental capacity or blameworthiness. To reduce the possibility of conviction based on an
improper psychiatric diagnosis, sentencing authorities must confine their judgment to "'evidence offered by each party' "889 in
seeking to resolve differences of medical opinion on the mental
state of the accused. In addition, an opportunity to challenge
the findings of state appointed psychiatrists must be furnished.8 9 °
Marshall's insistence on adhering to meticulous due process
safeguards underscored his concern that states not proceed
against capital defendants arbitrarily. To ensure that sentences
which may result in the penalty of death are based on full and
unbiased consideration of the individualized circumstances of
the accused, Marshall, like Brennan, 8 9 ' sought to maximize the
opportunities of a defendant to challenge trial proceedings and
decisions by petition for certiorari and habeas corpus.8 9 2 In the
1980s he addressed this subject in three cases: Coleman v.
Balkcom893 and Gray v. Lucas, 94 both of which considered petitions for certiorari, and Barefoot v. Estelle,89 5 which dealt with petition for habeas corpus.
Dissenting in both Balkcom and Gray, which denied petitions
for certiorari,8 9 6 Marshall emphasized that the need for appellate review is more compelling in capital proceedings. In Balkcom
he noted that, "when the death penalty is in issue, the Constitution may impose unusual limitations on the States." 9 7 Marshall
reiterated that: "If an individual is imprisoned for an offense he
did not commit, the error can to some extent be rectified. But if
he is executed, the wrong that has been done can never be corrected." 9 8 Believing that the state, in capital cases, "must survive
close scrutiny on post-trial review,"' 99 Marshall concluded that
petitioner's claim to have been deprived of an opportunity,
889. Id. at 414 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985)).
890. Id. at 415.
891. See supra text accompanying notes 686-96.
892. For a discussion of these concepts, see supra text accompanying
notes 674-96.

893.
894.
895.

451 U.S. 949 (1981).
463 U.S. 1237 (1983).
463 U.S. 880 (1983).

896. Gray v. Lucas, 463 U.S. 1237, 1240 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 953 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
897.

Balkcom, 451 U.S. at 954.

898.
899.

Id. at 955.
Id.
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under the Sixth Amendment,9"' to call witnesses, 90 1 merited
review, and that the petition for certiorari should be granted.90 2
In Gray, Marshall believed that petitioner's challenge of a
death sentence by exposure to cyanide gas90 3 constituted prolonged and needless infliction of pain which violated judicial
precedents. 9 0 4 This form of punishment, which involved
"extreme pain over a span of 10 to 12 minutes," 90 5 prolonged
suffering longer than lethal injection, which has been perceived
by state legislatures as a "more dignified way of administering the
death penalty."90 6 Based on evolving legislative trends which have
rejected use of lethal gas, Marshall concluded that the petition
for certiorari "raise [d] issues of sufficient import"9 0 7 and should
be granted. In Barefoot,90 8 also decided in 1983, Marshall once
again emphasized the importance of appellate review in capital
cases.
Dissenting from the majority's upholding of a lower federal
court decision to reject a petition for habeas corpus,90 9 Marshall
again urged that more careful scrutiny of trial proceedings take
place where the penalty of death may be imposed. A defendant
who, pursuant to congressional law, has obtained a certificate of
probable cause to appeal denial of a petition for habeas
corpus, 9 10 has already established that the grievance was not frivolous, and ought to be granted full review of the petition without
risk that the lower courts may adopt "expedited procedures in
resolving the merits of habeas appeals. .,9.11

This alternative,

Marshall objected, may result in denial of a petition for stay of
execution without having considered the substantive grievances
raised by a defendant; in effect, he maintained, a state could
"execute the prisoner before his appeal is decided"9 1' 2 and
render the appellate process "meaningless."9 1 3 In view of "the
900. See supra text accompanying note 143.
901. Id. at 953-54.
902. Id. at 956.
903. Gray, 463 U.S. at 1240.
904. Id. at 1244-45 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, reh'g
denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).
905. Id. at 1245.
906. Id.
907. Id. at 1247.
908. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. at 880 (1983).
909. Id. at 906 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
910. Id. at 906-07 n.1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253).
911. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 894.
912. Id. at 910.
913. Id. at 907.
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irreversible nature of the death penalty," 914 Marshall concluded

that it would be "grossly improper"9 15 for an appellate court to
rely on summary procedures in capital cases.
During the tenure of Chief Justice Burger, Marshall
unwaveringly objected to the Court's perceived failure to preserve a full range of due process protections for capital defendants. He continued to express this concern after Justice William
Rehnquist was elevated to the position of Chief Justice in 1986.
C.

Objections to the Position of the Rehnquist Court (1986and an Emotional Dissent the Day Before Marshall's
Retirement in 1991

In five years on the Rehnquist Court, Marshall wrote an
opinion in eleven cases: five examined the weighing by jurors of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances;9 1 6 one reviewed the
empaneling of jurors;91 7 one dealt with a prosecutor's comments
to the jury;91 8 one focused on the withholding from defense
counsel of a psychiatric report;9 1 9 two considered standing to
appeal capital convictions9 20 and one focused on introduction of
testimony describing9 2 1the emotional effects of the victim's death
on family members.
Marshall continued to believe that arbitrariness had not
been eliminated from capital proceedings and that the Court
had not been consistent in its adjudication of cases on capital
punishment.9 22 With regard to the weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors, he maintained that the wording of statutory
provisions did not confine jurors to the individualized circum92
stances of the accused. In the 1988 case of Lowenfield v. Phelps,
a judge, upon hearing of the jury's inability to agree upon a ver914. Id. at 913.
915. Id. at 915.
916. Shell v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990); McKoy v. North Carolina,
110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990); Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190 (1990); Hildwin v.
Florida, 109 S. Ct. 2055 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (brief statement
expressing categorical opposition to capital punishment); Lowenfield v. Phelps,
108 S. Ct. 546 (1988).
917. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, reh'gdenied, 112 S. Ct. 13 (1991).
918. Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990).
919. Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S. Ct. 1792 (1988).
920. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990); McCleskey v. Zant,
111 S. Ct. 1454, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 2841 (1991).
921. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, reh'gdenied,112 S. Ct. 28 (1991).
922. For a discussion of the Rehnquist Court's position on the death
penalty up to the time of Marshall's retirement in 1991, see supra text
accompanying notes 337-64.
923. 108 S. Ct. 546.
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dict, declared that a sentence of life imprisonment would be
imposed if a unanimous recommendation was not forthcoming. 2 4 Shortly after this communication, a verdict of death was
issued by the jury and adhered to in the sentence. 925 The Court
upheld the judge's sentence of death, satisfied that the verdict
was based not on intimidation but rather on full consideration of
"the mitigating aspects of the crime and the unique characteristics of the perpetrator. "926
Marshall, in dissent, believed that the judge's comments
coerced the jury into reaching a verdict. Though compromise of
jury objectivity is "difficult to discern in concrete situations,"927
Marshall maintained that the enormity of the death penalty
demanded stricter examination of jury deliberations than that
conducted in noncapital proceedings, and that any doubt as to
whether jurors were pressured to reach a verdict must be
resolved by refusing to support a sentence of death. After examining the long hours of deliberation during which time a verdict
could not be reached, and the relatively brief time which elapsed
following the judge's communication and the announcement
that jurors are in agreement, 9 28 as well as the tone of the judge's
comments and manner in which the jury was addressed, Marshall
concluded that the possibility of coercion was realistic. 9 29 In
addition, he objected that the jury, basing its verdict on a single
aggravating circumstance which essentially duplicated one of the
defendant's allegations,93 ° did not meet its burden of independently linking the nature and character of the accused and
offense to a statutory provision. This, Marshall feared, might
facilitate pronouncement of a death sentence without conducting a probing analysis into an accused's culpability.
Marshall again expressed disapproval with the manner in
which jurors weighed aggravating and mitigating evidence in
9 2 and
three 1990 cases: Shell v. Mississippi,9"' Boyde v. California,
9
3
McKoy v. North Carolina." In Shell, the Court, per curiam,
declared that requiring the jury to assess whether a murder was
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"93 4 insufficiently chan924.

Id. at 549.

925. Id. at 549-50.
926. Id. at 555.
927. Id. at 556.
928. Id. at 557-58.
929. Id. at 557-59.
930. Id. at 560.
931. 111 S. Ct. 313.
932. 110 S. Ct. 1190.
933. 110 S. Ct. 1227.
934. 111 S. Ct. at 313.
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neled its discretion.9 3 5 Marshall, in a brief concurring statement,
noted that even if the word "cruel" had been precisely defined,
9 36
the statute would still contain "two constitutionally infirm"
guidelines, rendering the entire provision invalid. He spoke at
greater length on the weighing by jurors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in Boyde and McKoy.
Both of these cases dealt with consideration of mitigating
evidence. In Boyde, the Court, citing precedents in Lockett v.
Ohio93 7 and Penry v. Lynaugh,9 3 s reiterated that a jury may consider any mitigating factors pertaining to the circumstances of
the accused. 9 39 While uncertainty over the meaning of a judge's
instructions on interpretation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not uncommon, the Court declared that proceedings needed to be examined in the aggregate to determine
whether the jury has appeared to construe guidelines "in a way
that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence."9 4 ° Formal exclusion of mitigating evidence from jury
deliberations, however, violated these precedents; as the Court
declared in McKoy, where a statute allowing consideration of only
those mitigating circumstances unanimously found was held as
an impermissible restriction on jurors' discretion. 94 1
On behalf of the majority in McKoy, Marshall, relying on precedent established in Mills v. Maryland,94 2 pointed out that any
mitigating evidence introduced by the accused during proceedings must be assessed by jurors as an active and ongoing component of the accused's culpability. The unanimity requirement,
however, would preclude this by enabling "one holdout juror to
prevent the others from giving effect to evidence"94 3 which may
produce a verdict recommending a term of imprisonment. Marshall also expressed concern that this statutory provision would
935. Id. The Court based its ruling on the position taken in Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes 821-23. See

also Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 14 (1990); Walton v.
Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 14 (1990). In Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976), the Court held that a statutory
aggravating circumstance referring to the heinous, vile, or inhuman nature of
an offense is not unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 201. For a discussion of the
Gregg decision, see supra text accompanying notes 287-305.
936. SheI4 111 S. Ct. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original).
937. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 306-11.
938. 109 S. Ct. 2934.
939. Boyde, 110 S. Ct. at 1196.
940. Id. at 1198.
941. 110 S. Ct. at 1234.
942. 108 S. Ct. 1860.
943.

McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1231.
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alter the tone ofjury deliberations. Duringjury proceedings, various components of aggravating and mitigating evidence fluctuate in importance whereby, depending on the content of
discussion, a factor initially considered substantial may later be
deemed insignificant, and vice versa. Disallowing consideration
of some mitigating evidence at the outset of deliberations unconstitutionally inhibited full examination of the entire character
and background of the accused.9 4 4 This risk of incomplete jury
deliberations was also discussed by Marshall in Boyde.
Unlike the majority in Boyde, which believed that jurors are
presumed to have fully discharged their responsibility absent evidence in the trial court's record indicating impropriety, Marshall
insisted that, irrespective of actual performance, the potential,
based on the content of instructions from a judge, for incomplete consideration of an accused's circumstances, presumed
that "the jury's verdict could have rested on unconstitutional
grounds,"9 4 5 and rendered proceedings invalid. Prevention of
arbitrary sentencing demanded more meticulous examination of
due process protection accorded defendants in capital as
opposed to noncapital proceedings, and allegations that a sentencing jury "reasonably could have believed that it could not
consider [all] mitigating evidence regarding his character and
background"9 4 6 placed a burden on trial officials to prove that
this had not transpired. The majority's unwillingness to make
this inquiry, Marshall protested, stemmed from its "growing and
unjustified hostility to claims of constitutional violation 'by capital
defendants."9 4' 7 Marshall's concern that evidence of active consideration of the full range of a defendant's background and circumstances in courtroom deliberations be furnished was
expressed with different stages of trial proceedings. In the 1991
case of MuMin v. Virginia9 48 Marshall discussed enabling unbiased examination of an accused's situation in the manner prospective jurors are empaneled.
The MuMin case involved an extensively publicized murder
where the trial judge refused to ask prospective jurors what they
had read or heard about the alleged offense and defendant. Satisfied that the trial judge, who asked potential jurors who had
been exposed to media reports whether they "had formed an
opinion" and whether they could "determine petitioner's guilt or
944.
945.
946.

Id. at 1234.
Boyde, 494 U.S. at 389 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 387.

947.
948.

Id. at 406.
111 S. Ct. 1899, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 13 (1991).
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innocence based solely on the evidence presented at trial, "
took sufficient steps to empanel an unbiased jury, the Court
ruled that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a trial "by an
impartial jury"9 5 ° had been met.
Marshall, in dissent, once again emphasized that the potential for bias, apart from its actual occurrence, compelled invalidation of proceedings where the trial judge had not taken sufficient
steps to ensure objectivity by prospective jurors. Because "8 of
the 12 jurors who ultimately convicted... [the accused] of murder and sentenced him to death admitted exposure to... [extensive pretrial] publicity,"9 5 Marshall insisted that a majority of the
jury may have begun deliberations with degrees of bias. To preclude this possibility, it is insufficient for the trial judge to merely
ask potential jurors whether they could discharge their duty
objectively; impartiality, he maintained, "cannot [be] realistically
assess [ed] ...without first establishing what the juror already has

learned about the case."9 52
Interestingly, Marshall did not draw on recent precedents
which appeared to corroborate his position. The majority's ruling was consistent with the Court's pronouncement in the 1968
case of Witherspoon v. Illinois,9 5 which required a trial judge, irrespective of personal biases, to ensure that a potential juror could
discharge an oath based on evidence presented.9 54 In subsequent cases, however, the Court declared that it was permissible
to question potential jurors on racial bias;9 55 arguably, extensive
pretrial publicity involving an alleged murder by an accused of
Indian ancestry required comparable inquiry at the empaneling
stage into possible ethnic bias. Though Marshall did not attempt
to analogize this case with those involving potential bias stemming from interracial homicide,9 56 his insistence on meticulous
adherence to due process safeguards in capital proceedings was
949.

Id. at 1901.

950. The Sixth Amendment in pertinent part states that: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartialjury. ...

."

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

951. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1909.
952. Id. at 1910.
953. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
954. Id.
955. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). For a discussion of these
rulings, see supra text accompanying notes 571-76, 579-86, 599-600.
956. The case of Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), was cited, but
its pronouncements on the need to question jurors about possible racial biases
were not relied on for comparison with Mu'Min's ethnicity. Mu'Min, 111 S.Ct.
at 1913.
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unabated. This was articulated by Marshall in the 1988 case of
Satterwhite v. Texas, 95 7 which dealt with the withholding from
defense counsel of a psychiatric report.
Agreeing with the majority's conclusion in Satterwhite that
failure to provide defense counsel an opportunity to consult with
the accused prior to the preparation of a psychiatric evaluation
prohibited use of the psychiatrist's testimony at the sentencing
stage,9 5 Marshall, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that capital trials require more extensive due process protections than
those followed in noncapital proceedings. Marshall declared
that the majority's application to capital cases of the harmless
error rule - which provides that, "if the prosecution can prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that a constitutional error did not
contribute to the verdict, the error is harmless and the verdict
may stand"9 9 - may qualitatively alter the tone of deliberations.
A psychiatric evaluation, Marshall pointed out, "is clothed with a
scientific authority that often carries great weight with lay
juries, "1960 and th
the kind of preparation undertaken by a defense
attorney "may be altered significantly"9 6 1 if counsel is made aware
of the state's intention to conduct such an analysis. The testimony of an accused, based on advice given by the defense attorney, would become part of a sentencing authority's "moral
judgment involving a balancing of often tangible factors" as to
whether "a defendant should live or die."9 62 By failing to take
this into account, Marshall believed that the majority undermined the manner in which a sentence in large part is based on
evaluation of a number of factors which gradually unfold during
a trial.
The basic principle which Marshall emphasized was that the
trial judge must ensure that all aspects of the accused's character
and background are being actively considered. Since a sentencing decision is based on cumulative evidence brought out in a
trial, it is imperative, Marshall maintained, that an accused have
an opportunity to challenge modes of proceeding at any stage of
deliberations. In two cases decided in 1990 - Sawyer v. Smith9 6 3
and Whitmore v. Arkansas9 64 - as well as McCleskey v. Zant,965 adju957.

486 U.S. 249 (1988).

958.
959.
960.
961.
962.
963.
964.
965.

486 U.S. at 260.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id.
497 U.S. 227 (1990).
495 U.S. 149 (1990).
499 U.S. 467 (1991).
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dicated one year later, Marshall insisted that this option is not
diminished in appellate proceedings.
The enormity of a possible sentence of death, as well as concern that arbitrariness could occur at any stage in capital proceedings, impelled Marshall to support application of revised
due process guidelines to those who have been sentenced without benefit of a new procedural interpretation, and to facilitate
access to appellate courts for litigants wishing to challenge trial
court pronouncements. In the 1989 case of Teague v. Lane,9 66 the
Court put forward a standard which a litigant had to meet for a
new ruling to be applied retroactively; Marshall, dissenting in
Sawyer, expressed his position on this issue.
An underlying principle of the Court's Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence has been that execution, "qualitatively different
...

from all other punishments,"9 6 7 compelled establishment of

extensive due process protections, and opportunities for defendants to challenge perceived abridgment of explicit statutory provisions and trial proceedings which, in totality, enhanced "the
risk that the death penalty would be imposed in an arbitrary or
capricious manner."9 6' 8 Though he acknowledged that "recognition of a right under state law does not translate automatically
into the existence of federal constitutional protection,"9 6 9 Marshall added that state law has not "evolved independently of our
Eighth Amendment decisions."9 7 The commitment of states to
"'a fair trial in the sentencing phase"' 9 7 ' established a right "cognizable under the Federal Constitution"972 and subjected state
9 73
practices to adjudication "informed by federal principles."
After indicating that retroactive application of rules "designed to
promote the accuracy of criminal proceedings 9 74 has been "routinely afforded defendants,"9 75 Marshall emphasized that this
policy is no less compelling with the commitment to "heightened
966.

489 U.S. 288, reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1031

(1989).

See supra text

accompanying notes 680-83.
967. Sauyer, 497 U.S. at 252.
968.

Id. (emphasis in original).

969.
970.

Id. at 250.
Id. at 251.

971.

Id. (quoting State v. Berry, 391 So.2d 406, 418 (La. 1980) (emphasis

in original)).
972. 497 U.S. at 250.
973. Id. at 251.
974. Id. at 258.
975. Id. (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); and
citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965)).
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reliability in capital sentencing."9 76 Denial of retroactive application of federal law to state proceedings constituted "an especially
condescending federalism."9 7 7 A state, he concluded, "undoubtedly possesse [d] a legitimate interest in the finality of its convictions;" however, when "the State itself undermine [d] the accuracy
of a capital proceeding, that general interest must give way to the
demands ofjustice."9 78 Thus, Marshall believed that the position
put forward by the Court in Teague concerning the retroactive
application of new rules979 is not to be followed in capital
proceedings.
Marshall's position in Sauyer underscored his concern to
make appellate review readily available to capital defendants. He
further elaborated on this concept in Whitmore with regard to
establishing standing for federal appellate review, 9 8° and in
McCleskey concerning petition for habeas corpus.9 8 1
Disagreeing with the majority's ruling in Whitmore that an
inmate lacked standing to appeal the death sentence of a defendant who, consistent with state law, waived the option to challenge
the trial judge's pronouncement, Marshall, in dissent, declared
that it was unconscionable to execute an individual without
mandatory appellate review. Marshall did not attempt to directly
refute the majority's position that the inmate failed to meet the
requirements of Article III for securing a grant of jurisdiction
from the federal courts;9 8 2 rather, he declared that establishment
of next-friend standing is not fixed in the Constitution but based
on evolving principles of common law.98 The Court, Marshall
maintained, "certainly has the authority to expand or contract
a common law doctrine where necessary to serve an important
judicial or societal interest,"9 84 and the majority's failure to
acknowledge this indicated that its "desire to eliminate delays
in executions s5 exceed[ed] its solicitude for the Eighth
9
Amendment."
Marshall reiterated his concern that the risk of an erroneous
capital conviction justified mandatory review of trial proceedings.
976. 497 U.S. at 246-47.
977. Id. at 251.
978. Id. at 259.
979. See supra text accompanying notes 680-83.
980. See supra text accompanying notes 676-79.
981. See supra text accompanying note 675.
982. For a discussion of the Court's position, see supra text accompanying
notes 676-79.
983. 495 U.S. at 177.
984. Id. at 177-78.
985. Id. at 176.
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Noting the relatively high rate of reversal of sentences of death in
several state supreme courts, 986 Marshall emphasized that appellate examination "is an indispensable safeguard."9" 7 He did not
believe that an individual's decision to waive appellate review
outweighed a state's interest in dealing with defendants in a civilized manner. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel
and unusual punishments," Marshall maintained, envisioned
moral conduct which required adherence "to our basic societal
values and to the integrity of our system of justice." 8 8 Just as
Marshall believed this command of the Eighth Amendment compelled mandatory appellate review, he no less fervently maintained, in the 1991 case of McCleskey v. Zant,9s9 that restrictions
on one's ability to challenge a sentence in capital proceedings by
petition for a writ of habeas corpus were impermissible.
Examining the proper exercise of a habeas corpus petition
in capital proceedings, 99 ° the Court in McCleskey held that one
who failed to raise a legal claim in an initial petition must
demonstrate, in a second or subsequent application seeking to
refute the government's assertion that the writ has been abused,
that "a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to entertain the claim. "99 Marshall, in dissent, believed that
this standard presented a formidable obstacle to a defendant
seeking to challenge a sentence. After examining applicable
precedents,9 9 Marshall declared that abuse of the writ occurred
when a defendant intentionally sought to "achieve some end
993
other than expeditious relief from unlawful confinement."
However, a litigant who, in an initial petition, made "a good-faith
assessment of the claims available to him," or who has come
986. Marshall pointed out that "[s]ince 1983, the Arkansas Supreme
Court, on direct review, has reversed in 8 out of 19 cases in which the death
penalty had been imposed;" the "Florida Supreme Court set aside 47% of death
sentences between 1972 and 1984;" the "Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
reversed conviction or invalidated death sentence in 33% of cases between
October 1975 and March 1979;" and that the "Georgia Supreme Court did
same in 30% of capital cases between April 1974 and March 1979." Whitmore,
495 U.S. at 149.
987. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 170.
988. Id. at 172.
989. 111 S. Ct. 1454, reh'gdenied, 111 S. Ct. 2841 (1991).
990. See supra text accompanying note 675.
991. McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1470.
992. Id. at 1477-79 (Marshall citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986); Smith v.Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Price v.Johnston, 334 U.S.
266 (1948); and Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924)).
993. Id. at 1478.
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across "'new or additional information' 994 in support of a claim
not previously raised,"99' 5 should not be required to "demonstrate

any particular degree of prejudice" 9 96 before a second or subse-

quent petition is filed. If a defendant, Marshall maintained,
"demonstrate [d] that his claim has merit, it is the State that must
show that the resulting constitutional error was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt."99 7 Marshall believed that an accused whose
sentence may have been based on arbitrary factors should not be
compelled to show that a lesser penalty would likely have been
imposed had the alleged error not have been committed by the
trial judge; this position, he concluded, placed a formidable
obstacle on the accused, and may give a state reason to believe
that there will be fewer occasions in which it has to justify its
mode of proceeding leading to pronouncement of sentence.
In Whitmore and McCleskey, Marshall believed that the majority was more concerned with efficient administration of capital
statutes than examining possibly protracted allegations of arbi998
trary trial proceedings. In the case of Payne v. Tennessee,
decided on the last day of the October, 1990 Term, Marshall
expressed his strongest objection to the Court's perceived insensitiveness to a litigant's assertion of abridgment of due process
protections.
The Paynecase considered whether the introduction of statements from family members of the murdered individual concerning their emotional suffering unconstitutionally diverted the
jury's attention from the circumstances of the accused and made
possible a sentence based on factors unrelated to the defendant's
culpability. Though the Court had previously disallowed such
testimony due to its perceived likelihood of producing a verdict
based on the jurors' emotions, 9 99 the majority in Payne believed
that introduction of victim impact statements would enable
jurors to more broadly.weigh a range of factors connected to an
offense and acquire a better insight into the character and circumstances of the accused. ' °0° Prior rulings never held that "the
defendant, entitled as he was to individualized consideration, was
994. Marshall quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 290 (1948).
995. Id. at 1479.
996. Id. at 1479.
997. Id. at 1479.
998. 111 S. Ct. 2597, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 28 (1991).
999. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056
(1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991); South Carolina
v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989), overruled by Payne v.
Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
1000. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607.
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to receive that consideration wholly apart from the crime which
he had committed," 10 1 and the Court, after indicating that states
retained considerable discretion to formulate proceedings in
trial deliberations,1 00 2 overruled precedent 0 0 3 and concluded
that the Eighth Amendment established "no per se bar"10 0 4 to
the admission of victim impact evidence.
The dissenting opinion written by Marshall contained his
most vitriolic statements on the majority's evolving Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. "Power, not reason," he declared at
the outset, "is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking. '105 The majority's contention that "stare decisis is not an
inexorable command," 10 0 6 and that the need to correct decisions
which "are unworkable or are badly reasoned" 0 0 7 is compelling
when precedents
are not old, was categorized by Marshall as a
"staggering"10 0 8 position which "sends a clear signal that scores of
established constitutional liberties are now ripe for reconsideration. " ' °° 9 Adherence to precedent, Marshall pointed out, furnished stability and continuity in the law, and its abandonment
should not be undertaken without "'special justification."'1 0 1 0 In
the past several years, however, there have been no changes in
legal or social developments to warrant a new constitutional
interpretation. Marshall believed that the majority's pronouncement made a mockery of the Court's fundamental position to
channel the discretion of sentencing authorities and confine
examination of evidence to the individualized circumstances of
the accused and offense. Sentencing decisions based on bias are
now being sanctioned, and Marshall concluded with a pessimistic
projection of future trends: "Cast aside today are those condemned to face society's ultimate penalty. 10
Tomorrow's
victims
11
may be minorities, women, or the indigent."
On June 28, 1991, the day after the Payne decision was
issued, Marshall, citing advancing age and declining health,
announced his retirement.
1001.
1002.

Id.
Id. at 2608.

1003.

See supra note 997.

1004.

Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.

1005.

Id. at 2619.

1006.
1007.
1008.
1009.

Id. at 2609.
Id.
Id. at 2619.
Id.

1010.
1011.

Id. at 2621 (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
Id. at 2625.
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A COMPARISON OF BRENNAN'S AND MARSHALL'S POSITIONS
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

The jurisprudence of Brennan and Marshall on the applicability of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unu-

sual punishments" to the death penalty is virtually identical.
Categorical opposition to capital punishment was first expressed
by both Justices in the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia,10 12 essentially for similar reasons: the death penalty, a barbaric form of
punishment which inflicts a great deal of pain, is offensive to
human dignity; it is arbitrarily imposed and racially biased
regarding the class of offenders sentenced to death; it is offensive
to contemporary society; and it does not deter commission of
homicide or serve any demonstrable purpose of punishment. 13
Fundamentally, Brennan and Marshall fervently believed that the
wording of the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty,
and both shared perceptions of judicial power which justified
abolition notwithstanding widespread adoption of capital punishment at the state and federal levels.
Brennan and Marshall frequently expressed their views on
the death penalty. In forty-two cases decided by the Burger
Court (1969-1986), excluding petitions for certiorari and stays of
execution decided without an opinion, 10 1 4 Brennan wrote ten
full opinionsl ° and a brief concurring statementl ° in sixteen
1012. 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972). See also supra text
accompanying notes 404-85, 713-82.
1013. For the position of Brennan, see supra text accompanying notes
421-24; for Marshall's pronouncements, see supra text accompanying notes 73134.
1014. See supra note 322; see also, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, reh'g
denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972);Jackson v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409
U.S. 902 (1972); Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902
(1972); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh'g denied, 406 U.S. 978
(1972); Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
For an overview of the Burger Court's position on capital punishment, see supra
text accompanying notes 265-336.
1015. Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) (Brennan,J., dissenting);
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (Brennan, J., for the majority); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (Brennan, J., for the
majority); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S.
902 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971), reh'g denied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1016. See supra note 505.
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others;10 1 7 Marshall wrote sixteen full opinions01° 8 and added a
brief statement reiterating his categorical opposition to the death
penalty where the Court invalidated a sentence of death on ten
occasions. 10 19 The Rehnquist Court (1986- ), up to Brennan's
retirement in 1990, decided thirty-two opinions on capital pun-

1017. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Campbell v. Washington, 103 Wash. 2d 1, 691 P.2d 929, cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring); Baldwin v. Alabama,
472 U.S. 372 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Smith v. Kemp, 717 F.2d 1401
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1032 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (Brennan,J., concurring); Estelle v. Smith, 451
U.S. 454 (1981) (Brennan,J., concurring); Adams v. Tixas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (Brennan,J., concurring);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
1018. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (Marshall, J., for the
majority); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (Marshall, J., for the
majority); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (Marshall,J., for the majority);
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1237 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983)
(Marshall,J., dissenting); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (Marshall,J.,
dissenting); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949 (1981) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring); Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
1019. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (Marshall,J.,
concurring); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (Marshall, J., concurring); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
637 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, reh'g
denied, 434 U.S. 882 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring);Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262, reh'g denied sub nom. Gregg v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 875 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 890
(1976) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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ishment; 10 20 Brennan wrote ten full opinions'0 2 1 and a brief
statement in five others.10 22 During this period, Marshall wrote
six full opinions 10 23 and two brief concurring statements. 10 24 In
1991, Marshall wrote an opinion in three 1 25 of seven 1 26 capital
punishment cases decided by the Rehnquist Court. Brennan
wrote just three 10 2 7 majority opinions, and Marshall spoke for the
1020. See supra notes 337-39. For an overview of the Rehnquist Court's
position on capital punishment, see supra text accompanying notes 337-64.
1021. Demosthenes v. Baal, 110 S. Ct. 2223 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047, reh'gdenied, 111 S. Ct. 14 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting; also applied to Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092, reh'g
denied, 111 S. Ct. 14 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S.
805, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989) (Brennan, J., for the majority); McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) (Brennan,J., dissenting);
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 921 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
1022. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638,
reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 927 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367 (1988) (Brennan,J., concurring); Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S.
578 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356
(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
1023. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (Marshall,J., for the
majority); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 17 (1990)
(Marshall,J., dissenting); Shell v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990) (Marshall,J.,
concurring); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 944
(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
1024. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 1961
(1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, reh'g denied,
492 U.S. 927 (1989) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
1025. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 13
(1991) (Marshall,J., dissenting); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, reh'g denied,
111 S. Ct. 2841 (1991) (Marshall,J., dissenting); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct.
2597, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 28 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1026. Parker v. Dugger, Ill S. Ct. 731, reh'g denied, III S. Ct. 1340 (1991);
McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 2841 (1991); Lankford
v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991); Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884 (1991); Mu'Min
v. Virginia, Ill S. Ct. 1899, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 13 (1991); Schad v. Arizona,
111 S. Ct. 2491, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 28 (1991); Payne v. Tennessee, I llS. Ct.
2597, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 28 (1991).
1027. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989); Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
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Court on four occasions.10 28 Except for one case - Strickland v.
Washington (1984)1029 - Brennan and Marshall always voted
identically, and, in addition to this instance, they each wrote
separate lengthy opinions in the same case on just one other
occasion.10 30 Thus, from 1972 to 1990 (the year of Brennan's
retirement), Brennan
and Marshall took different perspectives in
0 31

just two cases.

The central component of Brennan and Marshall's position
on the death penalty was based on the Court's contention in Trop
v. Dulles (1958)1032 that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."1033

Both believed that percep-

tions of unacceptable cruelty have evolved to a point where the
death penalty is considered offensive to human dignity. This
enlightened sense of justice, Brennan and Marshall maintained,
also made evident that the death penalty is not a demonstrable
deterrent to the commission of homicide and cannot be tolerated purely to inflict retribution on an alleged offender. Both
Justices strongly believed that it was impossible to prevent arbitrariness and bias, in some degree, from entering into capital
proceedings, and, given prejudice, ignorance, or lack of clarity
concerning trial officials' scope of responsibility, wrongful conviction and sentence are unavoidable. Brennan and Marshall
also maintained that it was appropriate to construe the Eighth
Amendment in light of perceived changing attitudes and notions
ofjustice; previous acceptance and infliction of the death penalty
did not unwaveringly bind the Court to preserve its constitutionality intact.
In his Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture at Harvard University on September 5, 1986,1034 Brennan, after summarizing
the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 10 3 5 explained
that, while the precise understanding of the Framers cannot be
ascertained, the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" indi1028. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
1029. 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Marshall, J., dissennting).

1030. Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (Marshall,
J., concurring). See supra text accompanying notes 404-85, 713-82.
1031. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1990); Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
1032. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
1033. Id. at 101.
1034. William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death
Penalty: A View From the Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313 (1986).
1035. Id. at 313-23.
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cated an intention for a principle to endure. The Framers, Brennan pointed out, spoke unambiguously in certain provisions of
the Constitution,'. 3 6 and could have explicitly sanctioned the
death penalty if this was desired. Instead, they adopted imprecise wording to convey to posterity an "understanding that this
language ["cruel and unusual punishments"] was not specific and
could be interpreted in any number of ways. . . ." The "best way
to effectuate the intent of the Framers," Brennan declared, "is to
allow the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to breathe, . . .1037 by deriving and then applying the principles and values that underlie the clause.' 0 3 Since the Bill of
Rights is intended to restrain legislative power, Brennan believed
that ultimate responsibility for interpreting its provisions in light
of contemporary values lies with the judiciary. This theme is similarly highlighted in Marshall's jurisprudence.
While the general tone of Brennan and Marshall's constitutional philosophy on capital punishment is evident with regard to
their similarities, several subtle differences in perspective also
emerge. Interestingly, Brennan expressed deeper sensitiveness
sentencing.
to the alleged racially biased components of capital
10 39
Godfrey,10 40
To be sure, Marshall addressed this in Furman,
and Payne,1 ° ' however, in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987),1 °42 which,
more than any other case, furnished an opportunity to elaborate
on sentencing disparities between blacks and whites, 1 43 he did
not write a separate opinion. 10 44 Brennan's opinions tended to
accentuate the risk of arbitrary execution as a justification for
abolition of the death penalty even where no discernible abridgment of due process protections had occurred in a particular
case; 10 45 Marshall, on the other hand, advocated abolition based
on the perceived inability of trial officials and appellate proceed1036. Id. at 325. Brennan mentioned provisions concerning the
minimum age to run for president, as well as the length of term for members of
Congress. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; art. I, §§ 2, 3, cl. 1.
1037. Brennan, supra note 1034, at 325-26.
1038. Id. at 328.
1039. 408 U.S. 238. See supra text accompanying notes 778, 780.
1040. 446 U.S. 420. See supra text accompanying notes 823-25.
1041. 111 S.Ct. 2597. See supra text accompanying note 1009.
1042. 481 U.S. 279, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987).
1043. See supra text accompanying notes 507-17.
1044. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 320 (Marshall, J., joining the dissenting
opinion of Brennan, J.).
1045. See, e.g., Blystone, 494 U.S. at 299; Saffle, 494 U.S. at 484; McCleskey,
481 U.S. at 279; Brown, 479 U.S. at 538; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 805; Turner,476 U.S.
at 28; Tison, 481 U.S. at 137; Francis,471 U.S. at 307; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668;
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 510. See supra text accompanying notes 506-650.
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ings to accord full procedural safeguards to a litigant. 10 46 Brennan tended to stress that the death penalty was antithetical to
enlightened conceptions of human dignity, 10 47 while Marshall
focused on the inability of capital punishment to fulfill the legislative goal of deterrence. °48 While both frequently objected that
Court rulings are inconsistent with precedents,1 0 49 Brennan
often cited the pronouncement in Trop that punishment is to be
assessed in light of evolving conceptions of dignity,10 50 while Marshall emphasized the enormity and unique character of capital as
opposed to noncapital offenses.' 0 5' Finally, Marshall's pronouncements in Payne revealed invective which did not appear in
Brennan's opinions; however, this might be attributed to Marshall's frustration that his strongest judicial supporter was no
longer on the bench.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Few contemporary issues have brought forth a wider range
of emotional feelings than the death penalty. Its statutorily widespread acceptance - only 13 states have refused to authorize
capital punishment '0 52 - makes the position of Brennan and
Marshall, the only members who, up to the end of the October,
1992 Term, expressed unconditional opposition to the death
1046. See, e.g., Caldwei 472 U.S. at 320; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668; Zant,
462 U.S. at 862; Barclay, 463 U.S. at 939; Ramos, 463 U.S. at 992; Godfrey, 446 U.S.
at 420. See supra text accompanying notes 818-69. For an elaboration of this
position, see Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial
Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1986).
1047. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153; Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. See supra
text accompanying notes 478-82, 491-97.
1048. For Marshall's most extensive comments on this subject, see Gregg,
428 U.S. at 153; Furman, 408 U.S. at 238. See supra text accompanying notes 78993, 765-69; see also, Ramos, 463 U.S. at 992; supra text accompanying note 846.
1049. For Brennan's contention that the Court has not adhered to
precedent, see generally, Saffle, 494 U.S. at 484; Tison, 481 U.S. at 137; Brown,
479 U.S. at 538; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279; and Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 412. For
Marshall's objection that precedent has not been followed, see generally,
McKoy, 110 S. Ct. at 1227; Sauyer, 110 S. Ct. at 2822; Zant, 462 U.S. at 862;
Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 320; and Ake, 470 U.S. at 68. See, however, Mu'Min, 111 S.
Ct. at 1899, and supra text accompanying notes 949-57.
1050. See, e.g., Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361; Peny, 492 U.S. at 302; Glass, 471
U.S. at 1080; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153; Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
1051. See, e.g., Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 227; Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 149; Strickland,
466 U.S. at 668; Ake, 470 U.S. at 68; Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 880; Barclay, 463 U.S. at
939; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153; Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
1052. The death penalty is prohibited in: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1988 167 (1989).
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penalty,1 0 53 dramatic. Though their views have never been
adopted by a majority of the justices, Brennan and Marshall
exerted an influence in shaping the direction of adjudication.
On the Rehnquist Court, Brennan and Marshall provided a
fourth and fifth vote to reverse seven capital convictions, 1054 and
both were in the minority in all twelve rulings which upheld a
sentence of death by a five-to-four vote. 10 55 In 1991, following
Brennan's retirement, Marshall contributed a fifth vote to
10 56
reverse two capital sentences.
Perhaps Brennan and Marshall's position can best be challenged by pointing out that the penalty of death is recognized in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments," 5 7 and that, while its
manner of infliction may be regulated, adoption of capital punishment is not prohibited by the states. Brennan himself
addressed this position, and denied that the death penalty is constitutionally sanctioned. He dismissed as "untenable" the contention "that the Constitution shows that the Framers intended that
1053. In Furman, 408 U.S. at 238,Justice Harry Blackmun conveyed the
"depth of' his "distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death
penalty," and declared that, were he a legislator, he would vote against it. As a
Justice, however, Blackmun felt obligated to support capital punishment. 408
U.S. at 405-06, 410-11 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). On February 22, 1994,Justice
Blackmun announced that he would not longer support any death penalty
convictions. Collins v. Collins, cert. denied, No. 93-7054. See Blackmun: 'I...
Concede That the Death Penalty Experiment Has Failed.', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1994, at
AIO. Justice Arthur Goldberg, who sat on the Court from 1962-1965, expressed
opposition to capital punishment after stepping down. See ArthurJ. Goldberg,
The Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 355 (1973). Brennan
intimated that he, along with Justices Goldberg and Douglas, was prepared to
strike down the death penalty in the 1963 case of Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S.
at 889 (Goldberg, J., joined by Douglas, J., and Brennan, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Brennan, supra note 1034, at 315-16. For a discussion of
Rudolph, see supra text accompanying notes 243-46.
1054. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Gathers, 490 U.S. at 805;
Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Brown,
479 U.S. at 538; Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056
(1987), and overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
1055. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990), reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 14
(1990); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050
(1990); Sawyer, 495 U.S. at 731; Demosthenes, 110 S. Ct. at 2223; Clemons, 494 U.S.
at 738; Saffle, 110 S. Ct. at 1257; Boyde, 494 U.S. at 370; Blystone, 494 U.S. at 299;
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 361; Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 231; Burger v. Kemp, 482 U.S.
776, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987); Tison, 481 U.S. at 137.
1056. Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723 (1991); Parker v. Dugger, 111 S.
Ct. 731, reh'g denied, 111 S. Ct. 1340 (1991).
1057. See supra text accompanying notes 132, 133.
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there be capital punishment;" 0 58 rather, Brennan believed that
the authors "sought to ensure that if there was capital punishment, the process by which the accused was to be convicted
would be especially reliable." 10 59 Regarding the wording of the
Eighth Amendment, Brennan maintained that it does not categorize the death penalty "for all time as presumptively not cruel and
unusual."10 60 In response, one may argue that the Constitution
does not preclude states from adopting capital punishment and
that the Court must abide by this decision while retaining power
to prescribe its mode of infliction. Brennan and Marshall, however, maintained that the Court did have power to invalidate capital statutes even though they presumably had been enacted with
majority support.
It is, arguably, difficult for a justice to separate perceptions
of constitutionality from personal views of morality. The degree
of deference to state policymaking choices or supervision of statutory provisions a justice chooses to follow is based, in part, on
perceptions of dignity and humanity with which the citizenry is
likely to be treated. This, in turn, may compel a justice to assess
constitutionality in view of its perceived moral character. This
was the perspective taken by Brennan and Marshall on capital
punishment: it presented a constitutional question which could
not be addressed without also examining its moral implications.
Clearly, the position of Brennan and Marshall that a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment is contemplated by the Eighth
Amendment has not, any more than arguments put forward by
retentionists, been shown to be a realistic deterrent to the commission of homicide, and their insistence, despite adoption of
capital punishment by well over 50% of the states (and the District of Columbia), on categorically invalidating the death penalty, does not reflect support of majority rule or a policy
preference representative of the people. Their opposition to the
death penalty was based both on interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment and their personal position on the taking by government of human life. In other words, they did not say that they
personally did not object to capital punishment but, as Justices
sworn by oath to interpret the Constitution, must oppose it; their
opposition to the death penalty was substantially influenced by
their perception of morality.
Fundamentally, Brennan and Marshall expressed a viewpoint on their understanding of the role of the Court in Ameri1058.

Brennan, supra note 1032, at 324 (emphasis in original).

1059.
1060.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis in original).
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can society. The Constitution, they believed, embodied moral
principles which need to be reexamined by each generation, and
the Court, in view of its pivotal responsibility to protect citizens
from excessive and arbitrary governmental power, is obligated to
reconcile the ongoing vision of the document with the perceived
aspirations of the people. Thus, morality is an integral component of constitutional adjudication, and its expression by Brennan and Marshall has enriched our understanding of capital
punishment.

